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Abstract 
In the last twenty years the U.S. government has increasingly utilized detention to control 
illegal immigration. This practice has become controversial because it has caused 
numerous in-custody abuses and deaths of immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees and 
even citizens. Immigrant rights advocates have called for the passage of binding 
detention standards to prevent in-custody abuses. This thesis’s policy analysis reveals, 
however, that while they may finesse the practice of immigration detention, such binding 
standards would be ineffective in protecting immigrants’ rights. Instead this policy 
analysis calls for and explains the feasibility of discontinuing the practice of mass 
immigrant detention. 
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“We are a nation of laws, and we must enforce our laws. 
We’re also a nation of immigrants, and we must uphold 
that tradition…” 
 
George Bush – 05/15/2006 
  
 
“We are a nation of laws and a nation of immigrants, and 
we must reconcile those traditions.” 
 
Barack Obama – 4/14/2008 
 
 
“America is a nation of immigrants – and it is the 
Department of Homeland Security’s role to manage 
America’s borders in a way that furthers this heritage, 
promoting legal immigration and cross-border commerce, 
while upholding the rule of law”  
 
Janet Napolitano (Secretary of DHS) – 01/30/2009 
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1. The Crisis of Mass Alien Detention 
Human rights abuses plague the immigration detention system in the United 
States. In the last twenty years, two interrelated trends have made such abuses possible 
and have brought immigration detention under the limelight. First, the inflow of 
undocumented aliens to the United States has grown significantly.1 Second, immigration 
policies have become more restrictive. Since the 1990s, the government has increasingly 
relied on the practice of detention to control illegal immigration.2 As a result of the 
interplay between these phenomena, the number of illegal aliens in custody skyrocketed. 
The average daily detention population increased from over 8,000 in 1997 to over 31,000 
in 2009.3 Similarly, the total annual number of individuals detained multiplied from 
155,000 in 1997 to 380,000 in 2009.4 In the last decades, immigration laws have 
                                                 
1
 The number of undocumented aliens is an estimation, which varies according to the source. The 
Department of Homeland Security estimates that in 1996 there were between 4.6 and 5.4 million illegal 
aliens. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Illegal Alien Resident Population,” 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/illegal.pdf (accessed February 11, 2010), 1). Hoeffer, Rytina 
and Cambpbell estimate that ten years later, in 2006 there were 11.6 million. (Michael Hoffer, Nancy 
Rytina and Christopher Campbell – U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Estimates of the 
Unauthorized Immigrant Population in Residing in the United States: January 2006,” 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ill_pe_2006.pdf (accessed February 11, 2010), 1). 
In January 2009, Hoeffer, Rytina and Baker estimated that the unauthorized immigrant population had 
decreased to 10.8 million. (Michael Hoeffer, Nancy Rytina and Brian C. Baker, “Estimates of the 
Unauthorized Immigrant Population in Residing in the United States: January 2009,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2009.pdf 
(accessed February 11, 2010), 1). 
2
 According to United States laws, “alien” is the correct term to denote persons who are not citizens or 
nationals of the United States (8 USC 1101 (a) (3)). Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, “immigrant” 
and “alien” will be used interchangeably in this thesis. Aliens are placed in detention when the United 
States government believes that they are deportable or inadmissible to the United States (8 USC 1226 (c) 
(1)). 
3
 Exact figures for the number of immigrants in detention vary according to the source. According to Chris 
Hedges from the New York Times indicates that in 1997 the average daily detained population was 8,200. 
(Chris Hedges, “Policy to Protect Jailed Immigrants is adopted by the U.S.,” New York Times, January 2, 
2001). According to Associated Press journalist Michelle Roberts’s investigation, on the night of January 
25, 2009 there were 32,000 immigration detainees. (Michelle Roberts, “Immigrants Face Detention, Few 
Rights,” The Associated Press, March 15, 2009). On September 1, 2009 there were 31,075 aliens in 
detention according to a report released by Dora Schriro. (Dora Schriro, Immigration Detention Overview 
and Recommendations, October 6, 2009, www.ice.gov/doclib/091005_ice_detention_report-final.pdf 
(accessed March 24, 2010), 2). 
4
 Schriro, Immigration Detention Overview, 6. 
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progressively demanded the detention of illegal aliens irrespective of whether they have a 
criminal record or pose a serious threat to the United States. Consider that whereas sixty-
six percent of the aliens who were in the government’s custody on September 1, 2009, 
were under mandatory detention, only fifty-one percent had a criminal record, and only 
eleven percent had committed serious crimes, namely, Part 1 crimes under the Uniform 
Crime Report system.5 This essay refers to the increasing incarceration of criminal and 
non-criminal aliens as mass immigration detention. 
Although detention has become a central immigration control tool, the 
immigration detention system is barely regulated. The absence of guidelines to govern 
detention conditions led to in-custody abuses and mistreatment. The fact-finding and 
advocacy work of human and immigrant rights organization put pressure on the federal 
government to find a solution to the crisis of abuses in immigration detention. In 1998, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) published a set of detention guidelines. 
However, abuses of alien detainees’ rights continued because the guidelines were not 
legally enforceable and applied only to a subset of detention facilities. The government 
expanded the guidelines in 2001 and in 2008; yet, the standards remained mere 
suggestions. Consequently, alien detainees have remained disempowered, in-custody 
abuses have continued to be an everyday reality, and the list of in-custody deaths has 
become more extensive. As a response to the crisis, immigrant rights advocates suggested 
the codification of detention guidelines into legally binding detention standards. 
                                                 
5
 The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) system was created in 1929 and is used to classify and account for 
crimes in the United States. The UCR divides crimes into Part I and Part II. Crimes under Part I are the 
most serious crimes such as: Criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Crimes under Part II include, inter alia, fraud, vandalism, sex 
offenses, drug abuse, drunkenness, vagrancy, and disorderly conduct. Schriro, Immigration Detention 
Overview, 6. 
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Notwithstanding advocates’ perseverance, legally enforceable standards have not come 
into being. In this context, the question arises: Are binding detention standards the most 
effective strategy to prevent abuses of illegal aliens in pre-deportation detention? 
This thesis analyzes and evaluates the strategy of developing legally enforceable 
immigration detention standards in terms of the extent to which it helps to prevent 
violations of alien detainees’ rights. The aim of this policy analysis is to minimize human 
rights violations in immigration detention. This thesis argues that the policy of 
establishing legally binding immigration detention standards is an impractical solution to 
the problem of violations of aliens’ rights and suggests that what is needed is a thorough 
reconsideration of the practice of mass immigration detention itself and the expansion of 
alternative to detention (ATD) programs. In other words, the advancement of aliens’ 
human rights necessitates that policy makers think outside the cell. 
This policy analysis argues that immigration detention standards are impractical 
and ineffective in protecting the rights of illegal aliens for two reasons. The first reason is 
that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the agency that manages immigration 
detention, is highly decentralized. As a consequence, coordination among its different 
organizational levels is poor and detention practices vary across the country. The second 
reason is that ICE outsources two of its most important functions, immigration detention 
and immigration law enforcement, to third parties. In the case of immigration detention, 
the majority of detained aliens are housed in facilities that are neither owned nor operated 
by ICE. In terms of immigration law enforcement, the agency allows local police 
departments to fully enforce immigration laws – a prerogative of the federal government 
– through inter alia the 287(g) program. Because local police departments lack 
 4 
perspective and have different priorities, the 287(g) program has led to anti-immigration 
raids and cases of racial profiling. ICE’s decentralized structure and its outsourcing of 
detention and enforcement functions make immigration detention a heterogeneous 
practice and prevents the systematic enforcement of binding detention standards across 
the country.   
This thesis favors the reconsideration of mass immigration detention vis-à-vis the 
codification of detention guidelines. Abolishing the practice of mass immigration 
detention will address the roots of the problem, namely the framing of undocumented 
aliens as criminals and security threats, will prevent the incarceration of asylum seekers, 
refugees and United States citizens, will subdue the lasting psychological impacts of 
detention, and will reduce the cost to taxpayers. As an all-encompassing analysis of the 
immigration detention system, this thesis intends to target issues in the long run rather 
than to find palliatives to today’s troubles. The aim of this project is to foster an 
immigration detention policy-making concerned with and informed by human rights 
imperatives. As such, the analysis is targeted towards policy-makers. While this thesis’s 
recommendations part ways with the suggestions that advocates for immigrant rights put 
forward, this does not imply a dismissal of advocates’ work, which is essential in many 
fundamental respects. Without immigrant rights advocates’ investigations little 
information about the immigration detention system would be available. Without 
advocates support, many of aliens in detention would not be aware of their rights and 
would be inevitably powerless in the face of a detention system that frames aliens as 
criminals and security threats. However, advocates’ efforts will hardly keep up with the 
 5 
pace at which the problem is growing. For this reason, a more systemic approach to alien 
detention is warranted.  
Before considering the crisis of immigration detention, some clarification points 
are in order. First, the sort of detention to which this project refers is pre-removal (pre-
deportation) detention. Second, illegal immigration is not a crime but a civil offense. 
Therefore, immigration detention is administrative because it only serves to ensure the 
alien’s presence throughout the removal proceeding. This means that immigration 
detention should not be punitive in nature. The non-punitive nature of immigration 
detention is supported by case law. In Bell v Wolfish the United States Supreme Court 
stated, “a detainee may not be punished prior to the adjudication of guilt in accordance 
with due process of law.”6 In Zadvydas v Davis the Supreme Court indicated that civil 
proceedings such as immigration detention are to be “nonpunitive in purpose and 
effect.”7 Third, this thesis refers to foreigners as “aliens,” which is the legal term.8 
According to the United States Code, the “alien” refers to an individual who is neither a 
citizen, nor a national of the United States.9 Yet, it is important to underscore that such 
term carries a negative connotation and has been used to other non-citizens. Within the 
category of aliens, this thesis considers the case of illegal or undocumented aliens. 
Notably, there is no definition of illegal alien in federal laws. According to the 
Government Accountability Office, an illegal alien is “a person who enters the United 
States without legal permission or who fails to leave when his or her permission to 
                                                 
6
 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Kelsey Papst, “Protecting the Voiceless: Ensuring ICE’s 
Compliance with Standards that Protect Immigration Detainees,” McGeorge Law Review 40 (2009), 266 
7
 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). 
8
 Although some authors use the term “immigrant,” it refers to individuals whose legal status reflects the 
reality that they have come to the United States to stay and have the right to do so. 
9
 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(3). 
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remain in the country expires.”10 Fourth, for the purpose of this project, the term 
“immigrant rights” comprises both human rights under international laws and aliens’ 
rights under the United States domestic laws. While the next section focuses on the 
international human rights regime, consider that both the United States Constitution and 
case law protect certain aliens’ rights as well.11  
To understand how both criminal and non-criminal aliens alike end up in 
immigration detention consider the following example. If a Mexican citizen enters in the 
United States illegally and does not have a criminal record, he will be detained and given 
                                                 
10
 U.S Government Accountability Office, Undocumented Aliens: Questions Persist about Their Impact on 
Hospitals’ Uncompensated Care Costs, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04472.pdf (accessed January 14, 
2010), 1; Linda S. Bosniak, “Human Rights, State Sovereignty and the Protection of Undocumented 
Migrants Under the International Migrants’ Workers Convention,” In Irregular Migration and Human 
Rights: Theoretical, European and International Perspectives, ed. Barbara Bogusz, Ryszard Cholewinski, 
Adam Cygan and Erika Szyszczak, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), 317. 
11
 Aliens detained in removal proceedings are entitled to the due process of law enshrined in the Fifth, Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments as established in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (118 US 369 (1886)) and in Wong Wing 
v. United States (163 US 228 (1896)). The last case states “all persons within the territory of the United 
States are entitled to the protection guarantied by [the Fifth and Sixth] amendments, and that even aliens 
shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” (Wong Wing v. United 
States 163 US 228, 238 (1896)). According to Margaret Taylor, immigrants’ ability to challenge the 
conditions of confinement is limited by great deference that the Supreme Court has given the executive and 
legislative branches of government over immigration (Papst, “Protecting the Voiceless,” 265). This 
deference, which has existed since the late nineteenth century, is called the plenary power doctrine. 
However, Papst argues that Congress’ choices are subject to constitutional limitations. Indeed, in Zadvydas 
v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that although “Congress has ‘plenary power’ to create immigration law, 
and the Judicial Branch must defer to Executive and Legislative Branch decision-making in this area [,] that 
power is subject to important constitutional limitation” (Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 US 678, 695 (2001)). 
Although the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis circumscribed the plenary power of the executive and 
legislative branches over the length of detention of immigrants with deportation orders, it issued no 
limitations in terms of conditions of detention (Papst, “Protecting the Voiceless,” 266). In Youngberg v 
Romeo the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that civil detainees are entitled to “adequate food, shelter, 
clothing, and medical care” (Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 507, 315 (1982)). In fact, in Jones v. Blanas 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a civil detainee is “entitled to ‘more considerate treatment’ 
than his criminally detained counterparts” (Jones v. Blanas, 393 F3d 918, 932 (2004)). Moreover, the Court 
stated that when a civil or pretrial detainee is “confined in conditions identical to, similar to, or more 
restrictive than, those in which his criminal counterparts are held, we presume that the detainee is being 
subjected to ‘punishment’” (Jones v. Blanas, 393 F3d 918, 932 (2004)). What case law suggests with 
respect to the detention of illegal aliens in removal proceedings is that they are indeed entitled to 
protections under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In other words, by virtue of being civil 
detainees, they are entitled to nonpunitive and adequate conditions of detention. In terms of codifying 
immigration detention standards, the rights that, according to the judiciary, immigration detainees enjoy are 
already in existence. Thus, the argument goes that making detention standards legally binding would not 
require the creation or reinterpretation of a set of rights, but the provision to detainees of an adequate tool 
to claim their rights. 
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a right to bail. Yet, because bonds are usually set at between $5,000 and $10,000, few 
illegal aliens are able to afford posting bail. As a result, he must sit in detention until 
deportation occurs. If the alien comes from Mexico, removal takes place within a few 
days. However, if the alien is from any other country, he has to wait for weeks or months 
until he obtains a travel document and the United States government is able to arrange a 
flight to the alien’s country of removal. If the alien is from a country where they cannot 
be deported because the United States government has no deportation agreements or 
diplomatic relations (for instance Somalia or Laos), the alien will be in ICE custody for 
ninety days and then will be granted a Custody Review that may or may not result in his 
release. If the alien has a criminal record, depending on the type of crime, he may have a 
higher bond, may be detained without bond until Custody Review occurs, or may be 
detained indefinitely. If an alien with a criminal record, which may consist only of a 
misdemeanor, seeks to challenge removal by requesting asylum, cancellation of removal, 
or adjustment of status, he will stay in detention until his case is adjudicated, which may 
take months or years. Though these are only few of the ways in which aliens may end in 
detention, it is evident that aliens do not have to be criminals to end up in ICE custody. 
The next section considers the secondary literature relevant to immigration detention, to 
properly understand the context in which mass immigration detention emerges and 
operates.  
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1.1. Literature Review: Charting the Scope and Meaning of the Crisis of Immigration 
Detention 
This section considers scholarly perspectives in the literature to understand the 
roots of the United States government hostility towards illegal aliens and the ensuing 
crisis in immigration detention. The following paragraphs argue that the current crisis in 
the detention system occurs at the intersection of domestic reactions to globalization and 
of the limited impact of the international human rights regime. The reason why a 
multiplicity of voices informs this project is that, being mass immigration detention a 
recent practice, the body of literature devoted to this issue is limited. This thesis borrows 
from the work of experts in the fields of human rights, migration studies, refugee studies, 
political science, economics, and communication and rhetorical studies. The interrelated 
and diverse insights that inform the debate are an advantage and an opportunity for this 
project to contribute to the establishment a body of literature focused specifically on the 
subject of immigration detention. This section suggests that, while compelling, existent 
approaches offer little in terms of pragmatic solutions to the problems that beset 
immigration detention. Thus, presenting and supporting a long-term humane solution to 
the immigration detention crisis in the United States is the main contribution this thesis 
makes to the debate.  
 
1.1.1. Mass Detention as a Domestic Response to Globalization 
Globalization has increased the movement of people. As a result, there are more 
foreigners attempting to enter affluent countries. Developed states in general and the 
United States in particular, understand this phenomenon as a challenge to their sovereign 
 9 
right to regulate the admission and expulsion of foreigners and deliver a hostile response 
by cracking down on illegal immigration. To stem illegal immigration, the United States 
has devised policies that emphasize border control and individual accountability on the 
part of aliens. The tightening of border control has led to the framing of illegal aliens as 
criminals and drug traffickers, a process called criminalization. The demand for 
individual accountability has led to the framing of illegal aliens as potential terrorists and 
existential security threats to the nation, a process called securitization. In addition to 
othering illegal aliens, the processes of criminalization and securitization have demanded 
and justified restrictive and punitive immigration policies, resulting in the increasing use 
of detention as an immigration control tool. Consequently, illegal aliens have been 
othered and detained en masse. These two phenomena have led to violations of aliens’ 
human and constitutional rights in detention centers and, in turn, to the current crisis of 
immigration detention. This section of the literature review considers immigration 
policies in terms of border control and in terms of the demand for individual 
accountability. 
In order to understand the way in which the United States’ response to 
globalization has led to mass immigration detention, it is important to begin with the 
effects of globalization on international migration. Jan A. Scholte defines globalization as 
the “spread of transplanetary … connections between people” resulting from a 
reconfiguration of social space, which among many other things, has interlinked 
countries’ economic systems and has facilitated international travel.12 These links have 
increased the international flow of money and people. According to the analysis of David 
                                                 
12
 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization, a Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 
69. 
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Held et al, the present migration trends under globalization are likely to outdo previous 
migration patterns in both intensity and extensity.13 By expanding the frontiers for the 
transboundary movement of people, goods, and services, globalization has also resulted 
in more individuals knocking on affluent states’ doors. The number of undocumented 
aliens in the United States has steadily increased sine 1980.14 Between 1990 and 2009, 
the number of illegal aliens in the United States tripled from 3.5 to 10.8 million.15 The 
unprecedented number of aliens without legal immigration status has called into question 
the state’s ability to regulate the ingress and permanence of foreigners. As Seyla 
Benhabib argues, globalization has reconfigured the Westphalian model of the state, 
according to which the state had full capacity to exercise its authority over the land and 
the people.16  
According to Saskia Sassen and Catherine Dauvergne, affluent states see the 
rising inflow of aliens as a threat to their right to regulate the admission of expulsion of 
foreigners. Thus the question rises, do states have such right? The maxim that states have 
the power to set their own immigration policy and the right to deny entry to aliens is 
today an established principle in international law. The publicist Emerich de Vattel 
tersely stated it in his 1758 treatise The Law of Nations.17 A United States court first 
                                                 
13
 David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: 
Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).  
14
 As underscored in the introduction, no exact figures exist and all the figures are estimations, which vary 
according to the source. 
15
 Note that these figures are estimates. Because the U.S. census does not ask for immigration status, it is 
impossible to define the exact number of illegal aliens in the country.  
16
 Seyla Benhabib, “Political Theory and Political Membership in a Changing World,” In Political Science: 
The State of the Discipline ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, 404-434. (Washington DC: American 
Political Science Association, 2002), 407. 
17
 Vattel says: “The sovereign may forbid the entrance of his territory either to foreigners in general, or in 
particular cases, or to certain persons, or for certain particular purposes, according as he may think it 
advantageous to the state.” Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, 
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and 
 11 
applied the principle in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States in 1892.18 In addition, the 
principle is enshrined in two international treaties. One of them is the Convention on 
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws of 1930, also known as 
The Hague Convention of 1930.19 The other is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which Article 13(2) protects the right to leave a country but not the right to enter 
another.20 Yet, the right of the state to control the admission and removal of foreigners 
has a recent pedigree. As John Torpey indicates, passports were introduced as means of 
state surveillance only in the early twentieth century.21 Thus, scholars such as James 
Nafziger,22 David Matas,23 and Teresa Hayter,24 have challenged this principle. Although 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nature of Natural Law on Luxury, ed. Béla Kapossy and Richard Withmore (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty 
Fund), http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2246 (accessed March 18, 2010), §94. 
18
 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). See James Nafziger, “The General 
Admission of Aliens Under International Law,” The American Journal of International Law, 77 no. 4 
(1983), 804. 
19
 Article 1 reads: “it is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals.” See League of 
Nations, Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law, April 13, 1930, 
League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 179, p. 89, No. 4137, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b00.html (accessed March 19, 2010), Article 1. 
20
 United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed March 19, 2010), article 13(2). 
21
 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 2. 
22
 James Nafziger posits that they have a qualified duty to admit aliens instead. He argues against the 
principle that states have a right to exclude aliens because; first, because it is based on a mistaken reading 
of Emerich de Vattel’s 1758 treatise The Law of Nations. Second, the right of exclusion is inconsequential 
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their arguments are compelling, the maxim of state sovereignty over the admission and 
stay of aliens has remained unmoved. 
Because states have a sovereign right to control the entry and permanence of 
foreigners, the United States government sees the presence of undocumented aliens in its 
territory as a direct challenge to its sovereignty. For this reason, Dauvergne asserts, “in 
the present era of globalisation, control over the movement of people has become the last 
bastion of sovereignty.”25 The reason why states seek to protect their sovereignty by 
controlling the movement of people is, according to Dauvergne, that people are 
inextricably linked to the territory. In summary, Sassen, Dauvergne, and Reza Barmaki 
suggest that the United States government’s response to growing extralegal immigration 
has been a hostile attitude towards undocumented aliens, in other words a “crackdown” 
on illegal immigration.26 The policy with which the government is cracking down on 
illegal aliens is two-pronged. On the one hand, it underscores border control and on the 
other it demands individual accountability from aliens. The following sub-sections 
explain how those approaches led to the criminalization and securitization of aliens 
respectively. 
 
1.1.1.1. Individual Accountability and the Process of Criminalization 
According to Sassen, immigration policy constructs illegal immigration as the 
product of individual decisions on the part of aliens and makes their bodies the site for 
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the reassertion of state sovereignty.27 In other words, the state sees the individual as fully 
responsible for his immigration status and demands individual accountability. Therefore, 
rather than targeting illegal aliens as a social group by excluding them from services such 
as health care, education or social security, the state uses detention to make everyone pay. 
Immigration detention has a direct impact on the body of aliens because it restricts their 
freedom of movement. The state’s demand for individual accountability crystallized in 
the criminalization process because, by shaping the public perception of aliens and 
immigration laws, criminalization demanded and justified the mass detention of illegal 
aliens. 
The criminalization paradigm, which equates illegality and criminality, governed 
policy making in the area of illegal immigration between the 1980s and the mid-1990s. 
Criminalization is, above all, a discursive process that frames illegal aliens as law-
breakers and drug traffickers. Like the securitization process discussed below, 
criminalization operates and emerges through acts of speech; it crystallizes in the 
language used in the interactions between policy makers and the masses. In this regard, 
Gallya Lahav and Virginie Guiraudon indicate that the criminalization discourse is the 
outcome of “compromises between different interest groups, mediated by media pressure 
and party politics.”28 As a discursive process, it affects policy, shapes aliens’ identities 
and serves as logical connection between their presence in the United States and their 
detention.29 In other words, criminalization both demands and justifies the mass detention 
of illegal aliens. Because it is a discourse in which policy makers, the media, and the 
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public participate, criminalization shapes immigration policy, and constructs reality, 
knowledge and values.30 For this reason, this thesis refers to criminalization also as a 
paradigm, as a specific way of looking and understanding reality. 
Criminalization discourse sees the presence of illegal aliens as conducive to 
crime, and assumes a positive correlation between aliens’ illegality and criminality.31 
Scholars point to four main roots of the criminalization process. First, Godfried 
Engbersen and Joanne van der Leun argue that criminalization arises from natives’ 
feelings of insecurity in the face of economic globalization.32 Second, taking a more 
comprehensive approach, Jonathan Inda analyzes the “ethnopolitics” of immigration and 
asserts that aliens are characterized as unethical beings unable to manage themselves, and 
as lawbreakers, job takers, and public burdens.33 Inda contends that illegality suggests the 
failure of conducting oneself ethically. While Engbersen and van der Leun see 
criminalization as driven by natives’ feelings, Inda argues that criminality derives from 
the construction of aliens as intrinsically ethically rotten individuals, as anti-citizens.34 
The framing of illegal aliens as unethical beings rather than as persons nurtures the idea 
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that they have fewer human rights and renders the protection of aliens’ rights a difficult 
task.  
A third approach, that of Noah Pickus and Peter Skerry, considers criminality as a 
direct result of migration flows. In the United States, the inflow of aliens has undergone 
two transformations. First, it has steadily grown since the thirties.35 Second, the abolition 
of national origins quotas in 1965 allowed a higher number of non-Europeans to 
immigrate, thus changing the racial composition of the alien population.36 Moreover 
recent years have seen a shift from the influx of Central American refugees to an influx 
of Mexico’s poor.37 Pickus and Skerry researched the feelings the public expressed as 
immigration reform gathered momentum in 2005 and found two kinds of fears: first, fear 
that immigration is out of control; second, fear that aliens are taking advantage of the 
system.38 While these findings are congruent with those of the scholars mentioned above, 
the novelty is that fears do not arise from aliens’ illegality but from their number.39 
Pickus and Skerry point to common complaints made about illegal aliens, for instance 
that they overwhelm public schools and hospitals, and argue that these complaints have 
nothing to do with aliens’ immigration status. Instead, the complaints are a consequence 
of the number of aliens present in the country.40  
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A fourth approach is that of Michael Welch and Liza Schuster, who utilize David 
Garland’s analysis of social responses to crime and the development of a crime complex 
in the United States and the United Kingdom.41 Although Garland’s theory is not about 
migration, it is attentive to “how today’s crime control arrangements reproduce a certain 
kind of social order” and affirms that new crime control policies conceive the poor as an 
“undeserving underclass.”42 Indeed, undocumented aliens are part of the underclass in the 
United States. Garland argues that, as a consequence of the new criminal challenges that 
policy-makers and the public have confronted in late modernity, a contradictory set of 
strategies has developed in the last thirty years to deal with crime. Garland contends that 
the United States and the United Kingdom are experiencing the coexistence of reactive 
(tough-on-crime) and proactive (focused on communal crime prevention) strategies. 
Since the 1970s, the traditional conceptualization of crime as a consequence of poverty 
has been challenged by two contrasting sets of criminologies: criminologies of everyday 
life and criminologies of the other. The latter are of particular importance to this thesis 
because immigration policy has othered aliens.  
According to Garland, the criminology of the other is anti-modern respect to its 
late-modern counterpart, the criminology of everyday life, which takes crime as written 
in the fabric of contemporary social and economic life and emphasizes pragmatic, 
instrumental, and rational solutions.43 The criminology of the other “re-dramatizes crime 
– depicting it in melodramatic terms, viewing it as a catastrophe, framing it in the 
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language of warfare and social defence.”44 It attempts to resolve the crime problem by 
questioning and changing the values upon which societies are built and is dehumanizing 
because it frames illegal aliens as “intrinsically evil” and assumes that there can be no 
understanding “between ‘us’ and ‘them.’”45 Garland’s perspective echoes Sassen’s 
argument and is a reason why undocumented immigration is seen as a matter of personal 
choice of the individual. Because undocumented aliens are illegal by choice, they are 
unethical. Thus, according to Welch and Schuster, Garland’s criminology of the other 
constructs aliens through a net of “images, archetypes and anxieties.”46 In conclusion, 
although scholars’ interpretations differ at the margin, they all point to a basic set of 
factors pertaining to the criminalization paradigm that has paved the road to the practice 
of mass immigration detention: domestic factors (natives’ anxiety about the global 
economy), factors related to aliens’ nature (the depiction of illegal aliens as unethical 
beings), and factors related to the process of migration (the size of the inflow of aliens).  
Because criminalization is a discursive process, it spreads through media and 
government statements.47 Consider the following example: a GAO report in 1993 states 
that illegal aliens are of concern to policy-makers because they are lawbreakers.48 While 
illegal immigration is a violation of the law, criminalizing statements equate criminal 
offenses with violations of immigration laws. In so doing, they create the fear that 
undocumented aliens are a threat for the personal safety of United States citizens. In 
addition, consider the issue of how undocumented aliens are labeled. A 1995 report 
defines illegal alien as “a person who is in the United States in violation of US 
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immigration laws.”49 The choice of “illegal” in lieu of “undocumented” further conflates 
a civil offense such as overstaying a visa with criminal behavior. While “undocumented” 
suggests an offense circumscribed to the realm of immigration law, “illegal” refers to a 
fundamental problem with the individual’s demeanor. This imputed behavior, Inda 
contends, is the reason why illegal aliens are framed as ethically improper subjects.50  
The criminalization of undocumented aliens has both immediate and profound 
consequences. In the short-term criminalization leads to policies that are exclusionary, 
restrictive, and punitive.51 Exclusionary and restrictive policies set limits on the social 
benefits and programs to which aliens have access and fall beyond the scope of this 
project. The subject matter of this thesis is punitive policies, that is, policies aimed to 
punish aliens for their lack of immigration status. Criminalization has also long-lasting 
negative consequences. First, it makes illegal immigration a unidirectional process by 
sealing the border and increasing the costs of being caught without legal immigration 
status. For this reason, abolishing mass immigration detention will help de-criminalize 
aliens and therefore reduce the incentives for aliens to resort to the informal sector. 
Second, criminalization forecloses the possibilities of undocumented aliens ever being 
able to exercise responsible citizenship by denying them opportunities to openly 
contribute to society. Third, criminalization shapes aliens’ identities: rather than 
challenging the criminality they are ascribed, they assimilate it as their modus vivendis. In 
this respect, Inda’s study of the United States reaches a conclusion similar to that of 
Diana Sigel and Frank Bovenkerk, who analyze the criminalization process in the 
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Netherlands. The scholars demonstrate that aliens exposed to criminalization tend to 
internalize their identities as criminals.52 Thus, these processes push aliens into a 
downward spiral of dependence on the informal sector and the underground economy, 
further exacerbating natives’ fears.53 The consequences of the criminalization process 
thus create conditions for human rights violations to occur.  
 
1.1.1.2. Border Control and the Process of Securitization 
According to Sassen, the second prong of immigration policy is border 
enforcement.54 A clear example is the Secure Fence Act of 2006, which expanded and 
reinforced hundreds of miles of the fence located on the border with Mexico.55 Yet, the 
erection of walls is not the only way of securing the border. This thesis focus on the 
framing of illegal aliens as existential security threats to the American nation, a process 
called securitization, as an example of border enforcement.  
Securitization frames illegal aliens as an existential security threat to the United 
States nation and calls for exceptional measures to manage the menace. This process 
began affecting immigration policy in the mid-1990s. According to Barry Buzan, Ole 
Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, authors of the securitization theory used in this project, 
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securitization is the most extreme form of politicization.56 An issue is securitized when an 
actor (the securitizing actor) identifies it as a threat (to a referent object) and attempts to 
break free of established procedures in order to control it.57 The applicability of a 
securitization framework to immigration detention derives from Buzan, Weaver and de 
Wilde’s development of a “wide” approach to security studies. Traditionally, 
securitization was limited to the field of military studies, but the development of the 
environmentalist movement and concerns with identity issues in the last three decades 
brought other areas under its scope. This motivated the authors to create a framework for 
the analysis of threats to referent objects other military ones.58 Like criminalization, 
securitization is a discursive process. According to Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, the 
identification of what constitutes a security issue depends on how the concept is deployed 
and used.59 Because the securitization of an issue depends only on subjective 
understandings, the scholars argue that an effective way to study securitization is through 
the study of discourse.60  
The securitization framework is not a novelty to the migration literature. Although 
they use different terminology, Zygmunt Bauman, B. S. Chimni, and Reza Barmaki, 
coincide that the end of the Cold War and the emerging North-South divide eroded 
refugee’s geopolitical significance and, as a result, governments began framing them as 
security threats.61 In the United States, the securitization discourse emerged in the mid-
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1990s. According to David Bacon, the immigration hysteria that securitization fuelled 
resulted in the reinterpretation of previously accepted phenomena.62 One example is 
border crossings in small towns along the Mexican border. For many years, it was 
common for people to across the border every day to go to work. However, as anxiety 
over undocumented immigration grew, these crossings were seen as a sign that the border 
was out of control.63 Thus, even scholars who do not apply a specific securitization 
framework point out that illegal aliens are perceived as a threat to the nation. 
Securitization has immediate and also long-term consequences. In the short-run, it 
leads to uncommonly harsh policies such as indefinite detention, the expansion of the 
category of aggravated felonies – which mandates the detention of illegal aliens without 
the right to bail – to include minor misdemeanors, and the outsourcing of immigration 
law enforcement to local authorities. These policies drive aliens deeper into the shadow 
of illegality, increase their vulnerability to mistreatment, instill fear and distrust of the 
police among aliens, and as Welch and Schuster indicate, detract attention from more 
progressive criminology.64  
Considering the nature and effects of criminalization and securitization, it is hard 
to miss the similarities among them. For the purpose of this thesis it suffices to point out 
that both discourses are at the roots of the United States’ hostile attitude toward illegal 
aliens. Criminalization and securitization demanded and justified the practice of mass 
detention of undocumented aliens, which led to poor detention conditions and to the 
mistreatment of immigration detainees. Therefore, the discourses jeopardize respect for 
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the rights of illegal aliens and detract attention from alternatives to detention. In addition 
the effects of these paradigms are detrimental to the United States because they drive 
aliens into the shadows of the informal economy and exacerbate ethnic and racial divides. 
It is precisely because these paradigms are deeply embedded in immigration policy that 
legally binding detention standards will not be able to neutralize the injurious impact of 
criminalization and securitization on illegal aliens and on the United States.  
 
1.1.2. Mass Detention as a Failure of the International Human Rights Regime  
This thesis argues that the current crisis in immigration detention – the recurrent 
instances of abuses of aliens’ rights – occurs at the intersection of the domestic responses 
to globalization and the limited impact of the international human rights regime on 
United States’ immigration policy. This section considers the latter aspect, namely, the 
ineffectiveness of the international human rights framework to uphold alien detainees’ 
rights.  
Rather than considering human rights law as a set of freestanding treaties, it is 
more practical to see human rights as an international regime. Stephen Krasner defines 
regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations.”65 A regime approach helps individualize the pertinent rules and decision-
making procedures and relates international rules and domestic politics, since the former 
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are collectively created but individually implemented by states.66 The human rights 
regime is unable to solve the crisis in immigration detention for two main reasons: 
shortcomings intrinsic to the regime and the United States’ indifference towards 
international human rights law. 
The international human rights regime has two key components: the institutional 
framework (what Krasner calls decision-making mechanisms, the organisms and 
international bodies) and the normative framework (the treaties). While the regime counts 
with operating institutional arrangements, their work is undermined by problems in the 
normative framework and by the United States attitude towards international law in the 
area of migration. The institutional framework of the international human rights regime, 
what Krasner calls decision-making mechanisms, is divided into charter-based 
institutions and institutions authorized by a charter organ legislate on human rights norms 
on the one hand, and treaty-based institutions monitor states’ compliance on the other 
hand.67 While the codification of human rights takes place in the framework of the 
General Assembly, treaty-based organs are in charge of monitoring activities.68 To begin 
with, the United States has accepted the legitimacy of two treaty-monitoring bodies: the 
Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture.69 In the specific case of 
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migrants, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants monitors compliance.70 
The Rapporteur’s mandate was created by the Commission on Human Rights in 1999, 
was renewed for three years in 2005 and was expanded by the Human Rights Council in 
2008. Apparently, the Rapporteur has an ample degree of maneuver: they monitor all 
countries’ actions regardless of whether they are party to the Convention on Migrants, 
and his or her action does not require the exhaustion of domestic remedies. Revealingly, 
the two individuals who served as Special Rapporteurs to date have come from the global 
south: Gabriela Rodríguez Pizarro from Costa Rica served between 1999 and 2005 and 
Jorge A. Bustamante from Mexico has served since 2005. The Rapporteur conducted two 
visits to the United States: one to the border with Mexico in 2002 and another to 
detention centers in the interior of the country. The Rapporteur’s report after the latter 
visit revealed persistent and concerning problems in detention facilities.  
As stated above, the first significant obstacle to the impact of the international 
human rights regime on United States immigration detention policies is the shortcomings 
in the regime’s normative framework. The cornerstone of the norms that are applicable to 
detained irregular migrants is the International Bill of Human Rights. Its three 
components – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),71 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – apply to everyone without 
discrimination, including illegal aliens.72 Pursuant Article 2 of the ICCPR the United 
States is bound to grant the rights enshrined in that convention to “all individuals within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”73 A key document related to migrants is the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (Convention on Migrants), which entered into force on July 
1, 2003. In spite of his pretentious name, the Convention on Migrants has had a 
negligible impact on international migrants, and thus requires a more detailed discussion.  
According to Bosniak and Dauvergne, the Convention on Migrants does more to 
reaffirm state sovereignty than to promote migrants’ rights.74 First, only a scant thirty-one 
countries have signed the Convention, as of March 2010.75 Moreover, all of them are 
sending countries. Second, the Convention defines migrants in economic terms. The title 
of the document proclaims that it is intended for the protection of the rights of migrant 
workers. Even if only at a nominal level, this definition of migrant leaves undocumented 
aliens out of the scope of the Convention. Third, some of the most important provisions 
in the Convention exclude undocumented aliens. Dauvergne indicates that the 
Convention omitted immigration status from the grounds for nondiscrimination.76 Fourth, 
many of the rights in the Convention are already enshrined in other human rights treaties. 
In fact, Dauvergne suggests that the only provisions strictly related to immigrants are in 
Articles 21 and 22, which prohibit the destruction of identity and travel documents and 
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collective expulsion respectively.77 Fifth, the Convention grants more rights to legal 
immigrants than to illegal aliens. According to Bosniak, the Convention allows states to 
discriminate between legal and illegal migrants inter alia in terms of the rights to family 
unity, liberty of movement, trade union rights.78 Sixth, Bosniak and Dauvergne coincide 
in that the Convention is a “staunch manifesto in support of state territorial 
sovereignty.”79 Article 68 requests inter-state collaboration to eradicate illegal migration 
and the employment of illegal aliens. Article 69 calls upon states to ensure that illegal 
immigration does not persist. These articles are problematic because it is the function of 
every state to define the meaning of illegality. Therefore, the Convention does not grant 
illegal aliens significant protection relative to other international legal instruments and it 
grants states a significant amount of discretion to combat illegal migration. For this 
reason, the Convention does more to reaffirm state sovereignty than to protect aliens. In 
short, the absence of receiving states among signatory countries makes the Convention 
currently ineffective. Yet, even if all developed states signed onto it, the Convention 
would still do little to prevent the mistreatment of undocumented migrants in detention.  
The second obstacle to the impact of the international human rights regime on 
United States immigration detention policies is the latter’s indifference towards 
international human rights law in the realm of illegal immigration. The United States has 
significantly limited the domestic impact of international law. First, it has neglected to 
ratify the ICESCR or to sign the Convention on Migrants. Second, it has declared the 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Articles 1 through 27 
of the ICCPR, and Articles 1 through 16 of the Convention Against Torture as non-self-
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executing. As Louis Henkin indicates, the guiding principle behind declaring treaties to 
be non-self-executing is that changes in domestic law must be the outcome of a 
democratic process rather than a treaty.80 Yet, he argues, “this argument impugns, of 
course, the democratic character of every treaty made or that shall be made by the 
President with the consent of the Senate.”81 Moreover, Human Rights Watch argues that 
the reservations expressed by the United States to the CERD have limited the impact of 
the treaty, subordinating it to the United States Constitution.82 This would contravene the 
purpose of international law as well as Article VI, Clause 2, of the United States 
Constitution.83 Furthermore, the United Nations Human Rights Committee found the 
United States’ reservations to the ICCPR as incompatible with purpose of the treaty and 
thus invalid.84  
As Henking, Sassen, and Dauvergne indicate, the United States has been resistant 
to embrace international human rights norms in the context of migration. Scholars 
provide sufficient evidence of the United States’ indifference to human rights laws when 
it comes to migration. First, they point out that immigration detention guidelines (see 
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chapter two) are based on domestic criminal detention policies and on the input of the 
Department of Justice and other United States-based organizations. Second, Michelle 
Brane and Christina Lundholm indicate that both the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Department of Justice “have been fairly unmoved by arguments based on 
international human rights law.”85  
The attitude of the United States towards human rights conventions epitomizes 
what Julie Mertus calls ‘exceptionalism.’ Exceptionalism is the assumption on the part of 
the government that “the United States should and will receive special treatment when 
human rights are applied in practice.”86 Mertus’s concept of exceptionalism echoes Peter 
J. Spiro’s concept of ‘New Sovereigntism,’ which suggests that rather than becoming 
isolationist, the United States chooses to endorse only those international conventions 
that are convenient to its purposes and rejects the rest.87 The subordination of 
international treaties to the Constitution and the fact that a significant number of articles 
are not self-executing makes the international human rights system, in the words of Jack 
Donnelly, promotional in nature: normatively strong but procedurally weak.88 For these 
reasons, although the United States played a crucial role in the development of the 
international human rights regime, its indifference towards human rights norms regarding 
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migration make it impossible for the regime to prevent the mistreatment of immigration 
detainees.  
The review of the literature demonstrated that policy makers can place the crisis 
of immigration detention at the intersection of the United States’ responses to the 
globalization of migration (individual accountability and border enforcement) and the 
limited impact of the international human rights regime over immigration detention 
policies and practices. While the secondary literature offers a valuable scheme of the 
crisis, it says nothing about how to solve it. That is precisely the vacuum that this thesis 
seeks to fill. The next section explains the method with which this project seeks and 
evaluates potential solutions to the crisis of immigration detention. 
 
1.2. Method: Policy Analysis 
In its approach, this thesis is a policy analysis. Policy analysis is a distinct field of 
study and practice, which according to Garry Brewer and Peter DeLeon, seeks to deal 
with intricate social problems that necessitate policy responses.89 That immigration 
detention is an intricate problem goes without saying: a hundred and seven aliens have 
died in the government’s hands since October 2003, in-custody abuses are continuously 
reported, and immigration detention costs almost two billion of taxpayers’ dollars per 
year. This policy analysis considers the solution that immigrant rights advocates proposed 
– the codification of detention guidelines into legally binding standards – with the aim of 
solving the ongoing crisis in immigration detention.  
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The policy sciences integrate theory (knowledge of) and practice (knowledge in) 
and aim to improve them for human benefit. For this reason, this thesis utilizes human 
rights as the standpoint from which to evaluate the solution that immigrant rights 
advocates proposed. Following Wayne Parsons, this thesis is concerned with “how issues 
and problems come to be defined and constructed and how they are placed on the 
political and policy agenda.”90 Thus, it utilizes the criminalization and securitization 
discourses to chart the current crisis in immigration detention and to demonstrate that 
these processes have become so deeply embedded in immigration policy that binding 
detention standards are not an effective strategy to protect aliens’ human and 
constitutional rights. From the multiplicity of models for policy analysis, this thesis uses 
Parson’s method to study whether the codification of immigration detention standards is a 
viable strategy to prevent in-custody abuses of immigration detainees. 
Policy analysis is a complex discipline of salient characteristics. The following 
are some of the attributes that Harold Lasswell ascribes to it.91 First, the policy 
orientation is multi-method. Brewer and DeLeon share such idea and assert, “problems 
designate theory and methods, not the reverse.”92 This is precisely why this thesis is 
focused specifically on the problem of the mistreatment of alien detainees in immigration 
detention. Second, policy analysis is multi-disciplinary. In this respect, Ira Sharkansky 
defines public policy as driven by the economy, popular demands and political culture, 
and by individual actors and institutions.93 Therefore, the analysis of the policy of 
binding standards that immigrant rights advocates propose and the introduction of the 
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alternate policy of abolishing the practice of mass immigration detention take into 
consideration human rights imperatives, economic arguments and practicality. Third, 
policy analysis is problem-focused; thus, Brewer and DeLeon argue that the discipline is 
better able to make sense of situations that the scientific method cannot comprehend.94 
For this reason, the analysis goes beyond the text of immigration laws and pays careful 
attention to statements and acts of speech. This is not only because the processes driving 
the practice of mass immigration detention, namely criminalization and securitization, are 
discursive practices, but also because the analysis of discourse facilitates the 
understanding of the rationale underlying policy.  
Fourth, policy analysis is “concerned to map the contextuality of the policy 
process, policy options and policy outcomes.”95 For this reason, this thesis pays particular 
attention to the discursive process through which the United States government presents 
and justifies mass immigration detention. The processes of criminalization and 
securitization, which demand and justify the detention of all aliens regardless of whether 
they pose a serious threat to the community or whether they are serious criminals, are 
indeed discursive processes. As such, they form part of the context in which immigration 
detention grows.  
Fifth, policy analysis’ goal is to produce and utilize knowledge to enhance 
decision-making. Thus, the literature informing this project comes from a variety of 
distinct and interrelated fields, which shine different lights on immigration detention 
practices in the United States. Sixth, notwithstanding the disagreement among scholars, it 
is important to add to this list the fact that policy analysis has an important normative 
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dimension.96 According to Brewer and DeLeon, the discipline is deeply concerned with 
the value of human dignity.97 For Frank Fischer, policy analysis must seek to evaluate not 
only the accomplishment of a goal, but also whether that goal was worth pursuing.98 In 
this respect, this thesis seeks to maximize the protection of human rights. In other words, 
it analyzes the policy proposed by immigrant rights advocates and proposes and presents 
an alternative following a human rights imperative. Finally, some scholars argue that 
policy analysis is an argumentative practice shaped by the institutional environment, 
relations of power and analysts’ choices. Fischer and John Foster see policy analysis as a 
“practical process of argumentation,” in which analysts delineate the problem in 
particular ways and exercise a degree of agenda-setting power.99 In other words, the 
scholars see practitioners’ work as having a significant impact on the issue under 
analysis, an impact that derives from analysts’ use of language. For this reason, it is 
important to keep in mind the standpoint and the aim of this thesis as being the protection 
of aliens’ human and constitutional rights.  
The structure of policy analysis varies between authors. According to Parsons, 
policy analysis is divided into four levels: meta analysis, meso analysis, decision 
analysis, and delivery analysis. Meta analysis is the study of analysis itself.100 Meso 
analysis is concerned with the way in which problems are framed and become items in 
the policy agenda.101 Decision analysis seeks to explain the way in which policy 
decisions are made (analysis of) and the way in which policy decisions ought to be made 
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(analysis for).102 In the words of Lasswell, decision analysis is about “who gets what, 
when [and] how.”103 Delivery analysis is concerned with the implementation of policies 
and with the question of why well-crafted policies sometimes fail.104 Among these levels, 
this thesis uses Parson’s decision analysis method. It explains why there is a crisis in 
immigration detention (how the practice of mass immigration detention developed), and 
argues that in light of the failure of current and proposed policies to prevent the 
mistreatment of alien detainees, policy making in the realm of immigration detention 
should seek to uphold the human and constitutional rights of aliens. 
As Parsons indicates, a variety of disciplines inform policymaking. In analyzing 
decision-making, Parsons groups the different disciplines into five major approaches: 
power, rationality, public choice, institutional frameworks, and informational and 
psychological.105 This thesis borrows from those five distinct approaches because 
immigration detention policymaking is the outcome of the interaction of a multiplicity of 
factors such as politics, economics, international and domestic law, and culture or public 
attitudes.  
This policy analysis is based on reports of non-governmental organizations, 
reports of government agencies such as the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the 
GAO, statements made by members of the government such as the President, the 
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Attorney General, members of Congress, officials from INS, DHS and ICE in speeches, 
congressional hearings, press releases and government websites, newspaper articles, and 
the text of the petition to initiate rule-making that immigrant rights advocates sent to 
DHS in 2007. 
The process of analysis involved the following steps. First, it considered all the 
available arguments on the subject of the detention of illegal aliens. Second, it identified 
and isolated the arguments and processes that justified the expansion of detention and the 
perpetuation of the status quo. Third, it identified the logics underlying the discourses of 
criminalization and securitization, and the institutional practice of mass immigration 
detention. It paid particular attention to the processes that have prevented extant non-
binding standards from effectively preventing in-custody abuses of aliens. The study of 
the arguments made on the subject of immigration detention and of the immigration 
system’s decentralized structure, the outsourcing of immigration law enforcement 
services to local agents, and the punitive, unjust and costly nature of detention from a 
human rights perspective, leads to the conclusion that the most effective path to uphold 
aliens’ human and constitutional rights is to dismantle the practice of immigration 
detention. 
The chapters that follow analyze the policy that immigrant rights advocates 
proposed to solve the crisis in immigration detention. They demonstrate that the current 
crisis in immigration detention is undisputed. The problems of recurrent in-custody 
abuses are conspicuous: first because the number of reports documenting deaths and 
instances of mistreatment constantly grows; second because the government has admitted 
that, notwithstanding the marked differences between criminal and immigration 
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detention, the government treats alien detainees as criminal prisoners.106 Paradoxically, 
the analysis of the proposed binding standards also demonstrates that neither current 
detention guidelines, nor the proposed legally enforceable detention standards will solve 
the crisis in immigration detention. For this reason, this policy analysis favors the 
abolition of the practice of mass immigration detention, the retreat to pre-1996 detention 
policies, and the expansion of ATD programs. 
The argument is laid out as follows: chapter two argues that immigration laws are 
deeply rooted in and have been significantly affected by the processes of criminalization 
(individual accountability) and securitization (emphasis on border enforcement). The idea 
that illegal aliens are criminals and an existential threat to the nation has led to punitive 
and restrictive policies, in particular, to the mass detention of irregular aliens in removal 
proceedings. Chapter three argues that criminalization and securitization have prevented 
the existent non-binding immigration detention standards from effectively preventing in-
custody mistreatment. Chapter four argues that the legally binding detention standards 
that immigrant rights advocates propose are unlikely to solve the current crisis in 
immigration detention because of ICE’s decentralized structure and because the agency 
outsources immigration detention and law enforcement to local agents and private firms. 
The outsourcing of services has created great discrepancies in the way in which the law is 
applied across the country and in some case has exacerbated the abuse of aliens’ rights. 
Chapter five argues that the most effective strategy to protect the rights of illegal aliens is 
that policy makers reconsider the practice of mass immigration detention.  This strategy 
is effective because it addresses the root of the problem, it will prevent the unnecessary 
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detention of asylum seekers, refugees and United States citizens, will subdue the long-
lasting psychological effects of detention, and will reduce the economic burden on 
taxpayers. This chapter concludes by emphasizing the complementary roles of advocates 
and civil society in dismantling the criminalization and securitization paradigms, and of 
policy-makers in abolishing mass immigration detention and expanding ATD schemes. 
 37 
2. Discursive and Structural Origins of the Mass Detention Policy for Undocumented 
Aliens 
The problem of in-custody abuses in immigration detention facilities is complex. 
The first thing to consider when discussing immigration detention is the root of the 
problem. The root of the problem of in-custody abuses of alien detainees is tough 
immigration laws that the criminalization and securitization paradigms fuelled. These 
laws, a product of discursive processes that frame undocumented aliens as criminals and 
security threats, have caused the unprecedented growth of the alien detention population. 
As the detention population has kept growing, the agencies in charge of immigration 
detention have become unable to manage the inflow of detainees. Consequently, the 
government has resorted to private and local (state and county) facilities. Overcrowding 
and the lax oversight of detention facilities have led to abuses of aliens’ rights, such as 
the denial of medical treatment resulting in deaths, sexual and verbal harassment, and 
beatings.  
This chapter identifies the key factors fuelling these trends and makes two 
important points. First, it argues that criminalization and securitization have profoundly 
affected immigration policies and the public perception of illegal aliens. Second, it 
contends that these processes have bolstered mass immigration detention since the 1980s. 
Thus, the structures of mass immigration detention are recent but are also deeply rooted 
in paradigms that other aliens as criminals and existential security threats to the nation. 
Because of its recent but deep roots, neither non-binding nor legally enforceable 
standards will effectively address the crisis in immigration detention. The most effective 
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path to address the crisis of immigration detention is to de-couple illegal aliens from the 
criminal sphere, by discontinuing mass immigration detention. 
 
2.1. The 1980s: Crime and Drugs Rhetoric 
The process of criminalization described in the introduction began affecting 
immigration policies in the 1980s. This section argues that criminalization is one of the 
roots of the current crisis in immigration detention because it profoundly reshaped 
immigration policies with far reaching consequences for illegal aliens. On the one hand, 
criminalization made an imprint on the text of immigration laws, thus erecting the legal 
structure that in the 1990s and 2000s would demand and legitimate the practice of mass 
immigration detention. On the other hand, criminalization had a significant impact on the 
body of undocumented aliens. Because the process of criminalization and its 
consequences are as recent as they are deep, regulating the practice of detention is not a 
viable strategy to prevent the mistreatment of detainees. The only effective strategy to 
protect the rights of undocumented aliens is to dismantle the practice of immigration 
detention, thus attacking the core of the problem. The following paragraphs describe the 
changes and effects the criminalization paradigm wrought in the pre-1996 years. The year 
1996 is a milestone because it saw the emergence of a different paradigm and the 
enactment of two significantly harsh immigration laws. 
The discursive process of criminalization, which frames illegal aliens as unethical 
anti-citizens, criminals and drug traders, had a deep influence on immigration law. In the 
pre-1996 years, criminalization informed and shaped two distinct sets of policies: those 
regulating the admission of foreigners and interior enforcement policies. First, 
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criminalization reshaped policies regulating the admission of foreigners to the United 
States. In this respect, Mark Dow, author of American Gulag, argues that the increase in 
the use of immigration detention was propelled by the arrival of refugees.107 In the 1980s, 
the United States became the destination of two groups of refugees: Cubans in 1980 and 
Haitians in 1981. Because the government was initially more sympathetic to Cubans,108 it 
utilized mass detention to stem the inflow of Haitians, who the government considered 
economic refugees.109 In the words of Attorney General William French Smith, 
“detention of aliens seeking asylum was necessary to discourage people like Haitians 
from setting sail in the first place.”110 The use of detention to sift aliens led to 
overcrowding and poor conditions in immigration detention facilities. The practice mass 
detention also became progressively embedded in laws that were intended to control drug 
trade and crime.  
Second, criminalization altered interior enforcement policies. Ira Kurzban argues 
that between 1986 and 1996 Congress acted under the premise of combating illegal 
immigration and crime. The framing of illegal aliens as criminals led to tough-on-
immigration interior enforcement law, which resulted in “the elimination of the basic 
features of a procedurally fair immigration system.”111 The relevant laws enacted in this 
period were: 
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• The Immigration Control and Reform Act112 of 1986 established expedited 
deportation for persons in prison.  
• The Anti-Drug Abuse Act113 of 1986 made drug offenses a basis for 
inadmissibility retroactively. This meant that non-citizens, who had been found in 
possession of controlled substances in the past, were now at risk of being deported 
from the United States. 
• The Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act114 of 1988 initiated the use of “aggravated 
felonies” as a ground for deportation. Aggravated felonies are crimes that 
automatically make an alien deportable. The Act defined aggravated felons as 
“drug traffickers and murderers” and stated that these individuals were not 
eligible for most of the forms of relief from deportation. This included lawful 
permanent residents. The Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act also established the 
mandatory detention of non-citizens and legal permanent residents convicted of 
aggravated felonies. 
• The Immigration Act115 of 1990 expanded the definition of aggravated felonies 
and eliminated judicial recommendations against deportation. 
• The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act116 of 1994 expanded the 
definition of “aggravated felony” and “permitted, for the first time, a summary 
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form of removal for certain nonresident aggravated felons.”117 This meant that 
aliens who committed a crime classified as an aggravated felony could be 
deprived of their right to see an immigration judge to challenge their deportation. 
As Kurzban points out, an amendment was later introduced that expanded the 
crimes that, under immigration law, qualified as “aggravated felonies.”118 
A product of a paradigm that equates illegality with criminality, the pre-1996 laws 
described above, introduced substantial changes in immigration policy. First, they created 
the category of aggravated felonies.119 This type of felonies is of concern only to aliens 
and causes much confusion because its definition remains vague. Second, the pre-1996 
laws applied the changes retroactively. The retroactive nature of the changes meant that a 
significant number of aliens who had committed offenses in the past became deportable 
overnight. Third, the pre-1996 laws created mandatory detention. Mandatory detention is 
the incarceration without right to bail of aliens in removal proceedings and occurs only 
after, and thus is different from, criminal detention.120 Notably, mandatory detention had 
a small impact on aliens prior to the 1996 laws because most courts held that it was 
unconstitutional.121 The creation of mandatory detention and of aggravated felonies in the 
context of anti-drug and anti-crime legislation demonstrates the significant extent to 
which the government and Congress conflated undocumented immigration with drug 
trade and crime. 
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The laws that emerged as a consequence of criminalization had direct effects on 
the body of illegal aliens. Recall that Sassen, Dauvergne and others argue that developed 
states respond to their anxieties about globalization by reaffirming their authority to 
regulate the admission and expulsion of foreigners. This demeanor leads to a crackdown 
on illegal aliens, whom states consider a direct challenge to their sovereignty. Recall 
further that developed states understand undocumented immigration as a product of 
individual decisions rather than geopolitical and socioeconomic phenomena; therefore, 
they demand individual accountability from illegal aliens. Thus the crackdown on illegal 
immigration occurs precisely on the body of undocumented aliens through their detention 
and deportation.  
The impact of the criminalization paradigm on illegal aliens is evident in the 
growth of the immigration detention population nationwide. As a result of the tough-on-
immigration laws enacted before 1996, the average daily detention population more than 
tripled from 2,370 in 1980 to 8,592 in 1996. The fast rate of increase in detention 
population overwhelmed the detention network. By December 1995 overcrowding 
compelled INS authorities in Miami, FL to relax immigration law enforcement.122  
Besides overcrowding facilities, criminalization led to poor detention conditions 
and to the mistreatment of alien detainees. The harmful consequences of criminalization 
were the clearest in two detention centers: Krome Processing Center in Miami, FL, and 
Elizabeth Contract Detention Facility in Elizabeth, NJ. Although they were 
geographically distant and were managed by different entities – the INS operated Krome, 
and a private firm operated Elizabeth – the series of events that occurred between 1993 
and 1998 in these locales demonstrates that criminalization is one of the causes of the 
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current crisis in immigration detention. In particular, these events suggest that, through 
the tough immigration laws it bolstered, criminalization led to appalling conditions of 
detention and to the mistreatment of detained undocumented aliens. In fact, the scandals 
at Krome and Elizabeth resulted in the creation of the first set of detention standards in 
1998.  
The government built Krome in 1979 to house Cubans during the Mariel Boatlift 
and used it to house Haitians asylum seekers in 1982, after which Krome became a long-
term detention facility.123 The first significant event at Krome occurred in September 
1993, when an officer, Edward Calejo punched and kicked several times David Bernard, 
a non-criminal detainee who posed no threat to his safety.124 Calejo changed the story and 
declared that the detainee had attacked him.125 The Department of Justice’s investigation 
that followed Bernard’s complaint revealed that Calejo had other guards hit him and the 
he tried to claim worker’s compensation.126 Calejo pleaded guilty and Judge Federico 
Moreno sentenced him to a year and a day in prison for a civil rights violation.127 
Calejo’s testimony revealed a more complex reality. After completing the sentence, 
Calejo met with Mark Dow and expressed sorrow and surprise about the outcome of his 
case because he “had never seen anything result from investigations of officer 
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misconduct.”128 Calejo argued that although it was common for guards to lock detainees 
who avoided counts in the bathrooms overnight and to have non-consensual sex with 
female detainees, investigations were often fruitless. According to Dow, this happened 
due to the lack of witnesses or because detainees were deported before they could 
testify.129 The punitive and abusive conditions of detention that detainees endured at 
Krome made the detention center, in the words of a local INS officer, very much like “a 
jail.”130 
The second event, which occurred in June 1995, made Krome nationally 
infamous. Upon the inauguration of the 104th Congress, Speaker of the House Newt 
Gingrich created a congressional task force to provide recommendations to curb illegal 
immigration and effectively remove undocumented aliens.131 Besides New York and San 
Diego, the task force visited Krome and the Miami Airport on June 10, 1995. The task 
force presented a report on June 29, 1995, which made almost no mention of Krome.132 
However, on June 27, 1995, the President and three officers from the INS local 
employees’ union in Miami sent Speaker Gingrich and members of the task force a note 
signed by forty-seven INS employees, which complained that the INS management had 
“purposefully and actively deceived the delegation” about the caliber of the problems 
with immigration detention in Miami.133 According to Michael Wixted, President of the 
Union of INS workers, “what the congresspeople saw wasn’t an accurate example […] If 
they had seen what chaos actually exists down here, I think they would have had a 
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different impression of what we do.”134 On July 12, Task Force Chairman Gallegly 
requested a formal investigation.135 The Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) inquiry 
revealed that out of a population of 407 aliens, local officers moved 137 detainees out of 
Krome in the 24 hours previous to the visit. Of the total number of transfers, 101 were 
directly motivated by the congressional inquiry. According to Inspector General Michael 
Bromwich’s testimony, senior district INS officials were concerned that Krome was 
overcrowded. For this reason, they moved forty-five detainees to another jail, some of 
them only during the visit, and they released fifty-six aliens into the community. This 
strategy prevented the task force from seeing that female detainees had been sleeping in 
cots in the lobby area. It was also problematic because 35 detainees were not medically 
cleared before release. In addition, the OIG found that INS employees had been 
instructed to lie to members of the task force if asked whether anyone except criminal 
aliens were housed in a particular section of the detention center. Bromwich called this 
finding the “worst of all” because it was not “merely a license to lie but an order to 
lie.”136 The façade the Miami Field Office erected to deceive Congress inspired the Miami 
Herald to refer to Krome as a Potemkin Village, after the Russian army officer Grigory 
Potemkin, who allegedly built artificial villages to deceive Russian Empress Catherine II 
during her visit to the Ukraine.137 Even though Miami INS officers knew that aliens were 
in substandard conditions of detention, they deliberately lied to Congress.  
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The detention center in Elizabeth, NJ reflects the pernicious nature of the 
criminalization discourse and the reasons why in-custody abuses became a significant 
problem that led INS to enact non-binding standards in 1998. In June 1995, after 
complaining of being beaten and drugged by prison guards, 300 detainees rioted and 
trashed the detention center.138 After the riot, INS revoked its contract with ESMOR Inc., 
the firm operating the facility. INS decided to temporarily shut down the facility and 
transferred detainees to a dozen other jails. However, that did not solve the problem of in-
custody abuses. In March 1998, three guards from Union County Jail, one of the jails in 
Elizabeth where INS had transferred detainees, were found guilty of assault, misconduct, 
and conspiracy to obstruct the investigation.139 These guards had assaulted and abused 
more than a dozen detainees. The problem continued. After keeping the facility closed for 
eighteen months, INS signed a contract with the Corrections Corporation of America 
(CCA) and by May 1996 INS had devised a plan to make Elizabeth a “national 
model.”140 The changes the CCA introduced in the facility exemplify the effects of the 
criminalization discourse. Rather than focusing on detention conditions, the CCA 
invested a million dollars in “security gates, motion detectors, shatter-resistant windows, 
surveillance cameras, and electronic doors.”141 Elizabeth reopened in 1997. In May 1998, 
Steve Townsend, a former assistant warden sued the CCA alleging that he was fired for 
informing INS that detainees were forcibly sedated.142 However, INS was quick to 
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dismiss the allegations. According to INS District Director in Newark, flawless oversight 
was impossible because “we can’t be everywhere and know everything.”  
The events at Krome and Elizabeth demonstrate that the criminalization paradigm 
is one of the main contributors to the current crisis in immigration detention. The framing 
of undocumented aliens as criminals gave rise to tough laws. These laws increased the 
number of aliens in detention, which led to poor detention conditions, overcrowding, and 
the mistreatment of alien detainees. Criminalization became a legitimizing rhetorical 
instrument for the government’s crackdown on illegal immigration. Criminalization 
demanded and justified the mass incarceration of illegal aliens, thus having a direct and 
harmful impact on the body of illegal aliens. Criminalization also dehumanized alien 
detainees because authorities began concealing information of abuses and considered 
natural the fact that detainees were falling through the cracks of an unregulated and 
unsupervised detention system. The complex, far reaching and dire processes that 
criminalization set off in the years prior to 1996 render attempts at regulating the practice 
of detention such as detention standards ineffective to prevent in-custody mistreatment.  
 
 
 
2.2. The 1990s: The Transition from Criminalization to Securitization 
Although criminalization remained the dominant logic, the mid-1990s witnessed 
the emergence of the securitization paradigm, which framed undocumented aliens as 
potential terrorists and thus as an existential threat to the nation. While securitization did 
not replace the criminalization paradigm, the laws enacted between 1996 and 2001 
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primarily connected aliens to terrorism. For this reason, those years represent a transition 
period. This section considers immigration policy until 2001 and the next section 
considers immigration policy post-9/11. 
Like the process of criminalization described above, securitization is also a 
product of states’ reassertion of their authority over the admission and expulsion of 
foreigners through individual accountability. The securitization paradigm sees illegal 
aliens as existential threats and promotes and justifies policies that would otherwise be 
uncommonly tough. This means that the policies enacted to deal with undocumented 
aliens would not be as harsh as they are if aliens were not defined as an existential threat 
to the American nation.  
This section argues that, in light of the significant extent to which securitization 
penetrated immigration laws, palliatives such as detention guidelines or legally binding 
detention standards are insufficient and ineffective to adequately protect the rights of 
aliens in custody. For this reason, policy-makers ought to end the practice of mass 
immigration detention and to extend the use of alternatives to detention. To advance this 
argument, the following paragraphs look at two landmark laws enacted in 1996. These 
laws introduced substantial changes to immigration policy and had negative far-reaching 
consequences in terms of immigration detention. Chronologically, the first one is the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which President Bill Clinton 
signed into law on April 24, 1996.143 The second law is the Illegal Immigration Reform 
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and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which President Bill Clinton signed into law on 
September 30, 1996.144 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) came into being at 
the crossroads of criminalization and securitization. In congruence with the 
criminalization discourse, Congress passed AEDPA as part of an omnibus crime 
package.145 Yet, the first word of the Act’s title was “Antiterrorism.” Moreover, President 
Clinton signed the Act into law on the first anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing. 
Although the Act had a significant impact on aliens, it must be kept in mind that the 
author of the attack was a United States citizen. This contradiction notwithstanding, 
AEDPA marks the beginning of securitization’s primacy in guiding immigration policies. 
Its aim was to facilitate the prosecution of individuals associated with terrorist activities. 
However, the law had several relevant ramifications and consequences for aliens. At that 
time, President Clinton expressed concerns that the Act “makes a number of major ill-
advised changes in our immigration laws that have nothing to do with fighting 
terrorism.”146 AEDPA made two significant changes that concern this thesis: it expanded 
the grounds for deportability and it restricted judges’ ability to grant discretionary 
waivers from deportation. Both changes legitimized and called for the detention of larger 
numbers of illegal aliens. 
First, AEDPA expanded the grounds for deportability to cover crimes of moral 
turpitude and all drug offenses. Crimes of moral turpitude are those that shock public 
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conscience147 and are inherently evil or malum in se.148 This concept resembles that of 
aggravated felony insofar as both are amorphous, and both have undergone expansion 
since 1996. In terms of drug offenses, Julie Rannik indicates that prior to AEDPA, 
possession of marijuana up to thirty grams was no ground for deportability.149 Second, 
the Act took away judges’ power to grant deportation waivers, which were called Section 
212(c) waivers, after the section of the INA describing them. Judges were able to grant 
this relief from deportation if aliens were able to show that their ties to the United States 
outweighed their convictions.150 The elimination of Section 212(c) waivers responded to 
concerns by Congress that aliens were abusing this option and that too many criminals 
were being released.151 From her research, Rannik asserts that aliens did abuse judges’ 
discretion to grant waivers.152 Nevertheless, Jacqueline Bhabha explains that the 
elimination of this form of relief separated families and jeopardized aliens’ United States-
born children’s access to parental care.153 The expansion of the grounds for deportability 
and the retroactive application of this change made deportable aliens who had committed 
crimes even before the act came into being.  
Five months after AEDPA came into being, President Bill Clinton signed the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). The Act 
compounded the criminalizing and securitizing effects of previous legislations and led to 
an increase in detention population, poorer conditions of detention, and the mistreatment 
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of alien detainees. IIRIRA introduced five substantial changes in the United States’ 
immigration laws. First, the Act expanded the category of aggravated felonies to include 
crimes of violence which term of imprisonment exceeds one year, and applied this 
change retroactively.154 As with laws discussed above, this change made many aliens 
deportable overnight. 
Second, IIRIRA expanded the definitions of “conviction” and “term of 
imprisonment” in a way detrimental to aliens. The meaning of these terms is important to 
determine whether crimes constitute aggravated felonies. The Act established that a 
conviction exists when there is a formal judgment of guilt, when a judge or jury finds the 
defendant guilty and orders some form of punishment, or when the alien enters a plea of 
guilt or nolo contendere.155 IIRIRA also redefined “term of imprisonment” to mean any 
period of incarceration ordered by a judge even if its execution is then suspended.156 The 
fact that procedures other than formal adjudication of guilt came to mean “conviction” 
and that even non-executed sentences began counting as “term of imprisonment” made 
deportable an increasing number of aliens.  
To understand the impact of those changes on aliens, consider the following 
example. An illegal alien (she could also be a legal permanent resident) commits 
burglary. Under the INA, burglary offenses for which the term of imprisonment is at least 
a year constitute aggravate felonies. Suppose that her attorney suggests that she pleads 
guilty in exchange for a light sentence. Suppose further that in this case the sentence is of 
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one year and one day in prison, but it is suspended. According to the criminal system, the 
suspension allows the alien to walk. However under post-IIRIRA immigration laws, the 
term of imprisonment of more than a year makes her an aggravated felon and therefore 
deportable. This is exacerbated by the fact that that the Act mandates her detention 
without the right to bail.  
Third, IIRIRA further developed mandatory detention. It is true that the Act 
shortened the period of pre-removal detention to ninety days and stipulated that 
individuals who the government cannot remove within ninety days may be released. 
However, IIRIRA established that aliens who are inadmissible on certain grounds157 such 
as health issues, who are ordered removed for a broad range of crimes such as aggravated 
felonies and controlled substances offenses,158 or who are considered a risk to the 
community must be detained beyond the ninety-day period.159 
Fourth, IIRIRA further disempowered aliens by introducing drastic changes to 
judicial review. Although not all of the changes to judicial review are strictly related to 
immigration detention, they show the government’s predisposition to limit aliens’ due 
process rights. IIRIRA striped courts of their power to review expedited removal 
decisions. The elimination of judicial review meant that decisions of immigration officers 
at the borders to expeditiously deport aliens are final. IIRIRA also barred courts from 
reviewing decisions regarding the removal of aliens who commit certain offenses.160  
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Fifth, in consonance with AEDPA, IIRIRA further limited the conditions of 
eligibility for deportation waivers. The Act amended Section 212(h) so that lawful 
permanent residents are eligible for waivers only if they have resided in the United States 
for the previous seven years and have not committed aggravated felonies.161 The broader 
definition of aggravated felony made many permanent residents ineligible for deportation 
waivers and subject to mandatory detention.  
While immigrant rights advocates and legal scholars argued that the 1996 laws 
had introduced some of the “toughest measures ever taken against illegal immigration,” 
the government expressed optimism.162 In 1998, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner 
extolled the “increased detention capacity and improved removal efforts” of the INS.163 
She argued that the 1996 laws had increased the government capacity to catch 
undocumented aliens, which were minimal under previous legislation.164 In fact, 
Meissner’s comment missed the point: the 1996 laws made an increasing number of 
aliens detainable, but did not significantly enhance the government’s ability to house 
them. Between 1997 and 2000, the detained population tripled from 8,200 to 20,000.165 
Such monumental increase was the result of the expansion of the grounds for mandatory 
detention, the increase in the number of crimes that count as aggravated felonies, the 
redefinition of the meaning of conviction and term of imprisonment, the limitation of 
judicial review, and the restrictions applied to eligibility criteria for deportation waivers. 
The retroactive application of these changes made many aliens deportable for crimes they 
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had committed in the past, and that at the time they were committed did not lead to 
deportation.  
The considerable increase in the number of aliens detained had two fundamental 
consequences. First, it overwhelmed the government’s detention capacity. As she praised 
the 1996 laws, Commissioner Meissner had to acknowledge thus, “even with the 
significant increases in resources, INS will be unable to meet the custody requirements of 
IIRIRA.”166 This is a parallel situation to the one that INS authorities in Miami, FL 
experienced in December of 1995, when lack of detention space compelled them to relax 
immigration enforcement. Due to the lack of space, Meissner explained that INS had “no 
alternative but to increasingly rely on local facilities” for the detention of aliens.167 
Contributing to the nascent crisis, the use of private and local jails sent detainees far from 
the public eye and from INS’s scrutiny.  
The second consequence of the increase in the number of aliens detained was 
overcrowding, violence, and instances of mistreatment. Across the country, detention 
conditions became progressively gruesome. A February 1998 article in The San Diego 
Union Tribune describes one of INS’s operations near the border with Mexico.168 In 
response to criticism from immigrant rights advocates about unsanitary conditions of 
detention and about the fact that INS was detaining 150 people in cells that could hold 
half as many, INS rented a motel. This did not solve the problem because female 
detainees had to sleep three-to-a-bed. To appease critics, a San Diego INS official 
clarified that “we don’t want to punish these people. All we want to do is warn them 
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about using fraudulent documents.”169 Nevertheless, 1996 laws and the way in which INS 
applied them showed otherwise. 
The 1996 laws further embedded criminalization and securitization into 
immigration policies. AEDPA and IIRIRA made fundamental changes in immigration 
laws. The 1996 laws AEDPA and IIRIRA converted the INS Detention Program into the 
fastest growing detention program within the Department of Justice, and made aliens the 
fastest growing prison population. The 1996 laws portrayed undocumented aliens as 
criminals and terrorists, which suggests that they are a direct threat to the existence of the 
American nation. Thus, the laws created extreme policies to deal with this threat such as 
mandatory detention or the limitation of judicial review. In this way, securitization had a 
deep and far-reaching impact on immigration policies and, according to Sassen, on the 
body of illegal aliens. In light of securitization’s deep imprint, policies that merely 
finesse the crackdown on illegal immigration such as detention standards would not be 
effective to prevent instances of in-custody abuses. Thus, only a critical reconsideration 
of the practice of mass immigration detention will effectively protect the rights of 
undocumented aliens. The next section turns to the securitizing policies enacted after the 
events of September 11, 2001. 
 
 
2.3. The 2000s: Security and Terrorism Rhetoric Post-9/11 
Immigration detention experienced another turn after 9/11. The policies enacted 
in the wake of the attacks mark the apogee of the securitization process. As DHS argued 
in a November 2005 press release, “since the events of 9/11, President Bush has placed 
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ever-increasing importance on immigration control … and has devoted significant 
resources to the stark challenge of illegal migration.”170 This section focuses on the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001, the REAL ID Act of 2005, and the end of catch-and-release 
policy in 2006. These measures expanded the grounds for the detention of undocumented 
aliens and made it difficult for them to seek relief from detention; thus bringing an 
increasing number of aliens under the shadow of immigration detention. As a result, 
detention conditions worsened, in-custody abuses became more grotesque, and the 
government faced increasing pressure from human rights advocates to enact binding 
detention standards. The effects of these policies suggests the high degree to which 
securitization became embedded in immigration policies. In light of such deep impact, 
neither the enactment of guidelines nor the creation of binding detention standards will 
effectively solve the crisis in immigration detention. Thus, the most effective way of 
protecting illegal aliens’ rights is that policy-makers reconsider the practice of mass 
immigration detention. 
The first example of the securitization’s tight grip over immigration policy is the 
USA PATRIOT Act. President George W. Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act into law 
on October 26, 2001.171 From behind a veil of secrecy, the Act expanded the mass 
detention of non-citizens and the use of mandatory detention. According to Shirin Sinnar, 
the Act made two substantial changes.172 First, it expanded the conditions under which an 
organization could be classified as terrorist and made aliens, even marginally related to it, 
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deportable.173 Before the USA PATRIOT Act, the label “terrorist” was reserved for 
organizations that directly threatened the security of the United States or its nationals. 
Under the Act, any organization designated by the Secretary of State in consultation with 
the Attorney General, or any organization engaged in committing, inciting or planning 
terrorist activities could be categorized as terrorist.174 Nothing depicts better the broad 
scope of the definition of terrorist than the Act’s treatment of the concept of 
“organization.” Under the USA PATRIOT Act, a terrorist organization can be “a group 
of two or more individuals, whether organized or not.”175 The lax definition of terrorism 
led to the following paradox: had the USA PATRIOT Act been enacted before 1980, it 
would have resulted in the deportation of supporters of the African National Congress 
party against apartheid.176 Second, the Act conferred a substantial degree of discretion to 
the government regarding alien certification. Certification is the process to establish that 
an alien is related to a terrorist organization. Aliens could be certified under the USA 
PATRIOT Act if the Attorney General had “reasonable grounds to believe” that the alien 
may pose a threat to national security.177 Certified aliens were to be placed under 
mandatory detention without bond.178  
The government’s attitude worsened the effects of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
According to Karen Tumlin, the government’s secretiveness made it difficult to 
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accurately evaluate the real consequences of the Act.179 Even so, it is known that there 
were more than 1,100 individuals in mandatory detention without the right to bond by 
October 2001.180 Once in detention, aliens were victims of different types of abuses. In its 
third semiannual report to Congress, the Office of the Inspector General identified over a 
thousand complaints alleging civil rights abuses related to the USA PATRIOT Act.181  
Out of the 1,043 complaints the OIG identified thirty-four that fell under its jurisdiction, 
were related to the USA PATRIOT Act, and entailed civil rights violations. According to 
the report, the complaints “ranged in seriousness from alleged beatings of immigration 
detainees to BOP correctional officers verbally abusing inmates.”182 Nevertheless, the 
government was unmoved. At a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft responded to allegations of abuses documented by the OIG. He 
stated that “we made no apologies” for holding people in detention for as long as the 
government needed to determine whether they were related to terrorism.183  
The second example of the high degree to which securitization influenced 
immigration policy is the REAL ID Act, which became law on May 11, 2005, formally as 
Division B of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief.184 Although its title says nothing about immigration, 
the REAL ID Act had different far-reaching implications for aliens and asylum seekers. 
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The Act is a product of the securitization paradigm because it frames aliens as potential 
terrorists and thus existential threats to the United States, and also because it led to more 
aliens in detention. The REAL ID Act made two sets of changes strictly related to the 
securitization of aliens. The first set of changes has to do with the asylum application 
process. Section 101 of the Act, titled “Preventing Terrorist from Obtaining Relief From 
Removal,” required asylum applicants to present evidence to corroborate that their race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion will be 
a central cause for persecution in their countries. In addition, the Act allowed for 
credibility of the applicant’s claim to be established based on the applicant’s demeanor, 
candor, or responsiveness. These placed female asylum seekers who find themselves 
unable to talk about rape in front of male asylum officers or immigration judges at great 
disadvantage. Furthermore, the Act limited the judicial review of decisions regarding the 
availability of corroborating evidence.185 Revealingly, the REAL ID Act introduced these 
changes, which placed more obstacles on the road of asylum seekers, under the premise 
of preventing terrorists from obtaining relief from removal. In reality, Section 101 of the 
Act prevents asylum seekers from finding refuge.  
The second set of changes the REAL ID Act wrought is related to the definition 
of terrorism. First, the Act broadened the definition of what counts as being engaged in 
terrorist activities. For example the REAL ID Act made inadmissible those aliens who 
received military training from or on behalf of organizations that at any point in time 
were considered terrorist organizations. In addition, the Act made inadmissible aliens 
who a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of the DHS “knows, or has 
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reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or is likely to engage after entry in any 
terrorist activity…”186 Thus, under the REAL ID Act aliens do not have to engage in 
terrorist activities in order to be considered terrorists. Second, the REAL ID expanded the 
definition of “terrorist organization.” It affirmed the definition of a terrorist organization, 
inter alia, as a “group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not …”187 
Moreover, the Act made relatives of individuals remotely connected to organizations that 
are deemed to be terrorist inadmissible and deportable. In short, the changes in 
immigration policy the REAL ID Act introduced lead to an increase in the size of the 
immigration detention population. Although the Act did not explicitly mandate the 
incarceration of aliens, by making them deportable or inadmissible the Act made them 
subject to mandatory detention. In short, the REAL ID Act further securitized illegal 
aliens: it portrayed them as terrorists and as an existential threat to the country, and 
fostered detention as the appropriate practice to deal with such threat.  
The termination of the catch and release policy is the third measure that this 
section considers to argue that securitization deeply affected immigration policies and 
became one of the roots of the current crisis in immigration detention. This measure 
expanded the practice of mass immigration detention, making an increasing number of 
aliens subject to poor detention conditions and mistreatment. Catch and release was 
informally introduced as a result of insufficient detention space. It consisted in serving 
aliens who were apprehended but could not be immediately deported with a charging 
document and releasing them until the date of the court hearing. As a result of the 
                                                 
186
 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief of 2005, Public Law 109-13, U.S. Statutes at Large 119 (2005), 306. 
187
 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief of 2005, Public Law 109-13, U.S. Statutes at Large 119 (2005), 308. 
 61 
security panic that followed the events of September 11, 2001, the government practically 
discontinued this practice. The termination of catch and release was part of the first phase 
of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). The SBI was a long term plan: the first phase, 
announced in November 2005, aimed to secure the border and the second phase, 
announced in April 2006, focused on strengthening interior enforcement.188 According to 
Kelsey Papst, although DHS announced the discontinuation of catch and release in 
November 2005, the policy effectively ended in August 2006.189 The ways in which the 
government announced the SBI and referred to catch and release are examples of 
securitization. 
The President’s depiction of the policy is an example of the securitization process. 
In a speech in May 2006 President George W. Bush argued that catch and release was an 
ineffective policy because the “vast majority” of aliens would not show up to court.190 
The statement was hyperbolic since figures for the year 2005 indicate that sixty percent 
of the aliens did appear in front of the immigration judge.191 Later, President George W. 
Bush reframed catch and release as a problem that undermined the effort of the Border 
Patrol to catch undocumented aliens.192 In a May 2007 speech he said, “one of the 
problems we had prior to the administration addressing the problem was we had what 
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was called – what happened was called catch and release.”193 Presenting catch and release 
as a problem rather than as a more or less effective policy is a way of securitizing 
undocumented aliens. This is so because whereas ineffective policies can be amended, 
problems ought to be eliminated. President George W. Bush’s description of catch and 
release as a problem foreclosed the possibility of finding a middle ground; the only 
tenable solution was to dismantle catch and release. 
The way in which immigration officials referred to catch and release is another 
example of securitization. In the press release announcing the first phase of the SBI, DHS 
Secretary Chertoff argued that illegal aliens posed a substantial problem: “the ability of 
individuals to enter our country outside legal channels is a threat to our homeland 
security.”194 Chertoff’s statement brought to the fore two fundamental components of the 
securitization paradigm: the concept of nation and the concept of an existential threat. 
First, Secretary Chertoff’s statement crystallized the differences between us, represented 
by the nation and the homeland, and them, illegal aliens. This underscored the idea that 
aliens are different from members of the nation, it contributed to creating an image of 
aliens as the other. Second, consistent with the securitization logic, Secretary Chertoff 
defined illegal aliens as a threat to “our homeland security.” This concept was expanded 
in the press release announcing the second part of the SBI in April 2006. In that occasion, 
Secretary Chertoff asserted, “illegal immigration poses an increasing threat to our 
nation.”195 At this point in time, the presence of illegal aliens was not only a threat, but 
also an increasing threat. Such an increasing challenge justified uncommonly harsh 
policies and increasing utilization of resources. Thus, a DHS September 2006 fact sheet 
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titled “Protecting the Homeland Post September 11” announced the expansion of 
detention beds to 27,500.196 
The discontinuation of catch and release was problematic. It affected primarily 
aliens other than Mexicans, since those coming from the neighbor country can be 
returned expeditiously. The fast removal of Mexican citizens is possible because they do 
not need a valid passport to return to Mexico, while aliens from other countries do. For 
those of other nationalities, the end of catch and release meant longer periods of 
detention. According to Ajmel Quereshi, the year before the termination of this policy the 
DHS only detained 34 percent of non-Mexicans for immigration violations. In contrast 
over 99 percent of non-Mexican illegal aliens were detained in 2006.197 The increase in 
the number of detainees and the shortage of detention space worsened the conditions of 
detention.198 In May 2008, an editorial in The Washington Post critiqued the impact of 
the abandonment of catch and release on the size of alien detention population and the 
quality of health care in detention centers.199 The editorial identified 83 deaths in 
detention between 2003 and 2008. Granted, a certain number of deaths in detention were 
explained by the large number of people going through immigration detention. However, 
The Washington Post states that even employees from the Division of Immigrant Health 
Services were concerned about the agency’s ability to provide adequate health care in 
light of the growing detention population. 
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This section argued that through its imprint on immigration laws, securitization 
led to a surge in immigration detention resulting in the mistreatment of immigration 
detainees. The years following the events of 9/11 witnessed the apogee of the 
securitization paradigm. The products of the securitization logic – the USA PATRIOT 
Act, the REAL ID Act and the end of catch and release policy – framed undocumented 
aliens as existential threats to the nation and caused a significant increase in their 
detention. As a consequence, detention conditions became precarious and instances of 
mistreatment became frequent. This section also contended that the securitization 
paradigm has been an established paradigm in immigration policy-making for the last 
fourteen years. In light of the deep, harmful effects of the process of securitization, the 
most effective way to solve the crisis besetting immigration detention is to dismantle the 
idea that illegal aliens are a threat to the nation. Therefore, the best avenue to protect 
immigrant rights is to reconsider the practice of mass immigration detention.  
 
2.4. The Current Legacies of the Criminalization and Securitization Paradigms 
This chapter made two arguments; first, it contended that criminalization and 
securitization had a deep impact on immigration laws and on the public perception of 
illegal aliens. Criminalization and securitization have acted as rhetorical instruments in 
the government’s crackdown on illegal immigration: justifying and calling for more 
restrictive, harsher measures against illegal aliens. Second, this chapter demonstrated that 
the impacts of criminalization and securitization are recent, deep, and detrimental to 
illegal aliens. Their recency suggests that the crisis of mass immigration detention is 
occurring at a specific point in time and that there is room for a solution. Their depth and 
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injurious nature indicate that the crisis is a grave and pressing problem that requires a 
swift and effective solution. The overcrowding of detention centers and the othering of 
illegal aliens as criminals and existential threats to the nation have led to human rights 
abuses and mistreatment of alien detainees. The next chapter considers the significant 
extent to which the government failed to address the crisis in immigration detention 
through non legally binding detention guidelines.  
 66 
3. Past and Current Proposals to Address the Crisis in Alien Detention 
The effect of criminalization and securitization on immigration policy created a 
crisis in alien detention. As the government began using detention as an immigration 
control tool and framing aliens as criminals and security threats, detention conditions 
worsened and the number of instances of in-custody abuse increased.  Progressively, the 
media and human rights groups began publicizing in-custody abuses. As a response, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) enacted a set of detention guidelines in 
1998. Because the standards did not carry the force of law, detainees were unable to 
utilize them to make legal claims; therefore, abuses continued undeterred. The increasing 
publicity of in-custody mistreatment of aliens intensified immigrant rights advocates’ 
pressure on the government to give the detention guidelines the weight of law. In light of 
the government’s indifference, in 2007 advocates formally petitioned the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to codify the standards. Two years later, DHS denied the 
petition. Upon taking office, the Obama administration recognized the gruesome 
conditions of detention and acknowledged that the immigration detention system is 
“broken.”200 In its first year in power, Obama administration promised structural reforms 
and enacted some promising changes. Yet, these have been insufficient to resolve the 
crisis in immigration detention. Therefore, advocates’ proposal of binding detention 
standards remains on the table. 
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3.1. The First Set of Standards 
In January 1998, INS created twelve non-binding standards to regulate 
immigration detention. According to immigrant rights advocates, public exposure of in-
custody abuses motivated the creation of the standards. The deception of Congress at 
Krome and the riot at Elizabeth revealed severe problems with immigration detention.201 
According to INS Commissioner Doris Meissner, implementing detention standards was 
part of INS’s “policy to treat all aliens in custody with dignity and respect” and as part of 
a commitment to “provide a safe and humane environment for all individuals held in its 
custody.”202 Furthermore, the standards were an attempt to homogenize conditions of 
detention across dissimilar facilities, a pressing issue in the light of an ever-increasing 
detention population: by 1998 INS detained a daily average of 16,400 aliens.203 With 
these standards, INS intended to address the concerning dearth of regulations. Before 
1998, the only norms governing immigration detention were twenty-four hour 
supervision, conformance with safety and emergency codes, food service, and availability 
of emergency care.204 The 1998 standards covered issues of access to legal materials, 
population counts, marriage requests, telephone access, visitation, detainee voluntary 
work program, group legal rights presentations, clothing, access to medical care, religious 
practices, suicide prevention and intervention, and hunger strikes. The standards applied 
to Service Processing Centers, such as Krome, and contract facilities, such as Elizabeth, 
but not to local jails.  
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Immigrant rights advocates had a marginal participation in the creation of the 
standards. The INS requested informal feedback from immigrant rights advocates and 
from the American Bar Association. INS Commissioner Meissner, who expressed 
satisfaction with the standards, explained that they were based on policies from INS, the 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the American Correctional Association (ACA). 
Nevertheless, she did not explain why criminal detention standards were used to devise 
detention standards for administrative detainees. Recall that, compared to criminal 
incarceration, immigration detention is administrative in nature and ought not to be 
punitive. Notwithstanding the inadequacy of criminal standards as a model for 
immigration detention guidelines, Meissner praised ACA standards and because they 
would “ensure detainee rights are not violated.”205 History proved her wrong. 
The 1998 standards failed to solve the crisis in immigration detention in three 
distinct ways. First, they did not apply to local jails.206 Although INS knew that it held 
contracts with hundreds of local jails, which housed a significant percentage of the 
immigration detention population, the agency decided to omit local facilities from the 
purview of the 1998 standards. According to official statistics, as of February 1998 the 
INS had agreements with over a thousand state, county and local jails.207 Moreover, the 
law stated that existent jails were to be used before constructing new facilities, which 
meant that the use of local jails would become more widespread.208 For this reason, the 
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exemption of local facilities from the requirements of the 1998 detention standard reflects 
INS’s willful neglect of the large percentage of aliens who were housed in these facilities. 
According to INS officials, the reason was the lack of space. In the words of Kristine 
Marcy, Senior Counsel at INS Office of Field Operations, “it is not in INS’s interest to 
force the jails to meet certain standards because we need the space … contractually, you 
cannot force the jails to do certain things. It’s a dilemma.”209 Revealingly, the dilemma is 
whether aliens are detained in humane conditions rather than whether mass immigration 
detention is desirable. Senior Counsel Marcy’s statement suggests that despite the fact 
that INS was aware that detention compromised human rights, the agency chose to 
introduce only cosmetic reforms.  
Second, the 1998 standards failed to create humane conditions of detention 
because they were implemented in a decentralized manner. Oversight of the standards’ 
implementation was left in the hands of the officers in charge of detention facilities. 
These local officers were to report back to INS district director, who reported to INS 
regional director. This meant that individual officers were requested to apply uniform 
standards in highly diverse contexts. As Meissner indicated in her Congressional 
testimony, “INS’ detention operations are complex because of the diverse populations 
within the two categories of detainees – criminal aliens and non-criminals. We detain 
adult males and females, juveniles and even families. Each of these groups presents 
complex security, administrative, and even social issues to our detention program 
managers.”210 Third, the 1998 standards failed to address mistreatment of detainees 
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because they were legally unenforceable, merely an INS’s internal policy, which 
detainees could not use to make legal claims. 
In its report Locked Away, Human Rights Watch heavily criticized the 1998 
standards. The report indicated that in 1998 INS held sixty percent of its detainees in 
local facilities.211 After interviewing over 200 alien detainees at different facilities, 
Human Rights Watch concluded that they were often treated in the same way as regular 
prisoners, that medical and dental care were substandard, and that detainees had limited 
access to attorneys and families.  The report expressed concerns about the lack of binding 
detention regulations: “There are no laws, federal regulations or INS policy governing 
how local jails holding INS detainees should be inspected or monitored.”212 For this 
reason, Human Rights Watch called on the INS to devise comprehensive national 
standards that applied to all types of facilities and to promulgate these standards as 
federal regulations.213 
Although the 1998 standards were ineffective to improve detention conditions, 
they succeed in raising public awareness about the gruesome conditions in detention 
facilities. Although detainees faced significant obstacles to access counsel, awareness led 
to civil litigation and formal complaints. In 1999, Salvador G. Longoria and Michele 
Gaudin sued the Orleans Parish Prison in New Orleans on behalf of thirteen Asian 
detainees who had been beaten by guards. The suit was settled in September 1999 and the 
detainees were ordered released.214 Suits were also filed by detainees at the Passaic 
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County Jail in New Jersey and the San Pedro Jail in Los Angeles.215 Two-dozen detainees 
from the Hudson County Correctional Center (Kearny, NJ) sent a letter to INS 
complaining of unsanitary conditions in detention, lack of legal representation and of 
frequent transfers that were causing them to miss court deadlines resulting in 
deportation.216 
In tandem with litigation, human rights organizations did significant research and 
fact-finding in detention facilities. In 1999 and 2000, Human Rights Watch conducted 
several visits to the San Pedro Processing Center and to INS’s staging area. Allyson 
Collins, a researcher for the organization, summarized the results of the visits in a letter 
to INS Commissioner Doris Meissner.217 For each facility it identified which standards 
were unmet and which situations fell beyond the scope of the 1998 guidelines but need to 
be addressed. Besides overcrowding, Collins raised concerns about lack of medical 
treatment, the lack of hygiene, and the humiliating nature of body searches among other 
issues. The report that came out of the visitations was the first to use the 1998 guidelines 
as units of measurement. 
In summary, the design and oversight of the 1998 standards prevented them from 
accomplishing INS’s goal to make immigration detention humane and protect 
immigrant’s rights. Although the standards’ limited scope and non-binding nature left 
many detainees unprotected, they generated an avalanche of complaints. These led to the 
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formulation of National Detention Standards (NDS) in 2000, by then, the number of 
detainees annually held by INS was 20,000.218 
 
3.2. The National Detention Standards 
INS released the NDS on November 13, 2000.219 The original set contained thirty-
six standards and was later expanded to thirty-eight. The NDS entered into force on 
January 1, 2001 and came into full effect in 2003. Though not legally binding, the NDS 
were more comprehensive than the 1998 guidelines and applied to all Service Processing 
Centers, Contract Detention Facilities, and to those Intergovernmental Service 
Agreements (local jails) that held detainees for more than seventy-two hours. As with the 
1998 standards, the negotiation leading to the NDS incorporated feedback from several 
parties: the Department of Justice, the American Bar Association and other immigrant 
rights advocacy organizations.220 The government, advocates, and media reactions bring 
to the fore the different attitudes towards illegal aliens in detention and crystallize some 
of the processes at play in the crisis of alien detention. 
Government officials underscored the positive changes that the NDS aimed to 
make in immigration detention. Notably, the arguments replicated those offered in 1998. 
First, officials argued that the NDS were to improve safety, security and fairness. 
According to Meissner, who resigned shortly after the standards were released, “our 
continued goal is to provide safe, secure and humane conditions of detention for all aliens 
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in INS custody.”221 A White House press release argued that the implementation of the 
standards would ensure that “those detained, particularly those who have pending asylum 
cases, are treated fairly.”222 Second, officials stated that the standards would create 
uniformity. In fact, their concerns about the heterogeneity in the immigration detention 
system were correct because the 1998 standards had done nothing to smooth the 
differences. Moreover, the constant increase in the detention population sharpened the 
contrasts between detention facilities across the country. The roots of the entropy were 
INS’s decentralized structure and the outsourcing of immigration detention and law 
enforcement to local authorities. INS spokeswoman Kareen Kraushaar explained the 
prevailing disharmony in geographical terms, saying that the United States “is a big 
country, and there are many different types of facilities.”223 Because discrepancies in 
detention practices across the country had become problematic, the government argued 
that the standards would assure “a basic level of care” to everybody.224 Third, 
government officials asserted that the NDS would enhance implementation and 
monitoring. According to INS spokeswoman Kraushaar, “in 1998, the standards were 
basically just put out there with very little training … Now the training will be significant 
to ensure that the standards are integrated, accepted, and adopted throughout the 
detention system.”225  
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Notably, government officials openly denied that the NDS were a response to a 
crisis in immigration detention. According to INS Director of Media Relations Russell 
Bergeron Jr., the standards were not conceived to address “major systemic issues in our 
own facilities.”226 In fact, they were devised, Bergeron said, to “provide standards and 
specific guidelines in all facilities.”227 The reluctance to admit that the standards 
answered to appalling conditions of detention is a manifestation of the effects of the 
criminalization and securitization paradigms. The framing of undocumented aliens as 
criminals and security threats had led to their dehumanization, and therefore, to the 
notion that they did not possess rights and that whatever rights they obtained were a 
privilege. Furthermore, while INS officials extolled the standards for all the benefits they 
were meant to bring, they were well aware that the NDS were mere guidelines. In fact, 
history would prove that, like the 1998 standards, the NDS achieved little in terms of 
preventing human rights abuses in detention centers.  
The government’s celebration of the 2000 detention guidelines served to further 
criminalize illegal aliens. In the same press release announcing the creation of the NDS, 
the White House equated illegal immigration with crime. The release stated that the Bush 
administration was committed to “removing those who have entered the country illegally 
and to detaining criminal aliens.”228 Though apparently a minor detail, the mention of 
illegal aliens and criminal aliens in the same sentence is significant. Recall that the 
criminalization and securitization of illegal aliens occur primarily through acts of speech. 
In the same paragraph, the White House used “deportable aliens” and “criminals” as 
synonyms: “INS will continue to target its efforts primarily on removing deportable 
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aliens held in Federal, State and local facilities to ensure that these criminal aliens are not 
allowed back on the street.”229 The equation of deportable and criminal aliens bears 
witness to the underlying assumption that immigration violations are criminal violations. 
While it is true that criminal aliens are deportable, the percentage of aliens in detention 
with criminal records has been historically low. A recent study by the Transactional 
Records Access Clearinghouse of the University of Syracuse shows that between 2005 
and 2008 the number of non-criminal detainees doubled, while the number of criminal 
detainees remained practically constant.230 According to Dr. Schriro’s231 October 2009 
report, only 11 percent of detained aliens have committed serious crimes, such as 
aggravated assault, rape, murder, robbery, arson, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor 
vehicle theft.232 The relative number of criminal aliens to the number of non-criminal 
detainees suggests that the equation of “criminal” and “deportable” lacks foundations. 
Immigrant rights advocates were ambivalent towards the creation of the NDS. 
They emphasized that the standards were long overdue and welcomed the uniformity that 
they were supposed to create.233 According to Chris Nugent, director of the immigration 
pro-bono project at the American Bar Association, immigration detention was 
excessively arbitrary. Nugent argued that the system was fragmented and that the 
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disproportionate amount of power local actors enjoyed resulted in disobedience.234 In 
fact, neither set of standards was able to solve the problems of arbitrariness and 
decentralization. Chapter four argues that these issues make binding detention standards 
an impractical solution to in-custody abuses of detainees.  
Immigrant rights advocates expressed two different concerns regarding the NDS. 
The first concern was that the standards lacked the weight of law. According to Judy 
Rabinovitz, senior staff attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union, detention 
facilities were not used to comply with detention regulations such as the standards set by 
the American Correctional Association.235 Therefore “the non-enforceable nature of the 
standards could prevent conditions in detention centers from improving.”236 Jail officers 
and county sheriffs echoed the idea that the unenforceable nature of the standards would 
become an obstacle. Bart Chavez, an immigration attorney in Omaha, argued that due to 
INS’s dullness in performing basic tasks and its lack of manpower, the creation of 
detention guidelines would “convolute things much more.”237 In fact, advocates’ concern 
about the limited effect of the NDS proved to be correct. The second concern that 
advocates voiced was that the standards were incomplete. According to Hussein 
Shadruddin, an attorney for the Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under Texas Law, 
the standards were “a good start” but came up short.238 Indeed, immigrant rights 
advocates asserted that the standards did not address issues such as frequent transfers of 
detainees without the notification of the lawyers.239  
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Unlike the government, the media made it clear that the standards sought to 
address in-custody violation of immigrant rights. The New York Times introduced the 
NDS as follows: “After scores of complaints and lawsuits concerning physical and 
mental abuse of aliens detained in county jails and other detention centers, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service has issued national standards for the treatment of 
its detainees.”240 Similarly, an article in The Record begins: “Confronted with riots, 
hunger strikes, and scores of allegations of abuse and inhumane conditions, the federal 
immigration agency has established standards for the treatment of foreign nationals 
detained in its custody.”241  
Some journalists introduced the NDS as an overreaction on the part of INS. Dane 
Schiller for the San Antonio Express-News explained that the standards called “for special 
treatment regarding everything from telephoning lawyers to changing underwear.”242 In 
his article for the New York Times, Chris Hedges indicated: “The new standards, cover 
everything from visiting policies to grievance procedures.”243These arguments were 
based, first, on the unfounded assumption that immigration detention was comparable to 
criminal detention. According to Chris Hedges, “for all the horror stories, no one is 
suggesting that the immigrant prisoners are treated any worse than the native-born 
prisoners in the county jails.”244 The New York Times journalist’s argument is similar to 
that of Sarpy County, NE, Sheriff Patrick Thomas, who claimed that there were no 
reasons for concern about immigration detention because all detainees, criminal and 
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immigration alike, received equal treatment.245 Second these arguments were based on 
journalists’ ambiguous descriptions of the NDS. For instance, an Associated Press article 
indicated that the standards covered “some three dozen areas,” when in fact they only 
covered three main areas: detainee services, security and control, and health services.246 
While the NDS were not an overreaction, they added to the extensive volume of 
information that detention facilities, particularly those housing immigration and criminal 
detainees, had to process. The large volume of information that detention facilities 
administrators must peruse and digest indeed creates space for the argument that the NDS 
were staggering. The 2000 standards can be found on ICE’s website in individual files, 
each containing several pages. Each file states the policy, defines the range of 
applicability of the standards, then outlines the way in which the policy is to be applied 
and finally contains several pages of tables and related forms. The total number of pages 
describing policies and their range of applicability is two hundred. While this may seem 
overwhelming, consider the standards that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the 
American Correctional Association (ACA) set for criminal detention. The BOP operates 
federal detention facilities, and its regulations take 161 pages of the Code of Federal 
Regulations.247 In addition, the agency periodically publishes Policy Statements, which 
are divided into eight different series.248 The ACA certifies detention facilities that 
comply with its national standards. Notably, ACA’s standards are compiled into twenty-
one manuals, each corresponding to a specific type of detention facility or correctional 
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program. Thus, the NDS were not significantly more complex than BOP or ACA’s 
regulations.  
Other journalists argued that the standards were incomplete and pointed to their 
unenforceable nature. An editorial in the St. Petersburg Times identified two main 
flaws.249 The first issue was that jails lacked incentives to enforce the standards because 
the NDS were only suggestions. The second problem was the omission of important 
aspects, such as the transfer of detainees, which have a significant impact on detainees’ 
ability to seek counsel. Thus, the editor recommended INS to “give these suggestions 
teeth” and to include the relevant issues that were left out.  
The different reactions to the NDS on the part of the government, advocates, and 
the media brought to the fore three important issues. First, they revealed that the 
standards were useless to detainees because they were not legally binding. In this regard, 
the progressive wording of the policy statements contrasted with their ineffectiveness as a 
tool to seek redress. For instance, the standards requested detention facilities to “provide 
detainees with nutritious, attractively presented meals, prepared in a sanitary manner,” 
but failed to prevent that detainees were fed uncooked food or food that was still 
frozen.250 Second, the NDS added to an already extensive volume of information that 
detention facilities, especially those housing also criminal detainees, had to process. This 
was more so in local jails housing aliens and citizens. Third, the NDS left important 
issues unaddressed. One of them was that they did not regulate the transfer of detainees. 
According to a 2009 report by Human Rights Watch, INS/ICE conducted 1.4 million 
transfers between 1999 and 2008. Although transfers are sometimes necessary to provide 
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detainees with medical care, they often jeopardize detainees’ access to legal counsel and 
contact with family members.251 Another limitation was that the NDS did not apply to 
local facilities holding alien detainees for less than three days.  In effect, the NDS 
promised too much but accomplished too little.  
 
3.3. The Performance-Based Standards and a Denied Petition 
In tandem with the increase in immigration enforcement after 9/11 described in 
chapter two, the impracticality of the guidelines standards to solve the crisis in 
immigration detention paved the way for more in-custody abuses of aliens’ rights. The 
mistreatment of alien detainees resulted in bad publicity for DHS, which had taken over 
INS’s functions in 2003. In December 2006, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
found instances of noncompliance with the NDS at five immigration detention 
facilities.252 Perhaps not surprisingly, Krome was one of them. The OIG found that 
several facilities failed to provide adequate medical care and food, and that conditions of 
detention in many of them were improper.253 Motivated by the report, over a dozen 
human rights organizations wrote a letter to the DHS petitioning the agency to codify the 
standards.254 Among the signatories there were American Friends Service Committee 
Immigrant Rights Programme, the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, the 
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Centre for Constitutional Rights, and the Seton Hall University Law Centre for Social 
Justice. 
Advocates presented a more formal request shortly afterwards. On January 25, 
2007, a group of immigrant rights organizations and individual immigration detainees 
filed a petition, pursuant the Administrative Procedures Act, for the DHS to initiate 
rulemaking.255 This time, it was not individual parties, but a coalition of some of the most 
important legal and immigrant’s rights organizations in the country. The signatories were 
the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association, the American Immigration Law Foundation Legal 
Action Center, Casa de Proyecto Libertad, the Catholic Legal Immigration Network Inc., 
Families for Freedom, and the National Immigrant Justice Center.  In addition, eighty-
four individual alien detainees endorsed the petition. All of them were represented by 
Attorney Michael Wishnie, a Professor of Law at the Yale Law School. The participation 
of different organizations reveals the high degree of relevance that the issue of in-custody 
abuses had attained by early 2007.  
The Petition for Rulemaking (henceforth, the Petition) is an exceptional document 
for the study of the controversy surrounding immigration detention standards. The 
Petition traced the history of the detention standards, identified the problems that beset 
immigration detention and explained the reasons why the DHS should promulgate 
regulations governing the detention of non-citizens. The text underscored the importance 
of the 1998 and 2000 standards in “creating uniformity among facilities and 
acknowledging the necessity for safe and humane treatment of immigrant detainees.”256 
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Nonetheless, because abuses in detention persisted, “without meaningful enforcement, 
the DOM [Detention Operations Manual] alone is insufficient to assure uniform and 
human treatment of detainees.”257 The petition thus proposed four different ways in 
which the standards could be codified and emphasized the importance of including all 
detention facilities, especially local jails and facilities holding detainees for less than 
seventy-two hours, under the scope of the standards.  
The Petition provided six justifications for the codification of detention standards. 
On the one hand, these reasons echoed the arguments put forward thus far. On the other 
hand, as the next paragraphs note, the arguments contained certain logical and practical 
gaps, which reveal the extent to which detention standards are an impractical solution to 
the current crisis in immigration detention. 
A. Regulations are needed to insure uniformity and consistency in detention 
condition, an announced agency priority. 
In the light of staggering differences among detention centers, binding regulations would 
force all detention facilities to operate in the same way and to reach the same results. In 
other words, binding standards would force uniformity. Although solving the disharmony 
besetting immigration detention was a paramount endeavor, the Petition did not address 
why uniformity would be a consequence of, rather than a necessary factor for, legally 
enforceable standards. Consider that ACA has different manuals with regulations for 
different types of facilities. Given the significant discrepancies between government-
managed immigration detention centers and small local jails, it is doubtful that binding 
standards will bring all facilities into line and it is also questionable whether subjecting 
all facilities to the exact same standards is desirable. 
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B. The expanding detainee population, housed in the absence of uniform 
standards, risks exposing DHS to legal liability and adverse publicity. 
The petitioners argued that binding standards would shield the DHS from litigation and 
the bad publicity originated by the results of a growing detainee population. However, 
unless the binding standards were internalized, they would continue to be an ex post facto 
solution to in-custody abuses. Rather than preventing abuses from happening, the 
standards would create consequences for violations.  
C. DHS can better monitor and assure quality control in all of its facilities 
through the promulgation of standards. 
The petition stated that binding standards placed DHS at a better position in bargaining 
with private contractors and local detention facilities. Once the standards have the force 
of law, the argument holds, ICE will be better able to threaten non-complying parties 
with termination of the contract. This idea suggested a process of “survival of the fittest” 
among contractors in as much as the standards placed them in a position in which they 
must either comply or exit the market. Although incentives in the form of regulations are 
an attractive strategy, the fact that local facilities and private contractors agreed to 
comply with the regulations did not imply that they would actually do so. In this sense, 
binding standards were, again, an ex post facto solution. Moreover, the petitioners did not 
address the fact that, even with incentives in place, ICE would have to effectively oversee 
compliance.  
D. Regulations are needed so DHS can preserve the health and welfare of 
detainees, prevent cruel and improper treatment, and reduce liability for violating 
the constitutional rights of detainees. 
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The idea that binding detention standards are essential to insure adequate treatment of 
alien detainees is the most compelling argument the petitioners put forward. In fact, as 
this thesis shows, the increasing use of immigration detention has led to poor conditions 
of confinement and abuses. In light of the human and constitutional rights that aliens 
enjoy, enacting legally enforceable detention standard would provide them with a tool to 
defend their rights in a court of law. 
E. DHS should emulate the bureau of prisons’ promulgation of binding 
regulations. 
The suggestion that the DHS should follow the Bureau of Prisons’ approach to detention 
is suggestive and compelling. The Petition explained that the BOP was created in the 
thirties due to overcrowding to preserve inmates’ wellbeing. The BOP published binding 
regulations governing detention practices between 1976 and 1979. Notably, these 
regulations, now included in the Code of Federal Regulations, were passed due to public 
outcry about conditions of detention.  
F. Codification of humane detention standards will complement U.S. foreign 
policy goals and strengthen compliance with international norms. 
The Petition argued that inadequate detention conditions are detrimental to the United 
States because, once removed, aliens would take this negative impression to their home 
countries. In addition, the petitioners argue that binding standards would facilitate United 
States compliance with international agreements on the subject of detention. As this 
thesis has shown, immigration detention policies in the United States criminalize and 
securitize aliens to a significant extent. It is also true that a significant number of binding 
and non-binding international agreements enshrine the rights of detained aliens and aliens 
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in general. However, as discussed in chapter one, the United States has on several 
occasions shown reluctance to apply and subject itself to international law. Therefore, the 
United States skepticism towards international law weakens the relevance of this 
argument. 
Although DHS did not respond to the petition initially, the exchange between the 
President of the American Bar Association Karen Mathis and DHS Secretary Michael 
Chertoff foretold the outcome of the Petition. Shortly after the Petition was filed, Mathis 
wrote to Chertoff. After explaining the ABA’s concerns with immigration detention, she 
asserted that legally binding standards were necessary because the solutions that the 
government had offer until then had been ineffective. Mathis said, “still, the Inspector 
General found, and we continue to hear, that immigrants do not have consistent, 
meaningful access to telephones or mail or adequate legal materials.”258 In addition, she 
pointed out that since 2003 ABA had received over a hundred letters of complaint from 
detainees at different facilities. In his response, Chertoff recognized the importance of 
ensuring “full NDS compliance by ICE officers” and of “providing safe, secure, and 
humane conditions of detention” to all immigration detainees.259 However, he indicated 
that codifying the standards could be “a lengthy and resource-intensive process” and that 
updating them would be “laborious,” “protracted,” and would “undermine” DHS’s 
flexibility to respond to “changing circumstances.” 
The stark contrast between advocates’ and DHS’s arguments suggests the 
existence of two parallel perceptions of the immigration detention systems. One of them 
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is plagued with instances of abuses of detainees’ rights exacerbated by improper 
oversight, excessive decentralization and lack of binding rules. The other runs smoothly, 
is concerned about the wellbeing of detainees and is effectively supervised. In May 2007,  
ICE spokeswoman Jamie Zuieback, stated that the immigration detention system was 
indeed performing well. When she was confronted with evidence of inadequate 
conditions of detention, Zuieback retorted, “I think you’ll see that our facilities are quite 
safe and humane.”260  
Notwithstanding DHS’s claims that the practice of immigration detention was 
humane, and that internal oversight was effective, investigations kept showing a different 
reality. In July 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that in spite 
of ICE’s annual reviews of detention facilities, the agency was unaware of pervasive 
problems with detainees’ access to telephones in twenty-three detention centers.261 The 
GAO identified monitoring shortcomings as “insufficient internal controls and 
weaknesses in ICE’s compliance review process.”262 The report echoed Mathis’s 
argument that “a new solution” was necessary because of flawed oversight.263 Advocates 
and the media’s increasing focus on in-custody deaths brought to light ICE’s lack of 
information about deaths in detention centers.264 After the release of GAO’s report, an 
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editorial in the Washington Post reflected public concern with immigration detention, 
calling on ICE to “treat detained migrants fairly.”265 
After a year of waiting for a response to the Petition, and in light of well-
documented inadequate conditions of detention, advocates filed a lawsuit against DHS. 
The attorney for the plaintiff, Michael Wishnie, filed the Complaint on April 30, 2008 to 
the United States Court of the Southern District of New York. The Complaint argued that 
Secretary Chertoff was in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act for failing to 
respond to advocates’ Petition within reasonable time. The Complaint reiterated the 
arguments outlined in the Petition: the fast increase in the immigration detention 
population, the high number of immigration detention facilities, the fact that most abuses 
occurred in state and local facilities, the inconsistent conditions of detention that 
motivated INS to enact the first set of standards, and the fact that the NDS did not apply 
to the 150 facilities that housed detainees for less than seventy-two hours.266 It also 
provided five justifications for binding standards: the nonbinding nature of the NDS, the 
lack of incentives for detention centers to comply with the NDS, the lack of an effective 
enforcement mechanism, the inadequate or nonexistent training jail employees receive, 
and the lack of a mechanism for detainees to report abuses. The Complaint requested the 
Court to direct Secretary Chertoff to design binding standards to regulate the detention of 
aliens. 
Secretary Chertoff responded more than two months after advocates filed the 
Complaint. In a latter dated July 15, 2008, the agency said that ICE would “continue to 
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study the possibility of commencing a rulemaking action” and outlined the DHS’s efforts 
to enhance the conditions of immigration detention.267 However, as District Judge Denny 
Chin later stated, this response was not a “response” as a matter of law. In fact, Chertoff’s 
letter left the question of whether the DHS would initiate a rulemaking procedure 
unanswered. 
While DHS placed the Petition on the back burner, it released new detention 
standards. On September 12, 2008 the agency published a set of 41 standards, known as 
Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS). These were the product of 
an eighteen-month revision of the NDS, which a new set of ACA standards, released in 
June 2004, had prompted.268 DHS revised the PBNDS shortly after their release, on 
December 5, 2008, and added an additional standard on February 20, 2009.269 The new 
standards focused on expected outcomes rather than procedures. They incorporated 
guidelines on news media interviews and tours, searches and detainees, sexual abuse and 
assault prevention and intervention, and staff training. According to ICE’s website, the 
PBNDS were a “natural progression and build upon the NDS.”270 The PBNDS entered 
into effect in January 2010. 
Although ICE praised the PBNDS as a step forward, the standards remained non-
binding. This raised concerns among advocates. According to the Detention Watch 
Network’s website, “the standards remain mere guidelines for which ICE cannot be held 
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accountable through recourse to the courts.”271 The PBNDS’s non-binding nature was 
problematic; first, because it made it difficult for detainees to seek redress for in-custody 
abuses, and second, because it made it hard for them to argue their cases against 
deportation. Thus, the devise of performance based standards as a solution to in-custody 
abuses and poor conditions of detention proved ineffective.  
Upon the release of the PBNDS it became clear that the media, advocates, and 
even Congress did not hope that the standards would make a significant positive change 
in immigration detention. First, unlike the 2000 standards, the media barely noticed the 
creation of the PBNDS’s. In fact, newspapers paid greater attention to reports of in-
custody abuses and deaths. Second, Representative Lucille Roybal-Allard, who called the 
detention conditions “shameful,” introduced the Immigration Oversight and Fairness Act 
of 2008 to create rules governing the protection of minor and women and detention 
conditions such as access to telephones, medical care, sexual abuse complaints, and 
transfer of detainees.272 According to Representative Roybal-Allard, “although federal 
immigration authorities adopted detention standards in 1998 and 2000, you wouldn’t 
know it today.”273 As a response to appalling conditions of detention and DHS’s inaction, 
the bill, which did not pass and was reintroduced in February 2009, drew support from 
immigrant rights organizations.274 
The DHS’s disregard for aliens in detention became clearer in during the last 
months of the Bush administration. On October 15, 2008, the agency requested the court 
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to dismiss the Petition.275 District Court Judge Denny Chin reserved his decision and tried 
to have the parties – advocates for binding standards and the DHS – negotiate an 
agreement. The DHS promised that it would reach a decision by January 16, 2009. On 
that day, it asked for a four day extension. By then, the Obama administration had taken 
office. On January 21, 2009, the Department declared that previous letters only 
represented the DHS’s perspective “at the time” they were issued, that it would miss the 
January 21, 2009 deadline, and that “it could not commit to a specific date” to reach a 
decision about plaintiffs’ petition.276 
The DHS did not reach a decision until they were ordered to do so. On June 6, 
2009, Judge Chin denied the DHS’s motion to dismiss the petition for rulemaking and 
declared the two and a half years delay “unreasonable as a matter of law.”277 
Simultaneously, Judge Chin gave DHS thirty days to respond to the Petition. The 
response came twenty-nine days later and was not surprising. In a letter dated July 24, 
2009, DHS Deputy Secretary Jane Holl Lute denied the petition for rulemaking. The 
overarching justification for the denial was that the recently released PBNDS were 
sufficient and that creating binding standards would be “laborious, time consuming, and 
less flexible.” Revealingly, these were the same reasons Secretary Chertoff put forward in 
his letter to ABA President Karen Mathis on March 19, 2007. The fact that the DHS used 
the same arguments that it had expressed two years before raises the question whether the 
Department actually gave the Petition any serious consideration. 
Yet more striking were the particular grounds on which the DHS denied the 
Petition. First, Deputy Secretary Lute argued that, because immigration detainees were 
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not comparable to criminal detainees, the argument that ICE should follow the Bureau of 
Prisons was invalid. Inasmuch as alien detainees are civil, not criminal detainees this is 
true. Notably, both plaintiffs and the defendant use the same assumption: immigration 
detention is not criminal detention. However, they reach opposite conclusions. For 
immigrant rights advocates, the differential nature of immigration detention was the 
reason why binding standards had to be enacted. For DHS, the differential nature of 
immigration detention was the reason why binding standards were unnecessary. Because 
immigration detainees are not criminals, they spend shorter periods of time in detention 
and therefore have different medical needs. In this way, DHS distinguished “health care” 
from “health maintenance.” The former applied to alien detainees, the second to remand 
(criminal) prisoners. While the DHS based its argument on a valid premise – immigration 
detention is radically different from criminal detention – it reached an erroneous 
conclusion. The first reason is that DHS’s argument took the comparison between 
administrative and criminal detention out of its usual context. The second reason is that 
available reports show that administrative and criminal detainees often suffer from 
similar ailments. After all, both aliens and criminals belong to the human species.  
The second argument DHS used to justify the denial of the Petition was that the 
new PBNDS already addressed the petitioners’ concerns. To make his point, Deputy 
Secretary Lute referred to some of the issues that the PBNDS covered, namely media 
interviews and tours, searches and detainees’ sexual abuse and assault prevention and 
intervention, and staff training. While these issues had been left out of the 2000 NDS, 
these aspects were only peripheral to detention and the petitioners’ concerns were broader 
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than those four issues. For this reason, the argument that the PBNDS addressed the 
concerns raised in the petition is untenable. 
The third explanation for the denial of the Petition was that the DHS had 
implemented other oversight mechanisms besides the PBNDS. In particular, Deputy 
Secretary Lute mentioned the creation of the Detention Facilities Inspection Group. This 
organ, operating within the Office of Professional Responsibility was in charge of 
reviewing inspection of detention facilities in terms of compliance with the PBNDS.278 
Fourth, DHS argued that the creation of binding standards was not a substitute for 
effective management of detention facilities. Because, according to Deputy Secretary 
Lute, DHS was committed to effective management, it was not necessary to create legally 
enforceable standards. This fourth argument presented a false dichotomy. Although it is 
true that, as DHS argues, “judicially enforceable regulations are no substitute for 
management of facilities,” this does not imply that enforceable rules and effective 
management are mutually exclusive. In fact, they logically seem two sides of the same 
coin because binding rules have the potential to make detention management efficient by 
establishing standard procedures and responsibilities. To summarize, DHS’s reasons to 
repeal the Petition were haphazard and suggested that the agency did not seriously 
consider the argument that immigrant rights advocates put forward. 
 
3.4. Policies under the Obama Administration 
While the Obama administration slammed the door to binding standards, it strived 
to champion a slightly different approach to the practice of immigration detention. The 
Obama administration took office with the aim of enacting comprehensive immigration 
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reform, a project several times unsuccessfully attempted by the Bush administration. 
However, the administration found significant challenges. In the area of alien detention 
these were the increasing number of deaths in detention and mounting allegations of poor 
conditions of confinement. Given the urgency of these issues and the magnitude of the 
project of comprehensive immigration reform, the administration took a pragmatic 
approach. At a press conference on April 29, 2009, President Obama stated his goal of 
earning public confidence before attempting comprehensive reform.279 To do so, the 
administration put forward a two-pronged approach: switching from factory raids to 
employer verification and working with the existent legal framework. Although the 
approach aimed to gain public confidence primarily by securing the border, the 
administration acknowledged the pressing nature of the problems with alien detention 
and their significance to the immigrant community. 
Although DHS’s officials argued that humanizing immigration detention was a 
priority, its actions conveyed a significant degree of ambivalence.280 On the one hand, the 
administration took some significant steps. For instance, DHS hired Dr. Schriro to head 
the Office of Detention Policy and Planning, act as Special Advisor to Secretary Janet 
Napolitano on immigration detention,  and to conduct a review of immigration detention. 
While the government’s acknowledgement of the crisis was a fundamental first step, the 
administration deferred meaningful changes to a later point in time. On the other hand, 
DHS announced the expansion of local enforcement programs, which chapter four argues 
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has starkly increased the number of detained aliens and has led to racial profiling.281 
Furthermore, in February 2009, ICE conducted a raid at shop in Bellingham, WA without 
the knowledge of DHS’s headquarters, in which twenty-eight illegal aliens were 
arrested.282 The raid caused public outcry not only because it was done behind the back of 
DHS but also because it contradicted the administration promise of switching from 
factory raids to employer verification. As reports of in-custody abuses kept piling up and 
meaningful changes were slow to happen, some newspapers began comparing President 
Barack Obama’s approach to alien detention with that of his predecessor. 283 The lack of 
a prompt solution to the crisis in immigration detention conveyed the idea that the new 
administration was “finessing” the crackdown on illegal aliens that previous 
administrations had begun284 and that a “firm stance on immigrants”285 remained the 
policy. 
Yet, in spite of the Obama administration’s initial inaction, the assessment of 
immigration detention practices bore fruit. On August 6, 2009, ICE announced a series of 
measures to overhaul immigration detention. The document released by the agency is a 
valuable object of study.286 It summarized ICE’s perspective on the state of affairs in 
immigration detention and outlined the agency’s aims for the future. ICE’s diagnosis 
stated that the primary problem besetting the immigration detention system was the lack 
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of federal oversight and management. This argument should come at no surprise. In fact, 
aliens are detained in 350 facilities around the country, the facilities vary in nature and 
most of them are not operated by ICE employees. In addition, ICE tangentially 
mentioned that alien detainees were housed in facilities designed for “penal, not civil 
detention.”287 That suggests the significant degree to which illegal aliens are 
criminalized. Not only they are framed as lawbreakers (even when some of them have no 
criminal record), but they are also housed in jails. With respect to ICE’s future goals, the 
agency indicated that in the next three to five years it would reduce reliance on jails and 
“design facilities located and operated for immigration detention purposes.”288 In order to 
centralize immigration detention and move it back into the civil sphere, ICE took seven 
concrete steps. The most significant actions were: the creation of an Office of Detention 
Policy and Planning (ODPP) led by Dr. Schriro to devise a “new civil detention system to 
meet the needs of ICE,”289 the recruitment and hiring of twenty-three ICE detention 
managers to replace the privately contracted inspectors at twenty-three facilities, the 
establishment of the Office of Detention Oversight to investigate detainee grievances, and 
the discontinuation of the use of the T. don Hutto Family Residential Center in Texas. 
The reforms announced in early August show that in spite of the initial lethargy, ICE was 
taking some initial steps in addressing human rights abuses in detention centers. For this 
reason, congressmen, advocates, and the media welcomed the announcement, but stressed 
that more substantial reforms were necessary.290 
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Further action took place two months later. On October 6, 2009, Dr. Schriro, 
released her report on immigration detention in the United States.291 After touring 
twenty-five facilities, interviewing employees, detainees and over a hundred non-
governmental organizations, federal, state, and local agents, Dr. Schriro reached 
significant conclusions. Her report found that ICE operated the “largest detention and 
supervised released program in the country.”292 Dr. Schriro’s investigation revealed that 
fifty-one percent of alien detainees were felons but that only eleven percent of them 
committed serious crimes under the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Program of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation,293 that the majority of detention centers were operated as 
jails and prisons, that ICE personnel lacked expertise on designing community-based 
alternatives, and that the strategies used to detain, supervise and provide medical care to 
detainees were disparate across the country and among detention facilities.294 These 
findings are similar in nature to the findings of previous reports. Nevertheless, the 
novelty is that this time, it was ICE rather than an external agency like the OIG or GAO 
that documented the problems.  
As the report was released, DHS Secretary Napolitano and Assistant Secretary 
John Morton announced a series of changes to address Dr. Schriro’s recommendations to 
improve oversight, increase efficiency, and cut costs. According to the press release, the 
changes aimed to “enhance the security and efficiency of ICE’s nationwide detention 
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system while prioritizing the health and safety of detainees.”295 DHS established five core 
principles to guide its policies in the long term. These guidelines expressed the agency’s 
concerns not only with implementing fair and humane detention practices, but also with 
reducing the cost of immigration detention. DHS also enumerated seven reforms that had 
taken place immediately. Some of these changes highlight the depth of the crisis of 
immigration detention in terms of improper federal oversight of detention centers, for 
instance the creation of a library of contracts for detention facilities with which ICE had 
agreements. In fact, the press release indicated that the Office of Acquisitions at ICE 
headquarters managed only eighty of the over three hundred contracts with detention 
facilities. Other changes revealed the intensity of the crisis in terms of the government’s 
lack of tools to provide adequate treatment to alien detainees. For example, the 
development of a risk assessment and custody classification system and the 
implementation of a medical classification system suggests that prior to October 2009, 
ICE lacked the tools to adequately evaluate risks and medical needs of detained aliens. In 
addition, DHS outlined three one-year benchmarks. In terms of the latter, the agency 
committed to revising the standards reviewing all its contracts with detention facilities, 
aligning detention standards with the different conditions of detention appropriate for 
diverse detainee populations, and to issuing bids for the construction of detention 
facilities embodying the agency’s five core principles.296 By the end of 2009, on 
December 16, ICE issued new parole guidelines for asylum seekers in detention in order 
to facilitate their release if they had solid basis for asylum and posed no threat to the 
community or flight risk. 
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As in early August, the changes enjoyed a warm reception. Representatives David 
Price and Lucille Roybal-Allard, who had introduced the Immigration Oversight and 
Fairness Act in February, commended the “administration’s determination to reform 
America’s broken detention system.”297 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International 
welcomed the announcements but underscored that the plans should be quickly converted 
into action and that the law must reflect the changes.298 Most of the comments drawn by 
the announcement referred not to the changes per se, but to the DHS’s attitude. In fact, 
what advocates and newspapers found positive was the change in the government’s 
mindset. An editorial in the New York Times asserted that immigration detention had 
“strayed far” its mission of sorting out those aliens who were deportable and removing 
them.299 For the New York Times editor, the plan unveiled in early October suggested, 
“the government has finally come to understand that detainees are not violent 
criminals.”300 In short, the government’s attitudes in 2009 were piecemeal but reflected 
an incipient change in mindset and a desire for correcting past policy mistakes and 
improving the conditions of detention. 
For all the initial gloss, the changes introduced in August and October were not 
enough to solve the crisis in alien detention. In addition, some of the policies have not 
been implemented; for instance, the submission to Congress of a nationwide plan to 
expand Alternatives to Detention (ATD).301 The language used in policies suggests that 
DHS is seeking to reduce its exposure to complaints rather than to prevent the 
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mistreatment of alien detainees. In testimonies, press releases and statements, DHS 
officials mentioned oversight, cost, and efficiency as the axes of the immigration 
detention reform. In its press releases, DHS made no mention of the rights of illegal 
aliens but framed the reforms in terms of making immigration detention civil and 
humane. While a significant step this approach indicates that the question of whether 
detention is the appropriate practice to deal with undocumented immigration is left out of 
the debate. In fact, the new policies that DHS announced contemplate the construction of 
detention centers designed for aliens rather than for criminals. According to New York 
Senator Charles Schumer, who serves as the Chairman of the Senate Immigration 
Committee, instead of detention, the government should use electronic monitoring 
technology.302 In the words of ACLU Immigrant Rights Project’s Deputy Director Judy 
Rabinovitz, “meaningful reform of the system must focus not only on the conditions 
under which immigrants are being detained, but on why they are being detained in the 
first place.”303  
The reactions to the changes that the Obama administration enacted suggest that 
policies thus far have been exclusively focused on the method of alien detention. In other 
words, the government is focused on how to detain undocumented aliens rather than on 
why it is necessary to incarcerate them. Therefore, DHS’s recent policies emphasize 
aspects such as detention capacity, management, and oversight. Nonetheless, as long as 
detention continues to be the primary tool to control illegal immigration, the 
criminalization and securitization discourses will continue influencing the public 
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perception of illegal aliens, making them more vulnerable to in-custody mistreatment. 
Because the changes introduced by the Obama administration were cosmetic, the crisis in 
immigration detention continues. At a Congressional hearing in December 2009, Dr. 
Schriro underscored the significant extent to which detention practices continue to 
criminalize illegal aliens; 
As a matter of law, civil detention is unlike criminal incapacitation and yet, civil 
and criminal detainees tend to be seen by the public as comparable and typically, 
both confined populations are managed in similar ways by government. Each 
group is ordinarily detained in secure facilities with hardened perimeters often in 
remote locations at considerable distances from counsel and their communities. 
With only a few exceptions, the facilities that U.S. Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) used to detain aliens were built, and operate, as jails and 
prisons to confine pretrial and sentenced felons. Their design, construction, 
staffing plans, and population management strategies were based largely upon 
the principles of command and control. Additionally, ICE adopted detention 
standards that were based upon corrections law and promulgated by correctional 
organizations to guide the operation of jails. Establishing standards and 
expressing expectations for civil detention are our challenge and our 
opportunity.304 
Dr. Schriro’s statement brings to the fore the inadequacy of alien detention practices and 
the ineffectiveness of the guidelines that INS and DHS created to regulate alien detention. 
Dr. Schriro argues that solving the crisis in immigration detention – “establishing 
standards and expressing expectations for civil detention” – remains a challenge and an 
opportunity. The next chapter demonstrates that the solution that immigrant rights 
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advocates propose of legally binding detention standards would be ineffective to address 
the current crisis in immigration detention and to protect the rights of aliens in detention. 
 102 
4. Obstacles to Implementing Legally Binding Detention Standards 
Given that promoting binding detention standards is the dominant idea among 
immigrant rights advocates, it deserves close scrutiny. This chapter evaluates the 
effectiveness of the policy of creating binding detention standards to solving the problem 
of abuses of detained aliens’ rights. Based on this analysis, this chapter argues that legally 
binding detention standards are an impractical solution to the current crisis in 
immigration detention for two reasons. First, binding detention standards would be 
ineffective because of ICE’s decentralized structure. Second, binding standards are 
impractical because ICE outsources two key services to local agents and private firms: 
detention and immigration enforcement. Because ICE is decentralized and outsources 
some of its most important functions to third parties, immigration detention has become 
an heterogeneous practice across the country. Thus, the first section of this chapter 
discusses ICE’s structural organization and demonstrates the high extent to which the 
agency is decentralized. The second section considers ICE’s outsourcing of detention to 
private firms and of immigration law enforcement to local police departments through the 
so-called 287(g) program. This chapter argues that binding immigration detention 
standards are an impractical solution to the current crisis of in-custody abuses of alien 
detainees because the immigration detention system is arbitrary, geographically 
fragmented, and ICE lacks presence in the field. 
 
4.1. ICE’s Decentralized Structure 
To begin with, binding standards are a futile solution to prevent the mistreatment 
of alien detainees because the decentralized structure of ICE complicates the uniform 
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enforcement of a given set of rules across the country. The story behind the evolution of 
ICE’s structures brings to the fore the significant extent to which the agency is 
decentralized and the problems that such decentralized organization would create for the 
uniform application of binding immigration detention standards.  
ICE bequeathed its organizational structure from INS. In 1991, INS underwent a 
process of centralization, which reduced the power of regional offices vis-à-vis 
Washington headquarters. This was not as successful as anticipated. According to a 1997 
GAO report, the changes in 1991 had unintended consequences which caused 
uncoordinated performance.305 The dire results of the 1991 reform created demand for 
decentralization. In November 1993, Doris Meissner was appointed as INS 
Commissioner. Consistent with the prevailing criminalization rhetoric, which saw illegal 
immigration as out of control, Commissioner Meissner stated that immigration had been 
“a backburner issue,” and aimed to make immigration enforcement a priority.306 In 
addition, Congress and interest groups put significant pressure on the federal government 
to eradicate illegal immigration. As a result, INS budget was drastically increased and 
Commissioner Meissner began a decentralization campaign.307 The campaign took place 
between July and October 1994 and aimed at reducing headquarters’ “span of control 
over field units” and to improve supervision on the field.308 This second set of changes 
did not produce the expected results. The 1997 GAO report found that the reforms 
created uncertainties about roles and responsibilities, which were deepened by 
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imbalances among INS staff.309 The greater degree of maneuver not only hindered 
functionality but also led to perverse consequences. One such was the deception of 
Congress discussed in chapter two, which INS Managers in the Miami and Eastern 
Regional Office orchestrated in 1995.310 
By the year 2000, the decentralized organization of the agency was still under 
fire. At that time, the agency was divided into thirty-four districts. In addition, INS stored 
its data at eighty different sites.311 An article in The Oregonian indicates that, 
paradoxically, both pro- and anti-immigration groups were frustrated with INS.312 Both 
parties’ discontent was fuelled by the consequences of INS’s decentralized structure. On 
one hand, anti-immigration groups argued that INS was ineffective at enforcing 
immigration laws. On the other, immigrant rights advocates were concerned that INS’s 
policies and the excessive authority local officers wielded led to mistreatment of 
detainees. In short, INS’s decentralized structure led to what Don Krewin, Director of 
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, called a system of “little fiefdoms” in which each 
locality operated under its own rules.313 
INS’s decentralized structure preoccupied the Bush Administration. Although the 
2000 detention standards promised uniformity, detention centers and field offices still 
enjoyed a high degree of discretion over the detention of illegal aliens. For this reason, 
the government began centralizing the immigration detention system. Besides 
strengthening national security, the centralization campaign had aimed for the “delivery 
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of better services to visitors and immigrants to the United States.”314 Revealingly, this 
argument in favor of centralization was the same as the one used to support the 
decentralization campaign in 1994.  
The events of September 11, 2001 provided the federal government with an 
opportunity to increase its authority over the detention of illegal aliens. On September 17, 
2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft requested INS Commissioner James Ziglar to 
increase the 24-hour period in which the government can decide whether to charge an 
alien detain for a violation to 48 hours or, according to the Attorney General, to “an 
additional reasonable time, if necessary, under emergency or in other extraordinary 
circumstances”.315 As Gamboa reports, Ashcroft chose not to specify what accounted as 
“extraordinary” but indicated that the change primarily applied to seventy-five 
individuals detained in the context of the September 11 investigation. Immigrant rights 
advocates expressed an ambivalent reaction. According to Jeanne Butterfield, executive 
director of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, “under the circumstance [of 
the September 11 events] 48 hours is not unreasonable.”316 Nonetheless, she 
recommended caution in determining what was reasonable beyond that.  
The government introduced more changes in April 2002, which also had very 
limited effect in terms of fostering centralization. Among other measures, the federal 
government consolidated the management of detention and removal operations. This 
meant the transfer of functions form federally-run detention facilities to INS headquarters 
in Washington. Once the changes were made, INS Commissioner James Ziglar indicated 
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that the head of detention and removals in Washington would directly supervise the 
detention centers operated by the government. In other words, the head of detention and 
removals would “have ultimate responsibility and accountability for the care of detainees 
and the implementation of detention standards.”317 Attorney General Ashcroft touted 
these changes as “unprecedented,” and Commissioner Ziglar underscored the beneficial 
impact they would have on aliens.318 According to Commissioner Ziglar, “the 
consolidation of management will help ensure that our detention policies and procedures 
are aimed at creating safe, secure and humane environment for all detainees and that they 
are executed uniformly and consistently throughout the United States.” Nevertheless, the 
consolidation of detention and removal operations management left aside all the local 
jails and private facilities that housed immigration detainees.  
The third change was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. DHS 
was created under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, signed into law on November 25, 
2002.319 The newly created department absorbed INS on March 1, 2003.320 The creation 
of DHS was the largest reorganization in the Federal Government since the creation of 
the Department of Defense in 1947. The reorganization of federal agencies was 
problematic because DHS integrated twenty-two extant federal agencies, each of which 
had disparate scopes and missions. For this reason, the creation of DHS led to a high 
degree of cohesion but sacrificed coherence.  
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In terms of immigration and immigration detention, the creation of DHS separated 
service from security functions and placed aliens under the security microscope.321 As 
Karen Tumlin indicates, the defunct INS conflated law enforcement and service provision 
functions. It was in charge of citizenship, asylum, detention, and removal among other 
things.322 Under DHS, separate agencies were created. On the one hand the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), is responsible for the administration of 
immigration and naturalization. On the other hand, the government gave Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) security 
and law enforcement tasks. In addition, whereas the old agency was called Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, the new organization’s name is Department of Homeland 
Security. In this way, the reorganization placed immigration affairs in the sphere of an 
agency which mission is to “lead the unified national effort to secure America,” further 
securitizing illegal aliens.323 
In spite of the agency restructuring, ICE and CBP inherited a decentralized 
structure. Whereas CBP is responsible for preventing “terrorists and terrorist weapons 
from entering the United States,” the government tasked ICE enforcing immigration and 
customs laws; therefore, this thesis is primarily interested in the latter agency.324 
Congruent with the securitization logic, ICE has become the “largest investigative arm of 
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the Department of Homeland Security.”325 Accordingly, it operates the largest detention 
system in the United States.326 Within ICE, the government created the Office of 
Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) to supervise the apprehension, detention and 
removal of illegal aliens.327 Both ICE and DRO have a decentralized structure, with 24 
field offices and 186 subfield offices. 
Thus, the decentralized structure of ICE and DRO remained a concerning issue. In 
May 2004, DHS Deputy Secretary James Loy acknowledged that the structure of the 
immigration system continued to be decentralized.328 More than five years later, in her 
October 2009 report, Dr. Schriro pointed out that the decentralized structure of 
immigration detention impaired communications along the chain of command. She 
indicated that policy direction comes in the form of memoranda, which are amended with 
superseding memoranda or verbally modified when policies change.329 For this reason, 
Dr. Schriro suggested, “the field should have access to timely, clear and complete written 
guidance about its critical functions.”330 Dr. Schriro reiterated the negative effects of 
decentralization in her testimony of December 2009. She argued that the decentralized 
management of bed and detainee transfers leads to mismanagement, longer periods of 
detention, a higher number of transfers and “aggravated disparities between arrest activity 
and bed capacity.”331 The lack of coordination between field offices and between field 
offices and headquarters makes it unviable to enforce a binding set of standards 
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uniformly across the country. To understand the extent to which ICE’s decentralized 
structure is complicates the enforcement of binding detention standards, it is illuminating 
to consider some of the consequences of decentralization. 
A problematic outcome of decentralization is inconsistency in the treatment of 
detainees across detention facilities. A case in point is the provision of medical care. As a 
response to concerns voiced by Congress, the media, and advocacy groups, GAO 
investigated ICE’s organizational structure and resources to provide for detainees’ 
medical needs. The report was released in February 2009 and concluded that ICE’s 
organizational structure differed across detention facilities.332 The report shows that some 
detainees were treated by staff from the Division of Immigration Health Services (DIHS), 
while others were treated by staff provided by local jails. GAO found that in fiscal year 
2007, DIHS staff treated detainees at 21 facilities holding 53 percent of the average daily 
detention population. The other 47 percent was treated at one of the remaining 508 local 
jails (IGSAs). The consequences of the decentralized approach to medical treatment are 
several. First, DIHS providers differed from IGSAs providers. Second, while DIHS 
compiles monthly reports with data from all the facilities it serves and reports to DHS, 
ICE does not collect data from IGSAs, because these local facilities are not required to 
report back to DHS. Third, although facilities are responsible for transferring medical 
information together with the detainee, ICE does not have a method to monitor whether 
local facilities comply with this rule. Therefore, in the area of medical services, ICE’s 
decentralized structure led to divergences among facilities with negative consequences 
for the quality of health care. 
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Decentralization also affected the reporting of detainees’ deaths. Notably, ICE did 
not previously have any centralized method to account for in-custody deaths. In practice, 
the headquarters had no information regarding the exact number and causes of death or 
the location of the deceased. According to New York Times journalist Nina Bernstein, the 
first list of in-custody deaths was complied by advocacy groups and aliens families in 
2007, which accounted for 20 fatalities.333 In fact, Bernstein argues that ICE established 
reporting procedures for in-custody deaths in 2006, according to which detention 
facilities were to report all deaths to ICE’s headquarters in detail.334 By mid-July 2007, 
ICE had compiled a list, which accounted for 62 deaths since 2004.335 However, the 
agency was reluctant to provide details regarding the identity of the deceased, location 
and cause of death. The agency’s accounting system contained serious flaws. On April 3, 
2009, ICE released an updated list, which included previously omitted deaths. This 
second death roster accounted for 90 fatalities. However, Bernstein argues that this 
second list also contained significant errors.336 First, it omitted the death of Ana Romero 
Rivera on August 28, 2008, which the press had reported at the time.337 Second, it 
changed the cause of deaths of some detainees without explanation. Third, the new list 
did not mention the facility at which the detainees were held. Of the 92 deaths that The 
New York Times accounted for, 32 occurred at privately contracted facilities, 37 at local 
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jails, 20 at federal detention facilities and the remaining three in other places.338 
Revealingly, the newspaper’s math yielded radically different results than the accounting 
done by ICE. In March 2009, a month earlier, ICE officials had testified before Congress 
that only six people had died in privately-run facilities. As ICE released the second 
version of the death roster, an ICE spokeswoman acknowledged omitting one death, but 
asserted thus, “we believe we have accounted for every single detainee death.”339 She 
was wrong. In August 2009, another New York Times article indicated that one out of ten 
deaths since 2006 had been overlooked and left out of the list of deaths that ICE had 
given Congress in March 2009.340 The omissions were because ICE’s mechanism to keep 
track of the number of immigration detention deaths across the country was inadequate. 
After correcting the omissions, the number of in-custody deaths since October 2003 
totaled 107.341 
In addition to gaps in the medical treatment provided to detainees and lack of 
information about the number of in-custody deaths, ICE’s decentralized structure creates 
conditions for local officials to withhold information about in-custody abuses. In early 
2010, the New York Times and the American Civil Liberties Union investigated this 
issue.342 The investigation revealed that staff at local facilities withheld information about 
in-custody abuses from overseers and that ICE officials used their overseeing authority to 
conceal this information from the public. The case of Bergen County Jail in New Jersey 
exemplifies this two-tiered mechanism of deceit. In 2007 an investigation conducted by 
ICE’s Office of Professional Responsibility found that untreated pain had been a main 
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factor in a 22-year-old detainee’s suicide. The internal investigation found also that staff 
at the facility had falsified the detainee’s medication log to make it look as if the detainee 
had received adequate treatment. However, ICE did not release this information to the 
public or the detainee’s family. The events at Bergen County Jail are similar in nature to 
those that occurred at Krome SPC in 1995. Back then, regional INS officials ordered 
subordinates to lie. At Bergen County Jail, ICE officials concealed and supported jail 
operators’ lies. 
This section argued that decentralization has an established pedigree and 
continues to be an obstacle to the uniform enforcement of binding detention standards 
across the United States. Already in 1991 GAO warned: “Strong leadership and 
management reforms needed to address serious problems.”343 Eighteen years later, in 
August 2009, ICE promised reforms to “move away from our present decentralized, jail-
oriented approach.”344 Yet, substantial change is wanting. The current organizational 
structure leads on the one hand to the mistreatment of detainees and on the other to these 
abuses being concealed. At first, binding detention standards seem the best move to 
prevent these abuses. However, under the current conditions, enforcing a set of standards 
in immigration detention facilities across the country becomes a chimera. Detention 
centers differ too much in scope, structure and management. Moreover, field offices 
across the country also differ significantly in size, they deal with different alien cohorts, 
and have different priorities. These obstacles make the implementation of binding 
standards for the sake of preventing abuses of aliens’ rights a good idea, but hardly a 
practical one. 
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4.2. ICE’s Outsourcing of Services 
The insurmountable problem posed by ICE’s decentralized structure is not the 
only obstacle to the implementation of binding detention standards. The second factor 
that makes legally enforceable immigration detention standards an ineffective solution to 
the crisis in immigration detention is the ICE’s outsourcing of two of its key functions: 
detention and immigration law enforcement. This section argues that the use of third 
parties places detainees further away from the public eye, hinders oversight, and 
ultimately increases disharmony and fragmentation in the detention system. The first part 
of this section demonstrates that the outsourcing of detention services limits ICE’s 
capacity to perform effective oversight of detention practices. The second part of this 
section argues that the outsourcing of immigration law enforcement services through the 
287(g) program bestows excessive power on local police departments. Because these lack 
perspective and have specific interest, they use such power as they see fit. The misuse of 
immigration law enforcement authority leads to the detention and deportation of aliens 
for minor issues such as traffic violations. Examining the consequences of the 287(g) 
program is significant because the Obama administration vowed to expand it in spite of 
the harsh criticism and evidence that the program led to racial profiling and civil rights 
abuses.  
Prior to the analysis, a few notes on terminology are in order. Rather than granting 
local agents a healthy degree of discretion over immigration law enforcement, the 
immigration detention system permits a concerning amount of arbitrariness on their part. 
There is a fundamental difference between these two qualities. One of the meanings of 
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“discretion” is the “ability to make responsible decisions.”345 In theory, by granting local 
authorities operational discretion and using local facilities, immigration laws intend to 
allow for sensible and expedient decisions to be made. However, as this section 
demonstrates, the detention system turns out to be quite arbitrary in practice. 
Arbitrariness means that decision-making is “based on or determined by individual 
preference or convenience rather than by necessity or the intrinsic nature of 
something.”346 In short, operational discretion leads to arbitrary practices and these in 
turn compromise immigrant rights and lead to significant discrepancies across regions. 
Arbitrariness thus creates a hostile environment for the uniform application and 
enforcement of binding detention standards.  
 
4.2.1. Contract Detention Facilities and Local Jails 
ICE uses a vast array of disparate detention facilities across the country, which 
increases entropy and disharmony in the immigration detention system. Revealingly, 
neither INS nor ICE knows the exact number of local facilities with which it has 
contracts. A Human Rights Watch 1998 report indicates that because each district 
decided the number of detention facilities to be used, Washington headquarters did not 
have a complete list of the jails INS used. In fact, when the organization asked the INS 
for this information, it obtained several different lists. After eliminating duplicate entries, 
Human Rights Watch counted 687 facilities. This number was far from INS’s statistics, 
which claimed the agency had contracts with 1,041 jails. Ten years later, the situation 
continues. In late 2009, ICE Director of Detention Policy and Planning Dr. Schriro 
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indicated that the agency was using “approximately” 247 local prisons, seven SPCs, and 
seven CDFs.347 However, Dr. Schriro’s figures differ significantly from those on ICE’s 
website. According to the latter source, detainees are housed at 350 local facilities 
(IGSAs), eight facilities managed by the government (SPCs), eight facilities owned by 
private companies (CDFs), and five facilities owned and operated by the Bureau of 
Prisons (BOP).348 According to ICE’s website, the detention population was assigned as 
follow: 67 percent to local facilities, 17 percent to contract facilities, 13 percent to ICE-
owned facilities, and 3 percent to Bureau of Prison’s facilities. Having the right figures is 
not a matter of just counting numbers. Knowing how many facilities ICE uses and where 
aliens are housed is fundamental to devising sound policies. Yet, ICE’s ignorance of the 
real number of local jails that are in use reflects the high degree to which detention 
management is decentralized. 
 
4.2.2. Immigration Law Enforcement by Local Police under 287(g) Program  
The real consequences of ICE’s overtly lax outsourcing of immigration law 
enforcement services can be gauged by a case in point. This section examines a specific 
program, known as 287(g) agreements, that grants state and local officers authority to 
enforce immigration laws.349 Subcontracting the enforcement of federal immigration laws 
to local police officers is problematic. Local officers’ view of the immigration landscape 
is limited to their immediate context. For this reason there is a significant risk that the 
program will lead to an arbitrary enforcement of immigration laws, which makes the 
                                                 
347
 Schriro, Immigration Detention Overview, 10, 11.   
348
 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Detention and Removal,” 
http://www.ice.gov/partners/dro/dmp.htm (accessed February 22, 2010).  
349
 For the sake of avoiding repetitions, the terms “287(g) agreements” and “287(g) program” will be used 
interchangeably. 
 116 
uniform enforcement of immigration detention standards impractical. The 287(g) 
program is a case in point, because the ways in which it has been organized and misused 
by local agencies has led in some locales to racial profiling, an extreme case of arbitrary 
enforcement of immigration laws. 
Before analyzing the extent to which 287(g) agreements exacerbate arbitrariness 
and disharmony in the immigration detention system, it is important to consider the legal 
framework regulating states’ ability to enforce federal immigration laws. States and local 
authorities have limited powers to enforce immigration laws. As stated by the Supreme 
Court in Takashashi v. Fish and Game Commission “the Federal Government has broad 
constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States 
[and] the period they may remain … Under the Constitution, states are granted no such 
powers.”350 This means that state or local agencies cannot establish who may remain in 
the United States, contradict federal laws or override legislation enacted by Congress.351 
In 1996 the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the Department of Justice issued a 
memorandum underscoring the limited powers states have to regulate immigration. The 
document established that local agencies had the authority to arrest individuals suspected 
of violating criminal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but indicated 
that they lacked the power to stop and detain aliens for civil violations. This meant that 
states could not detain aliens for residing in the country illegally.352 
The advent of the securitization discourse changed this. The events of September 
11, 2001 caused a reversal of such understanding. A 2002 memorandum by the OLC 
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rejected the conclusion of the 1996 document and encouraged states to enforce 
immigration laws. Thus, with certain limitations, states were bestowed the power to 
detain aliens solely based on immigration status.353 Some conservative scholars such as 
Kris Kobach interpreted this as a positive change.354 The events of September 11, 2001 
also increased the demand for stricter enforcement of immigration laws. As Kobach put 
it, “the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 underscored for all Americans the need to 
restore the rule of law in the immigration arena.”355 In a context of security hysteria, 
conservatives such as Jessica Vaughan and James Edwards Jr. from the Center for 
Immigration Studies praised local immigration law enforcement programs as the solution 
to terrorism.356 For this reason, the 287(g) program suddenly became popular.357 
The creation of the authority of state and local officers to perform arrests for civil 
violations of immigration laws gave rise to a number of local anti-immigration 
initiatives.358 For instance, the number of bills containing anti-immigration provisions in 
all fifty states increased from thirty in 2005 to over 1,500 in 2007.359 Especially after the 
events of September 11, 2001 and with the encouragement of Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, many cities entered into 287(g) agreements with the federal government. The 
next paragraphs examine the nature of 287(g) agreements and argue that these lead to a 
high degree of arbitrariness in the immigration detention system. Coupled with the 
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decentralized structure of immigration agencies, arbitrariness leads to heterogeneity in 
the enforcement of immigration laws and in detention practices. In such an inharmonious 
environment, implementing and enforcing immigration detention rules would at best 
produce uncertain results.  
Further evidence for the effects of the decentralized structure of immigration 
detention can be gathered from the effects of 287(g) agreements, which name derives 
from the corresponding section of the Immigration and Nationality Act.360 The 
agreements were created in 1996 to enhance states’ ability to fully enforce immigration 
laws: to investigate, prepare cases, and hand them over to ICE to begin removal 
proceedings.361 To become involved, an agency must sign a memorandum of agreement 
with ICE and its officers must undergo training.362 The intention behind the creation of 
287(g) agreements is still the subject of debate. Immigrant rights advocates and GAO 
argue that the program is meant to facilitate the removal of serious criminals; however, 
conservative groups and some Congressmen led by Representative Lamar Smith argue 
that the program was devised to authorize local law enforcement agencies to enforce 
immigration laws as they see fit.363 Notably, while the 287(g) agreements were hardly 
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noticed at the time of their creation, they became very popular after September 11, 
2001.364 In 2009, the program produced the second highest number of detentions relative 
to other programs run by ICE.365  
The 287(g) agreements render binding immigration detention standards 
impractical to address the crisis in immigration detention because they foster 
arbitrariness. Local police departments can choose whether or not to enter into a 287(g) 
agreement and can also choose the degree to which to use the authority the agreement 
confers. In this way, 287(g) agreements lead to different degrees of immigration law 
enforcement in different localities. Precisely because of this, 287(g) agreements have 
been unable to achieve their goal of deterring illegal immigration. For instance, while 
Gwinnett County Sheriff Butch Conway praised the program for reducing the number of 
foreign inmates in jails through their removal, other officials suggested that the reduction 
was rather due to the fact that illegal aliens were moving elsewhere.366 Because of their 
capacity to lead to arbitrary enforcement of immigration laws resulting in racial profiling 
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and arbitrary detention, the “explosion in interest in 287(g) agreements” in the last two 
years is a matter of concern as expressed by Representative Zoe Lofgren.367  
The next paragraphs consider Maricopa County, AZ to argue that such fears are 
well founded and that 287(g) agreements fracture the immigration detention system and 
create disharmony. The recent events in Maricopa County indicate the ease with which 
local authorities can use 287(g) agreements to arbitrarily detain and deport illegal aliens 
based on their physical appearance or on minor issues such as a broken headlight. The 
inability of ICE to effectively monitor the use of such powerful tool as 287(g) agreements 
are, demonstrates that the agency’s outsourcing of immigration law enforcement services 
is a major obstacle for binding immigration detention standards to prevent abuses of 
aliens detainees’ rights. 
In November 2004, Andrew Thomas, a conservative attorney ran for Maricopa 
General Attorney on an anti-immigration platform. He won and together with Maricopa 
County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, they became nationally known for their raids on 
undocumented and legal aliens. At that time, Sheriff Arpaio was already nationally 
known for making inmates wear pink underwear among other mean practices. He was 
sued by U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno in 1997 over the conditions in the jail he 
administered.368 In late 2007 Sheriff Arpaio decided to participate in the 287(g) program 
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and deputize 160 of his officers.369 Under Arpaio’s command, his deputies began pulling 
over cars that had broken lights, asking for identifications and arresting individuals 
unable to produce one, gave false names or had forged documents. As a consequence, 
aliens and United States citizens would be arrested for crimes that merited no time in 
jail.370 Those who were determined to reside in the country illegally were handed over to 
ICE.  
Next, Arpaio began conducting sweeps in Latino neighborhoods and stopping and 
questioning street vendors. At that point, his deputies operated in teams, wearing ski 
masks.371 In addition to targeting Latino neighborhoods Sheriff Arpaio also arrested 
United States citizens. The American Civil Liberties Union points to the case of Julio 
Mora. Mr. Mora, a United States citizen was detained for several hours while his 
immigration status was being determined, during which time the deputies humiliated 
him.372 Sheriff Arpaio’s tactics exemplify the negative consequences of the arbitrary 
enforcement of immigration laws. Indeed, his crackdown on aliens targeted mostly those 
who were in the country illegally rather than those who had committed serious crimes. 
By intimidating day laborers, street vendors, and people committing minor traffic 
violations, Arpaio’s 287(g) authority and resources was not directed towards detaining 
aliens that posed a real serious threat. Instead, they instilled fear and distrust among the 
population.  
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As the raids became cruel and discriminatory, complaints from advocacy 
organizations and politicians increased. Notwithstanding the mounting evidence of racial 
profiling and civil rights violations, neither ICE field office nor the agency’s headquarters 
pay heed. Arpaio’s roundups exerted such a terrorizing effect that the mayor of 
Guadalupe, Rebecca Jiménez, asked him to terminate a raid in her city.373 Upon asking 
Arpaio not to return on the next day, the Sheriff replied “Well, we will be back here 
tomorrow. Full force! … If you don’t like the way I operate, you go get your own police 
department.”374 In the course of 2008, the mayor of Phoenix, the Arizona Anti-
Defamation League, the Arizona Latino Legislative Caucus among others, asked United 
States Attorney General to investigate the Sheriff for racial profiling and for violating the 
terms of the Maricopa County Sheriff Office memorandum of agreement with ICE.375 In 
April 2008, the Mayor of Phoenix requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 
scrutinize Arpaio’s sweeps, accusing the Sheriff of “a pattern of practice and conduct that 
includes discriminatory harassment, improper stops, searches, and arrests.”376 In July 
2008, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund and the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Arizona filed a class-action lawsuit against Joe Arpaio, the Maricopa 
County Sheriff Office, and Maricopa County.377  
However, ICE officials were unmoved and claimed that the allegations were 
unfounded. The agent in charge of the ICE Office of Investigations in Arizona asserted 
thus, “so far, we have not been able to identify any allegations against Maricopa 
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County.”378 After a visit to Guadalupe to observe Sheriff Arpaio’s procedures, Jim 
Pendergraph, an ICE official from Washington, declared: “I saw nothing that gave me a 
heartburn.”379 Because neither Arpaio nor ICE cared about the terms of the memorandum 
of agreement, an editorial in the New York Times argued that “if this doesn’t look to you 
like a carefully regulated, federally supervised effort to catch dangerous criminals, that’s 
because it isn’t.”380 Sheriff Arpaio’s use of his 287(g) authority to persecute and terrorize 
illegal aliens generated distrust of the police and discontent among the population. Above 
all, Arpaio’s racial profiling demonstrates how discretion can lead to abuses and arbitrary 
enforcement of laws, especially when oversight is lacking. 
The events of February 4, 2009 brought government inaction to an end.381 On that 
day, Sheriff Arpaio conducted a televised parade of two hundred detainees who marched, 
escorted by heavily armed guards, into a tent detention camp outside of Phoenix in 
shackles and wearing prison jumpsuits. National media referred to the camp as “Tent 
City” called the parade “a degrading spectacle.”382 A February 6 editorial in the New 
York Times called Arpaio as a “publicity-obsessed star of a Fox reality show and the self-
appointed scourge of illegal immigrants.”383 Amidst media condemnation, Maricopa 
County Attorney Andrew Thomas withdrew his support, stating: “Racial and ethnic 
segregation is unconstitutional.”384 On February 13, House Judiciary Committee 
Chairman John Conyers, Immigration Subcommittee Chairwoman Zoe Lofgren, 
Constitution Subcommittee Jerrold Nadler, and Crime Subcommittee Chairman Bobby 
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Scott requested United States Attorney General Eric Holder and Department of 
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano to investigate the allegations of racial 
profiling and civil rights abuses by Sheriff Arpaio. 
The increasing allegations of Arpaio’s misuse of his 287(g) authority to terrorize 
undocumented aliens in Maricopa County brought 287(g) agreements under the limelight. 
The effectiveness of the program and its potential to lead to ethnic profiling and 
discrimination were put under the microscope. As public outrage about Arpaio’s 
treatment of aliens spiked, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano acknowledged being wary of 
the Sheriff’s tactics. As a result of Arpaio’s opportunistic behavior in using the power 
bestowed by the 287(g) agreement to run an anti-immigration campaign, the repeated 
allegations of human rights abuses in detention centers, and the change in administration, 
DHS Secretary Napolitano ordered a review of several of ICE’s programs, including 
287(g) agreements.385 According to Napolitano, the scrutiny was motivated by “questions 
about how 287(g) agreements are administered, and if uniform standards are applied.”386 
In addition, the GAO was requested to review the program’s effectiveness and report the 
results before the House Homeland Security Committee. 
The report GAO released on February 20, 2009, found that the structure of the 
287(g) program had granted local officers a high degree of discretion. Not a surprise. As 
local agencies implemented the agreements under lax supervision, the enforcement of 
immigration laws became arbitrary. Arbitrariness not only led to differences in the way in 
which immigration laws were enforced across communities, but it also sparked concerns 
of discrimination among the locals. In short, GAO’s report found significant problems in 
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the structure of the program.387 The agency demonstrated that although memorandums of 
agreement and background checks were required, other fundamental controls were 
lacking. One of the main shortcomings of the program was that memorandum of 
agreements did not convey the idea that the 287(g) partnerships were meant to facilitate 
the detention of serious criminals. As a result, local officers would arrest individuals for 
petty crimes such as speeding or carrying an open container of alcohol.388 GAO also 
found that ICE did not consistently explain the way in which participating agencies were 
to use their 287(g) authority.389 In addition, the report suggests that ICE did not specify 
the “nature and extent” of its overview of participating agencies.390GAO also indicated 
that in twenty of the 29 memorandums of agreement reviewed, ICE did not specify what 
date participating agencies were mandated to report.391 In conclusion, the report argues 
that the 287(g) program led to concerns in more than half of the 29 communities 
scrutinized about racial profiling.392 Coupled with bigotry, the lax regulations of the 
287(g) program and the considerable degree of discretion it bestowed on local agents led 
to ethnic profiling, discrimination, arbitrary detentions and generated distrust among the 
population. 
After the release of GAO’s report, a House Homeland Security Committee 
hearing was scheduled to discuss the results reported by the investigative agency. The 
name of the hearing, “Examining 287(g): The Role of the State in Local Law 
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Enforcement in Immigration Law” suggests that neither the scope nor the effectiveness of 
the 287(g) program were clear. However, concerns about racial profiling were second to 
those about funding. In his opening remarks, Chairman Bennie G. Thompson “applauded 
the growth of successful programs” such as 287(g). Chairman Thompson then stated that 
in order to know whether the taxpayers’ money ($40 million in FY 2008) had been 
appropriately spent, it would have been necessary to know if the aliens removed through 
the program (29,000 in FY 2008) were actually dangerous. Concerns with arbitrary 
detentions and racial profiling only came second. Towards the end of his remarks, 
Chairman Thompson said that “while I do not know whether 287(g) is an effective 
program, I do know that it is a program that has been accused of racial profiling.”393 
The March hearing on 287(g) agreements led to a few modifications, which were 
introduced to placate GAO’s concerns.394 As it would soon be seen, the reforms did little 
to address alien, human, and civil rights advocates. The reforms also had a negligible 
impact on Maricopa County Sheriff Arpaio, who argued that he would continue arresting 
illegal aliens under state laws.395 On August 25, 2009, the American Civil Liberties 
Union together with other 520 organizations sent a letter to President Barack Obama 
urging him to terminate 287(g) partnerships. The letter argues that the program 
exacerbates the disproportionate detention of African Americans and Latinos. It asserts 
that the granting of authority to local officers to enforce immigration laws “has resulted 
in the widespread use of pretextual traffic stops, racially motivated questioning and 
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unconstitutional searches and seizures primarily in communities of color.”396 The letter 
also criticizes the program as a “failed Bush experiment.” Although the 287(g) 
agreements were devised in 1996, the first agreement was signed in 2002.397 The 
concerns of racial profiling also reached the United Nations. In a letter dated September 
28, 2009, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
recommended the Obama administration to reconsider programs such as the 287(g) that 
lead to racial profiling.398 
Mounting pressure on the government brought some changes to the 287(g) 
program. On July 9, 2009, DHS announced two main modifications to the Memorandum 
of Agreement.399 First, DHS required partner agencies to pursue all the criminal charges 
for which offenders are arrested. This policy was intended to prevent arrests for minor 
violations. Second, the reformed MOAs would specify partners’ enforcement powers, 
incorporate guidelines for oversight and complaints procedures among other things. 
Months later, in early October, the Department of Homeland Security revoked its 
agreement with Maricopa County Sheriff Office.400 However, Sheriff Arpaio was not 
moved. He vowed to use anti-human smuggling law to stop and question people.401 If 
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ICE did not want to take them he would “take a little trip to the border and turn them over 
at the border.”402  
Local officers’ abuse of 287(g) authority aggravated and exemplified the 
criminalization of illegal aliens. Recall that criminalization is a discursive process that 
sees the presence of illegal aliens as conducive to crime. Because Sheriff Arpaio saw 
undocumented aliens as criminals, he arrested both criminal and non-criminal aliens 
alike. Arpaio’s use of his 287(g) authority to target non-criminal aliens is a consequence 
of criminalization. Anti-immigrant advocates may object that 287(g) agreements are for 
localities to use as they see fit. Or perhaps they may argue that if detention is the only 
way to remove undocumented aliens, then arresting criminal and non-criminal aliens is 
the right thing to do. However, the aim of the 287(g) program is to arrest dangerous 
aliens. In addition, according to GAO, ICE would not have enough detention space if 
local agencies detained aliens for minor offenses.403 For this reason, it would be logical 
for participants in the 287(g) program to use the limited number of beds available to 
detain aliens who pose a significant threat to the public.404 In short, local officials’ 
deviation from the original and logical scope of the 287(g) program, the terrorizing of 
aliens communities and the arrest of aliens for minor misdemeanors or traffic violations 
are palpable instances of criminalization. 
While some local officers used their 287(g) authority to zealously eradicate illegal 
immigration, other localities questioned the effectiveness of the program and refrained 
from participating. This reflects how a single program, which is improperly overseen, can 
be or not be used for different purposes. One example is Houston, TX. In mid 2009, 
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Houston Mayor Bill White backed off from his previous decision of joining the 287(g) 
program. The Mayor had sought to participate in order to be consistent with his previous 
policies.405 However, the events in Maricopa County and the investigations that followed 
raised concerns among the Latino community.406 In an intermediate step, Mayor White 
tried to modify the terms of the agreement to ensure that the 287(g) program would only 
target serious criminals.407 Indeed, the Mayor and the press were aware that in its generic 
form the 287(g) would cast a wide net over criminal and non-criminal aliens. 
Nevertheless, negotiations with the federal government failed. For this reason, and 
because he believed that the program was too costly in terms of budget and manpower, 
Mayor White chose not to participate in the contentious program. 
Another instance of local officers expressing concerns about the 287(g) program 
is that of Los Angeles Police Department Chief William Bratton. As he explained the 
reason why the Los Angeles Police Department chose not to participate, Chief Bratton 
raised important issues. First, he said that the 287(g) program does not make 
communities safer because it instills fear of the police among immigrant communities.408 
The Police Department Chief referred to a case in which an illegal alien who contacted 
the police about a crime he witnessed was later arrested and deported.409 Second, Bratton 
argued that participation could lead to an increase in crime. “Breeding fear and distrust of 
authority among some of our children could increase the rate of crime,” Bratton said.410 
In short, Chief Bratton suggested that community trust in the police is a key element of 
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security. Because programs like 287(g) that give immigration law enforcement powers to 
local police erode trust, they backfire.  
The divergent reactions to the 287(g) program in Maricopa County on the one 
hand and in Houston and Los Angeles on the other reflect the significant degree of 
maneuver that local authorities enjoy. While some police departments used their authority 
to terrorize aliens, others expressed concerns about the effects of the program on alien 
communities. The disparate actions and opinions reflect the disharmony prevailing in the 
immigration detention system. Not only can local agencies decide whether or not to 
participate, but also they can decide how to use their 287(g) authority. Because 287(g) 
agreements allowed partner agencies to use their power according to their needs, the 
discretionary use of 287(g) authority inexorably led to significant differences between 
regions.  
Connecting the facts with the literature, the effects of ICE’s outsourcing of 
services confirms Riddhi Mukhopadhyay’s argument and disproves Miriam Wells’s 
thesis. The analysis of ICE’s use of private and local detention facilities and the 287(g) 
program echo Mukhopadhyay’s assertion that federal immigration policies grant 
excessive discretion. According to Mukhopadhyay, current policies “provide untrained 
immigration officials with high levels of discretion in determining whether an immigrant 
should be detained and deported, adding to an already xenophobic detainee system.”411 
Although local officials receive training, they remain untrained in that their perspective is 
narrow. Local officials see immigration as a local phenomenon, affecting their city or 
county. Acting under the premise that illegal aliens are criminals, which Mukhopadhyay 
identifies as xenophobia, local officers such as Joe Arpaio conduct sweeps and arrest 
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whoever is suspect of being in the country illegally. Yet, this not only leads to 
mistreatment of detainees, but also it does not solve the problem of undocumented 
immigration. If aliens are chased out of one city, they move to another. 
The argument put forward in this chapter challenges Miriam Wells’s idea about 
the ways in which localities reshape immigration policy.412 According to Wells, while 
federal policies are migrant-exclusive, implementation at the local level is migrant-
inclusive.413 Localities are able to dilute the restrictive terms of federal immigration 
policies because the many administrative layers that compose the state do not function 
harmoniously. These disjoints create space for local organization to reshape federal 
policies on the ground. Wells explains that identification and arrest depend on local 
police and that the immigration authorities only come into play at a later stage. She 
argues that although the law instructs police departments to cooperate, the terms remain 
ambiguous.414 However, the case of 287(g) agreements shows that this is not so. In fact, 
some of the localities such as Maricopa County used their authority to carry out anti-
immigration initiatives. Thus, the consequences of the 287(g) program contrast with 
Well’s argument that local enforcement agencies are more lenient on aliens than federal 
laws request.  
 
4.3. Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter explored the nature and consequences of ICE’s 
decentralized structure and the outsourcing of two of ICE’s main functions: immigration 
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detention and law enforcement. The analysis showed that decentralization and the 
haphazard outsourcing of ICE’s functions have perverse consequences for immigrant 
rights and make binding immigration standards as proposed by immigrant’s rights 
advocates an ineffective solution to the crisis in immigration detention. Decentralization 
reduces ICE’s presence on the field and hinders oversight. Unchecked local discretion is 
problematic because local officers have limited horizons inasmuch as they only see the 
effects of immigration on their localities. For this reason, local use of 287(g) authority is 
myopic and leads to the mistreatment of aliens when informed by the criminalization or 
securitization paradigms. Besides identifying the negative consequence, the discussion 
showed that immigration detention is indeed remarkably decentralized. Decentralization 
results in stark differences between detention facilities across the country. These 
differences are an insurmountable obstacle in the road of uniform and effective 
implementation of binding detention standards. For this reason, legally enforceable 
detention standards are an impractical solution to in-custody human rights abuses.  
 133 
5. Going Forward: Reconsidering the Policy of Mass Detention of Undocumented Aliens 
This closing chapter carries the debate about immigration detention a step 
forward. Before moving on to its argument, a recapitulation of the preceding chapters is 
in order. This thesis investigates what can be done about the problem of alien detention in 
the United States. The introduction suggested that immigration detention is a significant 
problem – in terms of the number of aliens in detention centers – and is deeply rooted in 
the contemporary dynamics of states’ responses to globalization. Chapter two considered 
the results of the processes of criminalization and securitization, and argued that these 
have led to recurrent violations of immigrant detainees’ rights. That chapter suggested 
that the increase in the size of immigration detention population, the punitive conditions 
of detention, and the mistreatment of immigration detainees are recent and grave 
phenomena. Chapter three argued that the responses to the crisis of immigration detention 
that the government has engineered so far have been at best insufficient. As a response to 
the failure of nonbinding guidelines to prevent in-custody abuses, immigrant rights 
advocates proposed the creation of legally binding detention standards. Chapter four 
demonstrated that binding detention standards are also impractical because the agency 
dealing with immigration detention is decentralized and it outsources some of its primary 
functions to local actors, which make the immigration detention system arbitrary. The 
obvious and thus far unpreventable abuses of detained illegal aliens raise the following 
question: What can be done to solve the problem of abuses in immigration detention in 
the United States?  
Chapter five approaches the problem of recurrent in-custody abuses with a long-
term perspective. This chapter answers that the best way to prevent in-custody abuses of 
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aliens in deportation detention is to abolish the practice of mass immigration detention. 
The aim of this strategy is that human rights violations are not the outcome of 
immigration policy. The following paragraphs introduce four arguments in favor of 
ending mass immigration detention. First, ending mass immigration detention will 
remove non-criminal aliens from the criminal sphere, thus countering the harmful effects 
of criminalization and securitization. This strategy will also prevent, rather than seek 
redress for, human rights abuses in detention. Second, abolishing mass immigration 
detention will prevent the incarceration of asylum seekers, refugees and United States 
citizens. Third, terminating such practice will subdue the lasting injurious psychological 
impacts of detention. Fourth, ending the practice of mass immigration detention will save 
taxpayers’ money. 
Prior to delving into those four rationales for reconsidering the practice of mass 
immigration detention, it is important to underscore the reasons why such strategy is a 
valid endeavor. First, this project has a long-term scope and focuses on the problems that 
lie at the core of immigration detention. Advocates who propose binding detention 
standards are offering a patch to some symptoms of the immigration detention crisis such 
as access to attorneys and medical treatment. In contrast, this thesis goes deeper into the 
problem and seeks to eliminate the root of these flaws, namely, the practice of mass 
immigration detention, which is a result of the paradigms of criminalization and 
securitization.  
Second, the argument that policy-makers should discontinue the practice of mass 
immigration detention is not at all radical because, as chapter two shows, mass 
immigration detention is a recent practice and the discourses that enable it are recent as 
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well. On the one hand, this policy analysis is not in favor of the total abolition of 
immigration detention. It recognizes that illegal immigration is a breach of the law and 
that the government has a right to remove aliens who are in the country without 
permission. Yet, this thesis is also attentive to the fact that illegal aliens are human beings 
and deserve not to have their rights violated, and to the fact that almost half of the aliens 
in detention are not criminals.415 On the other hand, alternative to detention programs 
already exist, yet they are still underdeveloped. If policy-makers reserve detention only 
for aliens who commit serious crimes such as those categorized as Part 1 under the 
Uniform Crime Reports, they could utilize the remaining funding to enhance and expand 
alternative to detention programs.416  
 
5.1. Reconsidering Mass Immigration Detention Will Address the Root of the Problem 
This section argues that while the strategy of binding standards advocates 
acquiesces with and institutionalizes the practice of mass detention, this thesis’ proposal 
of abolishing such practice directly targets the root of the crisis of immigration detention. 
The issue at stake is in-custody abuses of aliens’ rights, which roots are the negative 
effects of the criminalization and securitization paradigms. Because the most effective 
approach to any malady is to target its causes, ending mass immigration detention is an 
effective strategy to protect aliens’ rights. To understand why the strategy of abolishing 
mass immigration detention addresses the root of the crisis of immigration detention it is 
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important to consider the shortcomings of the strategy proposed by binding standards 
advocates. 
What makes binding standards advocates’ policy ineffective to solve the current 
crisis in immigration detention is that advocates are excessively focused on finessing 
immigration detention and avoid asking a fundamental question: why is mass 
immigration detention necessary? In other words, they are strictly focused with the 
cosmetic aspects of the problem, the conditions of detention, rather than with the problem 
itself: immigration policy that sees illegal aliens as criminals and terrorists, and a 
mushrooming immigration detention system that incarcerates criminal and non-criminal 
aliens alike, under lax supervision, in facilities that for the most part are not prepared to 
house them. 
Because advocates are too busy seeking to improve the conditions of detention 
today, the lose sight of the dominant trend in immigration detention: the breathtaking 
increase in the number of detained aliens since the 1980s. In other words, advocates for 
binding standards place too much emphasis in the short-term. Their shortsightedness is 
notable in their reports on immigration detention. The evidence to support this claim 
comes from the analysis of reports by non-governmental organizations on the subject of 
immigration detention published between 2007 and 2009. The authors of these reports are 
immigrant rights organizations such as ACLU of Massachusetts, the Women’s Refugee 
Commission, the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, Amnesty International and Human 
Rights First, among others.417 The purpose of analyzing those reports is that the 
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suggestions that advocates put forward indicate their understanding of the issue at stake 
as well as their strategy to approach it. Revealingly, only few of the many suggestions 
that advocates make advise the government to discontinue the use of mass detention part 
of immigration policy. The majority of the reports are concerned with how rather than 
why undocumented aliens must be detained. Thus, they champion cosmetic solutions 
such as determining mandatory detention on a case-by-case basis, restricting aliens’ 
freedom according to their flight risk, humanizing the conditions under which 
undocumented aliens are detained, and incorporating human rights frameworks into 
immigration detention. From those recommendations it becomes clear that rather than 
asking whether detention itself is compatible with human rights, the organizations 
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suggest ways of finessing the practice of mass immigration detention. The Director of the 
Immigrant Rights Project at the American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, Ajmel 
Quereshi, makes a similar argument as many of the reports.418 He suggests the Obama 
administration the termination of Operation Streamline, the suspension of ICE detention 
quotas, and the reinstitution of the catch and release policy. While these 
recommendations may decrease the number of aliens in custody, Quereshi does not 
question why mass immigration detention is necessary or desirable 
Some reports come close to questioning the practice of mass immigration 
detention, but they utilize superficial arguments. Consider A Broken System, published in 
July 2009 by the National Immigration Law Center, the American Civil Liberties Union 
of Southern California, and the law firm Holland & Knight. The report shows that ICE 
compliance with its own standards is dismal and makes twenty-five detailed 
recommendations. A Broken System is the most forward among the fourteen reports 
analyzed in its challenge of mass immigration detention because it calls for a moratorium 
on the expansion of the immigration detention system. However, it argues that the 
moratorium should only last until “conditions in immigration detention are dramatically 
improved.”419 The report Unseen Prisoners, published in January 2009 by the University 
of Arizona also recommends reduction or termination of mandatory detention. However, 
its authors remain silent about the reasons for this change and this recommendation is 
buried among more than thirty suggestions. In short, non-governmental organizations’ 
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reports avoid suggesting a reconsideration of the legal and discursive process through 
which immigrations have been othered as criminals and security threats. 
Other reports make a point in suggesting the implementation of ATD schemes. As 
the proposal of a moratorium on immigration detention, the call for the expansion of 
ATD programs comes closer to but still falls short of questioning the practice of mass 
immigration detention. While ATD initiatives such as electronic monitoring and 
reporting programs take aliens physically outside of the criminal sphere (i.e. detention 
centers), they will remain ineffective unless they are accompanied by the abolition of 
mass detention. Only the abolition of mass immigration detention will defuse the 
criminalizing and securitizing rhetoric. If alternatives to detention are expanded but the 
practice of mass immigration detention continues, in-custody abuses will continue to 
occur. The only difference will be that in addition of 32,000 illegal alien detainees, there 
will be a growing number of illegal aliens under state supervision. But the crisis, which is 
a product of the massive incarceration of non-criminal aliens and therefore of the 
criminalization and securitization discourses, will ensue. For this reason, policymakers 
must implement ATD programs together with the abolition of mass immigration 
detention. 
The websites of immigrant rights advocacy groups or organizations that run 
campaigns on immigrant rights present a similar picture. Human Rights Watch website 
states that United States’ immigration policies and enforcement procedures violate 
provisions of international human rights treaties by, inter alia, depriving immigration 
detainees of their freedom from arbitrary detention.420 Likewise, the American Civil 
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Liberties Union recognizes the government’s power to set immigration policy but 
underscores the importance of defending the rights granted to aliens by the 
Constitution.421 A similar case is that of Detention Watch Network, a coalition of 
organizations that focuses specifically on immigration detention. According to its 
website, Detention Watch Network runs campaigns to improve detention conditions, to 
educate communities about detention and deportation issues, and to foster timely 
response to ICE raids.422 On February 25, 2010 the Detention Watch Network launched 
the “Dignity Not Detention: Preserving Human Rights and Restoring Justice” 
campaign.423 The initiative focuses in the states of Arizona, Georgia, and Texas, which 
have seen a drastic expansion in the use of immigration detention in the last years.424 The 
objective of the campaign is to defend the values of dignity, human rights and the due 
process of law. For this reason, it advocates for a reduction in detention spending and a 
greater availability of ATD programs. As such, the campaign does not question the 
practice of detention but seeks to make amendments so that immigration detention does 
not undermine immigrants’ dignity, human rights and their right to due process. This 
strategy is a contradiction in terms because detention is intrinsically punitive and, when 
fuelled by the paradigms of criminalization and securitization, it greatly undermines all 
the values that the “Dignity Not Detention” campaign is set to protect. In conclusion, 
non-governmental organizations advocating detention standards and better conditions of 
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detention are advancing a strategy that is incapable of protecting aliens’ rights in the long 
run. 
Having demonstrated that advocates for binding detention standards and 
immigrant rights advocates do not question the practice of mass immigration detention 
substantially, it is important to explain the problematic aspects of such stance. First, 
because they seek to finesse mass immigration detention, binding standards advocates 
tacitly acquiesce with the massive incarceration of all illegal aliens irrespective of their 
criminal records. The debate about detention standards forecloses any discussion about 
the practice of detention itself. Once standards are passed and detention becomes 
“humane” there is no reason anymore to discuss whether detaining illegal aliens en masse 
is in fact desirable from a human rights perspective. For this reason, advocates 
acquiescence results in the legitimization of mass immigration detention. Second, the 
institutionalization of mass immigration detention is problematic because detention is a 
punitive practice in itself. Although alien detention shall not be punitive in nature, the 
confinement of aliens’ bodies to a limited space and the imposition of prison jumpsuits 
and shackles are quite punitive practices.  
While immigrant rights advocates’ support for binding standards has the effect of 
legitimizing the practice that leads to abuses of aliens’ human and constitutional rights, it 
is important to recognize the positive aspect of advocates’ work. Advocates bring relief to 
those aliens who are currently in custody. Undoubtedly, fair, humane and civil conditions 
of detention should characterize any detention system. In their endeavor to protect human 
rights and ameliorate the contractual conditions of detention, advocates must work with 
the policies that be.  
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In light of advocates’ myopia and the government’s paranoia about illegal aliens, 
this policy analysis seeks an effective way out of the current crisis that respects and 
protects aliens’ rights. That way is to suggest that policy-makers abolish mass 
immigration detention. As stated above, the problem of alien detention is in-custody 
rights violations, themselves a product of the effects of the criminalization and 
securitization discourses. For this reason, to address the root of the problem, policy-
makers should terminate mass immigration detention. Ending this practice means 
discontinuing the incarceration of aliens who pose no serious threat to society. Currently, 
the majority of illegal aliens must go through the detention system; those who have no 
criminal records and have economic resources are able to post bond and may be released. 
Yet, illegal aliens rarely have access to between $5,000 and $10,000, and therefore they 
must sit in detention.  
Terminating mass immigration detention will decouple illegal aliens from the 
criminal sphere. As chapter four explains, in the case of the 287(g) program, immigration 
law enforcement generates distrust of the authorities not only among illegal aliens, but 
also among the immigrant community in general. In a similar way, practices such as mass 
immigration detention other immigrants and aliens and create fear and distrust. This has 
two far-reaching results. First, as Engbersen and van der Leun argue, mass immigration 
detention drives aliens further into the underground.425 For this reason, ending mass 
immigration detention becomes an effective strategy to reduce the size of the 
underground economy and enhance the security of the nation. The second result of mass 
immigration detention is to fracture the polity by neglecting and othering immigrants and 
aliens. Needless to say, aliens are not part of the polity, but the immigrant community is. 
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In light of this negative effect, ending mass immigration detention becomes, once again, a 
practical strategy to promote unity, discourage resentment, and defuse social and ethnic 
tensions.  
 
5.2. Reconsidering Mass Immigration Detention Will Prevent Abuses of Asylum Seekers, 
Refugees and Citizens 
The second reason why it is imperative that policy-makers reconsider the practice 
of detention is that asylum seekers, refugees, and United States citizens are often trapped 
in the detention net. The detention, and in some cases deportation, of these groups of 
people is not only regrettable and concerning, but also paradoxical. It is the state turning 
against its own citizens and vulnerable displaced individuals.  
In the last years, asylum seekers have become a significant population group and 
the United States detains a significant number of them every year. According to the 
statistics published by DHS, the number of individuals granted asylum increased from 
8,472 in 1990 to 22,930 in 2008. Asylum seekers are individuals who have suffered or 
fear suffering persecution in their home countries due to race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group, and are physically present 
in the United States when asking for protection.426 This indicates that those asylum 
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seekers who arrive without valid documents, without a visa, or who miss the one-year 
deadline to file a petition for asylum, are at great risk of being detained.  
In a context of expanding alien detention, asylum seekers have also become 
victims of the criminalization and securitization paradigms. The government detains 
asylum seekers in different ways. One of these ways is at ports of entry. Between 2007 
and 2008, DHS detained 6,310 asylum seekers attempting to enter the United States.427 
This elevated number is due to expedited removal. Recall from chapter two that the 
government created this summary deportation proceeding in 1996 and broadened its 
reach in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 events.428 Under expedited removal, 
aliens arriving to the United States without proper documents must be summarily 
deported. However, the principle of non refoulment prohibits the United States from 
returning asylum seekers to their home countries if they fear persecution.429  For this 
reason, asylum seekers are placed in mandatory detention until an Asylum Officer or 
Immigration Judge determines that they have a “credible fear of persecution” and allows 
them to apply for parole. Another way in which asylum seekers are detained is in the 
interior of the country. In many cases asylum seekers overstay their visas or do not meet 
the one-year deadline to file the asylum application. Unfortunately, the data on the 
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detention of asylum seekers is incomplete. Under the Haitian Refugee Immigration 
Fairness Act of 1999, Congress requested ICE to release statistics about the detention of 
asylum seekers.430 However, the agency has not provided all the information required. 
The data available are only about the detention of a category of asylum seekers, called 
affirmative asylum seekers.431 According to these, the government detained 487 
affirmative asylum seekers in 2006 and 254 in 2007.432  
Besides asylum seekers, the immigration detention system also places a 
significant number of refugees in custody. The difference between asylum seekers and 
refugees has to do with the location of the individual at the time he or she seeks 
protection. Contrary to asylum seekers, refugees apply for protection outside of the 
United States. If the government considers that they face or fear persecution and if they 
are admissible under immigration law, refugees are allowed to travel to and reside in the 
United States.433 Although it seems that refugees’ situation is more secure than that of 
asylum seekers, a December 2009 report by Human Rights Watch shows that the 
government detains a significant number of them.434 
A variety of reasons make refugees victims of unnecessary detention. First, there 
is a legal inconsistency. On the one hand, the law mandates the detention of refugees who 
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do not adjust their status to permanent residents one year after arriving to the United 
States in order to reassess their immigration status.435 On the other hand, the law prohibits 
refugees from applying for permanent residence before being physically present in the 
country for a year.436 This legal inconsistency is paradoxical, as is the fact that those who 
flee persecution and unrest are placed in detention. Second, recent government policies 
related to refugees’ adjustment of status have increased the grounds for detention. 
Notwithstanding recent reforms, the government stated that section 209(a) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) “not only allows…detention, it mandates it.”437 
This indicates the intention to mandate the detention of refugees who fail to adjust their 
status to legal permanent residents within the one-year deadline. In addition, a 
memorandum issued on November 10, 2009 by the Phoenix (AZ) ICE Field Office 
indicates the tightening of immigration law enforcement. According to Field Office 
Director Katrina Kane, refugees may be placed in removal proceedings before they have 
a chance of applying for a green card.438 Third, refugees have the disadvantage of not 
knowing the particulars of immigration laws. In fact, the interviews Human Rights Watch 
conducted at detention facilities in Arizona and Pennsylvania revealed unawareness 
among refugees of need to adjust their immigration status to legal permanent residence 
within a year of residing in the United States. Coupled with refugees’ unawareness of the 
intricacies of the United States immigration laws, recent policies and perverse legal 
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inconsistencies lead to their arbitrary detention. Such detention places refugees at risk of 
mistreatment and human rights abuses. 
On January 4, 2010, ICE enacted new parole guidelines meant to benefit asylum 
seekers.439 While the changes were positive, they reflect the sorry nature of existent 
policies. Under the new rules, aliens who arrive in the United States and are found to 
have a credible fear of persecution will be automatically considered for parole. In 
addition, the new policy specifies the meaning of “public interest,” an essential term in 
the determination of whether aliens can be paroled. Although these changes may reduce 
the number of asylum seekers who are detained for not having proper documents, many 
asylum seekers and refugees continue to be detained in prison-like facilities. As a 
consequence they face overcrowding, lack of medical treatment, inability to obtain 
outside help and uncertainty.  
Besides asylum seekers and refugees, another case in point is that of United States 
citizens in deportation detention. This paradoxical fact proves that the widespread use of 
detention leads to the unfortunate reality of the state turning against its own citizens. The 
fact that citizens are being detained and deported proves that mass detention is a faulty 
strategy to deal with illegal immigration. In fact, taxpayers’ dollars are put to use not to 
ensure that serious criminal aliens leave the country but to incarcerate and remove 
citizens, victims of persecution and non-criminal aliens. An unpublished study by the 
Vera Institute of Justice shows that in 2006 there were 125 individuals in immigration 
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custody whose attorneys believed had valid claims to United States citizenship.440 In 
February 2008 the American Civil Liberties Union released a statement calling on ICE to 
terminate the deportation of United States citizens.441 The same month, Gary E. Mead, 
Deputy Director of the Office of Detention and Removal Operations of ICE 
acknowledged in a statement before the House Committee on the Judiciary that in some 
cases individuals who have claims to citizenship have been detained.442 Deputy Director 
Mead referred to the study by the Vera Institute of Justice and claimed that detention of 
citizens could only occur when ICE was unable to validate their claims.443 The scandal of 
United States nationals being deported reached such proportion that on September 25, 
2009, Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), introduced a bill to end the removal of citizens. 
The bill, titled “Protect Citizens and Residents from Unlawful Raids and Detention Act” 
(S.3594) died and was reintroduced on July 30, 2009 (S. 1549).  
A significant problem affecting immigration detainees is that, because detention is 
administrative, they have fewer rights and due process protections than criminal 
detainees. For instance, they must procure themselves legal advice at no cost to the 
government. Because they are often subjected to limited visiting hours and are held in 
facilities far from their homes, it is hard for detainees to find, hire and in many cases pay 
for attorneys. It is also hard for citizens to procure the documents they need to prove their 
claims to citizenship. In fact, while the burden of proof falls with ICE for arrests in the 
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interior of the country, the agency’s effort to prove citizenship is limited. As Deputy 
Director Mead explained, ICE only searches the detainee’s file and relevant databases. 
Yet, in many cases this search produces no results, even when the person in question is a 
citizen.  
It becomes evident that a reconsideration of the use of immigration detention as 
an immigration control policy is necessary. Asylum seekers and refugees arrive to the 
United States escaping persecution, torture, prolonged incarceration, and war. They often 
lack command of the English language, economic resources, and knowledge of the 
immigration laws. The government’s policies mandating detention further and deepen 
aliens’ vulnerability. Regrettably, the use of detention leads to the paradoxes of the 
incarceration of those who are fleeing persecution and the incarceration of citizens 
themselves. 
 
5.3. Reconsidering Mass Immigration Detention Will Subdue Its Lasting Psychological 
Consequences  
In addition to the unnecessary incarceration of asylum seekers, refugees, and 
citizens, the practice of immigration detention has lasting consequences on detainees’ 
psyche. Most of the research about this issue focuses on refugees and asylum seekers, 
who are a significantly vulnerable populations. Consider that they are driven out of their 
home countries because of their political ideas, nationality, religious beliefs, or 
membership in particular social groups. Many of them are victims of torture, abuses, 
arbitrary arrests and detentions. It is concerning that the government to which they turn 
seeking protection incarcerates them, sometimes for unclear legal reasons for an 
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undisclosed duration in remote facilities. Because of their vulnerability, and the nature of 
confinement, immigration detention has been proven to have lasting psychological 
impacts.  
The majority of the research about the effects of immigration detention on 
detainees has taken place in Australia and the United Kingdom. It is true that immigration 
detention systems are not comparable across countries. Although Australia enacted a 
policy of mandatory detention of asylum seekers, detention lasts between two and seven 
years and occurs in specific detention centers, some of which are offshore.444 In fact, 
researchers argue that the severity of Australia’s immigration detention system is 
unparalleled when compared to that of other developed countries.445 Nevertheless, 
because of the lack of data on the United States, this section considers research in the 
United Kingdom and Australia.  
Research in Australia shows that immigration detention has a harmful impact on 
asylum seekers’ psyche and that it undermines their precarious mental health.446 As 
victims of persecution who fled their countries, asylum seekers are a traumatized 
population.447 Immigration detention exacerbates their trauma. Detention has harmful 
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effects on adults, families and children. It leads to post-traumatic stress disorder, 
depression, mental health-related disability, and self-harm and suicidal behavior. 
Detention also disrupts family unity and causes illness of parents, and the reversal of 
family roles, whereby children have to look after their parents. Detention also results in 
emotional disturbances in children such as incontinence and food refusal. In addition, 
these effects have proven to be prolonged and to last for several years after the person is 
released into the community. In fact, Leslie Koopowitz and Sotoodeh Abhary argue that 
the effects of immigration detention are comparable to the psychological consequences of 
detention during the last apartheid government in South Africa.448 
Research in the United Kingdom shows similar results as that in Australia. A 
recent article by Katy Robjant, Ian Robbins, and Victoria Senior suggests that 
immigration detention further increases the psychological stress of asylum seekers.449 
The researchers compared levels of depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder 
between a group of detained asylum seekers, a group of asylum seekers who had been 
previously detained for criminal offenses, and a group of asylum seekers who were not in 
detention. The study revealed that detained asylum seekers had higher levels of 
depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder than the other groups.  
In the United States, Physicians for Human Rights and the Bellevue/NYU 
Program for Survivors of Torture studied the health of asylum seekers in detention. The 
report, titled From Persecution to Prison was released in June 2003. It evaluates the 
health status of 70 asylum seekers detained at two immigration detention centers and 
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county jails in the states of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Considering that 
the United States detained more than three thousand asylum seekers in 2008, a study of 
only 70 individuals is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, it echoes the findings of 
researchers in Australia and the United Kingdom. The Physicians for Human Rights’ 
report found “extremely high symptom levels of anxiety, depression and post-traumatic 
stress disorder among detained asylum seekers.”450 The researchers also surveyed the 
availability of health care and the conditions of detention. They conclude “in order to 
promote the health and well-being of asylum seekers, they should not be imprisoned.”451 
This coincides with the overall argument of this thesis: the most effective way to prevent 
violations of illegal aliens’ rights is to reconsider detention. 
Immigration detention is detrimental to detainees’ mental health. It exacerbates 
their fears of being deported and makes it difficult for them to resettle and leave their 
traumatic experiences behind. It may be said that the case of illegal aliens is different 
because they are not escaping torture or persecution. In reality, undocumented aliens face 
significant insecurities that make them vulnerable. Some left everything behind when 
they moved to the United States. Others entered the United States several years ago and 
do not have any support network in their home countries. Others have spouses or children 
in the United States and fear being separated. Detention exacerbates these anxieties and 
drives illegal aliens deeper into the shadow of illegality. Recall that detention fuels the 
criminalization discourse. Due to its reflexive nature, criminalization has a long-lasting 
impact on alien detainees’ identities. Because the perverse psychological impact is a 
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result of detention, neither non-binding nor binding detention standards will mitigate it. 
As long as asylum seekers, refugees, and illegal aliens are indiscriminately detained, they 
will continue to be vulnerable to the perverse long-term effects of detention. For this 
reason, it is imperative that policy-makers reconsider the practice of immigration 
detention. 
 
5.4. Reconsidering Mass Immigration Detention Will Reduce Cost to Taxpayers 
Thus far, this chapter has argued that the government must reconsider the use of 
detention as an immigration control policy for three reasons. First, it is necessary to move 
beyond the short-term strategies that advocates for binding detention standards promote. 
In other words, binding standards are not a long-lasting remedy to ongoing human rights 
abuses of alien detainees but only a temporary fix. Second, the practice of detaining 
undocumented aliens casts its net over asylum seekers, refugees and citizens. Third, 
immigration detention has an adverse impact on detainees’ mental health. This section 
presents a fourth argument in favor of discontinuing the use of immigration detention and 
returning to pre-1996 immigration policies. The following paragraphs demonstrate that 
policy makers should reconsider detention because the practice is costly to taxpayers. 
Immigration detention is an unnecessary expenditure in the case of non-criminal 
detainees, asylum seekers and refugees, and it is more expensive than ATD. Before the 
analysis, it is important to underscore that the economics of immigration and immigration 
detention are extensive fields of research. Because advocates and experts often use 
diverse sets of data from different years, this section relies solely on official data when 
possible. Third-party reports are used only when they are based on ICE’s figures or when 
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there is consensus and there are no official figures available. The argument that, because 
of its high cost, the government should reconsider the practice of detention has two parts.  
In first place there is the cost of detention proper. According to a National 
Immigration Forum study, the daily cost per alien detainee is $141 dollars.452 This 
includes the renting of bed space and ICE operational expenses. However, according to 
Dr. Schriro’s October 2009 report, the per diem rate of $141 does not account for certain 
costs of detention.453 For instance, one of these costs is the medical care that the Division 
of Immigration Health Services (DIHS) provides. The annual cost of immigration 
detention is even more alarming than the per diem rates. Multiplying $141 times the daily 
number of detainees, which on September 1, 2009 was 31,075, the annual cost to 
taxpayers of immigration detention is $1.5 billion dollars. In fact, ICE’s budget for 
custody operations in 2010 is $1.77 billion dollars. The historical evolution of ICE’s 
detention budget is also dismal.454 ICE’s budget for custody operations has doubled 
between 2003 and 2010.455 
The dollars that taxpayers spend in detaining asylum seekers, refugees, and 
criminal and non-criminal aliens were a salvation for private prison operators. According 
to Michele Deitch, an expert on prison privatization, the federal government rescued the 
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industry from bankruptcy in the late 1990s.456 For the government, economic incentives 
are the reasons why private facilities are attractive.457 The two main firms in this field are 
the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and the Wackenhut Corporation, now 
called the GEO Group. ICE, the United States Marshals Service, and the Bureau of 
Prisons have contracts with them. Each firm earns over ten percent of its revenue from 
contracts with ICE.458 In 2009, motivated by the lower cost of detaining aliens in private 
facilities, the government moved to completely privatize immigration detention. Its 
argument was based on economic incentives and the fact that ICE only owns and operates 
eight facilities. The Senate allowed ICE to complete privatization.459 However, the House 
of Representatives rejected the project on the grounds that ICE needs to demonstrate an 
ability to adequately provide for medical care and effectively supervise its facilities.460 
The final Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010 establishes that 
ICE shall not continue contracts with private facilities if in the last two evaluations these 
receive a score of less than “adequate.”461 The Act also stipulates that there will be no 
less than 33,400 detention beds until September 2010.462 While Congress did not allow 
ICE to fully privatize immigration detention, ICE’s attempt to sell its Service Processing 
Centers suggests that economics trumps concern about conditions of detention and 
monitoring of immigration detention facilities. In short, immigration detention is 
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undeniably an expensive practice. In 2010, taxpayers are footing a bill of $1.77 billion 
dollars to incarcerate non-criminal illegal aliens. Are there any alternatives? 
 
5.5. Beyond Mass Immigration Detention  
The analysis above established that in light of the high humanitarian and 
economic cost of mass immigration detention, and because this practice creates distrust 
of the government among the immigrant community, fractures the nation, and 
exacerbates ethnic tensions, policy-makers should dismantle mass immigration detention. 
Yet, this policy-analysis would not be complete if it remained silent about the way 
forward after mass immigration detention. For this reason, this last section argues that, 
together with the abolition of mass immigration detention, policy-makers should enhance 
and expand alternative to detention programs. Recall from section 5.1. that the use of 
ATD must be a substitute and not a complement of mass immigration detention. 
While criminalization and securitization have lent support to the idea that illegal 
aliens are criminals and pose a threat to the nation, immigration detention statistics offer 
a different picture. Consider the figures that Dr. Schriro provides in her report about 
immigration detention: of the total number of detainees, 31,075 in September 1, 2009, 49 
percent were not criminals, and of the remaining 51 percent, only 11 percent were serious 
criminals, namely aliens who committed UCR Part 1 crimes such as murder.463 For this 
reason, once mass immigration detention is abolished, ICE could monitor practically half 
of its detainees through ATD schemes.  
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 Currently, there are three ATD programs.464 Intense Supervision Appearance 
Program (ISAP) is privately run and consists of an arrangement of telephonic reporting, 
radio frequency and global positioning tracking, unannounced home visits, curfew 
checks, and employment verification. Enhanced Supervision Reporting (ESR), also 
privately run, is less restrictive and less costly. Electronic Monitoring (EM) is operated 
by ICE and relies on telephonic reporting, radio frequency and global positioning 
tracking. The use of ATD is more humane than incarceration and economically more 
attractive. Although official figures for the per capita costs of each program are not 
available, experts argue that the daily per capita cost is between $12 and $22 dollars.465 
This means that ATD programs cost approximately one tenth of immigration detention.  
Consider the advantage in using ATD for asylum seekers vis-à-vis detention. The 
last available comprehensive statistics related to the detention of asylum seekers are for 
fiscal year 2006. That year, ICE detained 487 asylum seekers who asked for protection 
after entering the United States (affirmative asylum), 257 asylum seekers who had met 
the credible fear interview, and 5,017 persons who asked for asylum after being detained 
for immigration violations (defensive asylum). Recall that defensive asylum means that 
the person asks for asylum after he or she has been placed in removal proceedings. The 
average stay for affirmative asylum applicants was 46.9 days, for those who had had the 
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credible fear interview it was 48.1, and for those who had defensive asylum cases it was 
109.1 days. Multiplying the number of applicants that were eventually granted asylum by 
the daily cost of detention, it is possible to calculate the total cost of detaining asylum 
seekers in a particular year. In fiscal year 2006, the taxpayers paid $18 million dollars to 
detain asylum seekers. One important caveat about this calculation is that the data for 
asylum seeker detention are from 2006 and that the figure for the cost of detention ($141 
per capita, per day) are for 2009. Notwithstanding this mismatch, it is clear that taxpayers 
spent a significant amount of their money to incarcerate asylum seekers. Using the 
highest imputed daily cost of ATD of $22 per person, had the government allowed these 
asylum seekers to participate in one of these programs, taxpayers would have only spent 
$2.9 million dollars. The use of detention rather than ATD programs cost the taxpayers 
an extra $15 million dollars. While these calculations may be deemed inaccurate due to 
the lack of up to date information, what matters is the message they convey. In brief, the 
use of immigration detention instead of alternatives to detention is costly and, in the case 
of asylum seekers and non-criminal aliens, it is a misuse of tax dollars.  
While current ATD programs have humanitarian and economic advantages, they 
face three significant limitations: lack of funding, technical limitations, and the 
unwillingness on the part of DHS to expand these schemes. In terms of funding, the 
distribution of resources between detention operations and ATDs schemes is 
staggering.466 For fiscal year 2010, while DRO allocated 69.4 percent of its budget to 
detention operations, the agency allotted only 2.5 percent to ATD programs. It may be 
said that because ATD schemes and alien detention have different per capita costs, the 
allocation of resources will per force be uneven. Yet, it is clear that ATD programs are 
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not a priority for ICE in terms of funds allocation. In fact, such eschewed allocation of 
economic resources has repeated itself ever year since 2005. For fiscal year 2005, DRO 
allocated only 1 percent of its budget to ATD.  
Because of funding limitations, ATD programs suffer from technological 
limitations. In fact, two of the three ATD programs are only available within a limited 
distance from ICE’s twenty-four field offices. As Dr. Schriro indicates in her October 
2009 report, ISAP and ESR are available only within a fifty to eighty-five mile radius 
from field offices.467 For this reason, EM is the only scheme available to aliens who live 
beyond such radii. Yet, EM can accommodate only 5,000 aliens per day. For this reason, 
if policy-makers are to end mass immigration detention and turn instead to ATD 
programs, they will have to allocate more funding to enhance the existent programs and 
increase the number of aliens who can participate.  
In addition to economic and technological limitations, DHS attitude constrains the 
use of ATD programs. Although DHS and ICE have vowed to expand ATD, their deeds 
indicate that the agencies are reluctant to do so. DHS failed to meet the deadline of 
January 5, 2009 for submitting a plan to implement ATD nationwide, as the DHS 
Appropriations Act for 2009 required.468For this reason, in its June 2009 report on DHS 
appropriations for fiscal year 2010, the House of Representatives expressed concern that 
the agency had failed to implement ATD schemes nationwide.469 Thus, ICE included the 
development of a strategy to implement ATD nationwide in the reforms announced in 
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August 2009.470 Yet, the agency has not taken any concrete steps. In light of DHS and 
ICE’s failure act, Congress required that the agencies make ATD nationally available to 
illegal aliens in the 2010 Appropriations Act for DHS, yet this time Congress did not set 
a deadline.471 Although the politics of ATD are beyond the scope of this thesis, DHS’s 
reluctance to expand these programs is clear. The criminalization and securitization 
discourses help understand such reluctance, which is puzzling at first because ATD are 
convenient from economic and humanitarian perspectives. It is for this reason that the 
development of ATD must be accompanied by the termination of mass immigration 
detention. 
Because on September 1, 2009 there were 19,160 aliens participating in ATD 
programs, it may be argued that three aforementioned obstacles are not significant. 
Nonetheless, if policy-makers were to make ATD available to all non-criminal detainees, 
they would have to roughly double the current capacity of the programs. Consider the 
following: According to Dr. Schriro, forty-nine percent of the 31,075 aliens who were in 
ICE custody on September 1, 2009 were not criminals. That translates as approximately 
15,226 aliens who could have been enrolled in an ATD program. This calculation does 
not include aliens who have minor crimes or minor misdemeanors. Again, recall that only 
eleven percent of the aliens who were in detention on September 1, 2009 had been found 
guilty of serious crimes. For this reason, if policy-makers abolish mass immigration 
detention, DHS must at least double the capacity of ATD schemes. Currently, the number 
of aliens who can participate in those programs remains limited: ISAP has a capacity for 
                                                 
470
 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “2009 Detention Reform.” 
471
 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2010, Public Law 111-83, U.S. Statutes at Large 
123 (2009), 2142, 2149. 
 161 
6,000 aliens per day, ESR for 7,000, and EM for 5,000.472 Notably, while the daily 
capacity is 18,000 aliens, Dr. Schriro stated in her report that on September 1, 2009 there 
were 19,160 aliens on ATD programs. This discrepancy suggests that the lack of accurate 
information, a negative outcome of ICE’s decentralized structure, or the fact that the 
system is overwhelmed and needs expansion. 
This concluding section has argued that, once policy-makers abolish mass 
immigration detention, the use of ATD is the way forward. It has also suggested that the 
termination of mass immigration detention is inseparable of ATD. Unless non-criminal 
illegal aliens and aliens with minor misdemeanors, for which they have already paid, are 
taken out of the criminal sphere, American taxpayers will continue funding a practice that 
leads to human rights violations and to the incarceration of vulnerable populations and 
citizens. This will be the case because detention reinforces the criminalization and 
securitization paradigm: the higher the number of illegal aliens in detention, the more 
dangerous they seem. For this reason, the termination of mass immigration detention is 
fundamental to dismantle the criminalization and securitization logics. 
While policy-makers must spearhead the change in immigration detention 
policies, human right advocates and civil society in general will play a fundamental role. 
In the path towards the abolition of mass immigration detention immigrant advocates and 
civil society are fundamental in changing the public perception of illegal aliens. In this 
respect, campaigns that emphasize the positive impact of immigration on the United 
States are fundamental. A concrete example of this sort of action is The Advocates for 
Human Rights’ campaign Energy of a Nation, which emphasizes the contributions of 
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immigrants to the United States.473 Utilizing this type of argument, advocates will 
facilitate the work of policy-makers by emphasizing the benefits of abolishing mass 
immigration detention. For instance, the facts that criminalization and securitization drive 
illegal aliens deeper into the underground and the informal sector and that mass 
immigration detention other illegal aliens and ostracizes the immigrant community, thus 
fracturing the nation. Although illegal aliens are different from legal immigrants, a 
change in public opinion favorable to immigrants will help de-criminalize illegal aliens.  
Yet, because, as Mertus indicates non-governmental organizations remain outside 
of the real of policy-making and implementation, policy-makers must take the crucial 
step of ending mass immigration detention, which is the most effective strategy to protect 
illegal aliens’ human and constitutional rights. Recall that chapter one utilized Mertus’s 
analysis to explain the limited impact of international human rights norms on 
immigration detention policies and practices in the United States. Although Mertus is 
concerned principally with United States foreign policy, her analysis is compelling and 
relevant to this thesis. In her book Bait and Switch, she argues that human rights norms 
matter, and that although American exceptionalism has limited their impact on foreign 
policy, due to the work of civil society human rights remains a rhetorically available 
framework in the United States.474 While Mertus recognizes the importance of human 
rights advocates and civil society in protecting human rights ideas, she acknowledges that 
those groups face a “Sisyphean struggle” and will triumph only when human rights 
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become embedded in United States’ interests, ideas and expectations.475 Thus, civil 
society has an important role in supporting policies that terminate mass immigration 
detention. Nonetheless, unless policy-makers introduce changes, immigrant rights 
advocates will continue to roll their boulder up the cliff day in and day out. 
As the conclusion to this thesis, this chapter identified four reasons why policy 
makers ought to reconsider the practice of immigration detention. First, the strategy of 
seeking binding standards is not likely to solve the problems that immigration detention 
creates in terms of the mistreatment of detainees. Second, the practice of immigration 
detention is undesirable because it is harmful to asylum seekers, refugees, and even 
United States citizens. Third, immigration detention has negative lasting consequences on 
detainees’ mental health and nurtures the criminalization complex. Fourth, because 
approximately half of the detention population is not criminal, detention is economically 
unwise and costly compared to its alternatives. Since the Obama administration took 
office, a breeze of change has begun to blow. The immigration agencies have 
acknowledged some of the issues besetting the immigration detention system and have 
promised change. Policy makers now have the challenge and the opportunity to solve the 
problems that cloud immigration detention. After twelve years of false starts, a good way 
to begin would be with the question: Why mass immigration detention? 
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